# Freud and Education

# I. The scientific approach to education

To educate is to act with a certain purpose. Every educator, conscious of his task, will have to answer two questions: what is the aim of my action? and what is the best way to reach this aim?

Consequently, education covers two large areas: that of the purpose and that of the means. Moreover, one should note that, when education gives an answer to the first question, this implies certain solutions to the second problem, viz. that of the means.

Pedagogy, as the science of education, will have a double character: it will be normative, in so far as it sets an end for action, and practical, in so far as it describes the means to attain the ends that were set.

The double aspect of pedagogy immediately brings about some difficulties — and the same can be said of ethics! To some educators the normative character of education suffices to state that science, here psychoanalysis, has nothing to say about it (1). Science describes and explains facts, but it cannot set norms, because they are not to be found empirically (2). This assumption makes every scientific research in the field of education impossible. It supposes that pedagogy in its normative sense is a branch of philosophy, or rather of philosophical speculation, which in its turn misses every scientific character. The sterility of such a view on education cannot be better illustrated than by quoting Prof. Apostel's words (3), which were meant for ethics, but which can readily be applied to pedagogy as well: "And here perhaps we may afford one of the few polemic remarks we want to make in this exposition: he who has understood how fundamentally

<sup>(1)</sup> Kobi, E. E., Vom Einfluss der Freud'schen Psychoanalyse auf die Pädagogik, Schweizer Erziehungs-Rundschau, 37. Jg. (1964), 3, pp. 45-49.

<sup>(2)</sup> Dejung, B., Vom Einfluss der Freud'schen Psychoanalyse auf die Pädagogik, Schweizer Erziehungs-Rundschau, 37. Jg. (1965), 11, p. 249.

<sup>(3)</sup> Apostel, L., De pluralistische grondslagen van de moraalwetenschap, (The pluralistic bases of moral science), in *Problemen rond de moraalwetenschap*, Rijksuniversiteit Gent, 1965, pp. 69-126. We have translated this text from p. 84 with the author's permission.

practical, near to life and experimental ethics is as a science cannot but deeply deplore that in this field, in this applied science, work is so often done by persons who have not solved their own problems and who do not even recognize them as their own conflicts, but project them as eternal structures of man or even as those of the universe upon humanity and the world. By making this fundamental mistake they not only hamper their own insight and recovery, but also — and this is far worse — prevent other people from keeping their own difficulties at the necessary objective distance and thus overcoming them. Much of the classical ethical literature belongs to this dangerous kind of work, which emotionally carries us along, but obscures rational insight in ourselves.

Only truly constructive and durable action in the world of reality — at the same time social, psychical, biological and cosmological — can refrain the moralist from perishing from this occupational disease."

And so we come to a second approach of education. Education is directed towards action. In a broad sense it designates "all measures applied by adults, expert or non-expert, teachers and parents, to influence the behavior of the growing child in a desirable way" (4). It seems evident that in order to influence someone's behaviour in a certain direction, one does not only have to take into account the desirabilities, but also the possibilities of the growing child and of the educator. Education includes the child and the educator who live in a particular frame. A philosophy of education which wishes to be of some value for the practice of education, will have to take this reality into consideration, as it determines the possibilities of present and future action. If education wants to influence human behaviour, then pedagogy most certainly is to be based upon a knowledge of that behaviour. This knowledge, if it is to be reliable, cannot but be the result of scientific research in different fields. Only when science has gathered sufficient knowledge in all these fields can one start to think of an answer to this question: how could this behaviour be made different from what it is now? And only later still the desirability of such a changed behaviour can be investigated. To our mind the ethical or normative questions may be of paramount importance in education, but the answers to these questions come chronologically last, because they cannot be answered properly, unless other problems have been solved.

<sup>(4)</sup> Kris, E., On Psychoanalysis and Education, Amer. Journ. of Orthopsych., XVIII (1948), 4, p. 622. This definition may give the impression that all educational measures are carefully premeditated. This, of course, is not always the case as an eminent psychoanalyst as Kris most certainly knows. A lot of education is unintentional (unconscious) as we shall see later when speaking of the unconscious determination of behaviour.

This implies that norms can be found empirically, viz. in the study of the developing child, of the educator and of the world in which they live.

In keeping with these preliminary remarks the study of Freud's work may prove to be of some importance for pedagogy, as it contains definite views on human behaviour and the ways to change it. It can be objected that the psychoanalytic method has no real scientific value. We shall not enter into this crucial problem here. It has been — and still is — a topic of discussion in numerous publications (5).

We simply start from the fact that Freud's ideas have had a tremendous influence upon scientific thought in various fields and that pedagogy cannot pass by his theories without a systematic investigation of them, which to our knowledge is still lacking. It is most surprising indeed to see how many educators up to our days "quote" Freud and condemn him or his pedagogical value without having read his original texts. The present study aims at an objective and systematic approach of Freud's works as to their pedagogical meaning. Therefore we shall to the utmost confine ourselves to the original sources.

## II. The purpose of education

#### 1. Psychotherapy and education

"Die Erziehungsarbeit ist etwas sui generis, das nicht mit psychoanalytischer Beeinflussung verwechselt und nicht durch sie ersetzt werden kann" (6) and "Mein persönlicher Anteil an dieser (= der pädagogischen) Anwendung der Psychoanalyse ist sehr geringfügig gewesen. Ich hätte mir frühzeitig das Scherzwort von den drei unmöglichen Berufen — als da sind: Erziehen, Kurieren, Regieren — zu eigen gemacht, war auch von der mittleren dieser Aufgaben hinreichend in Anspruch genommen" (7). Do not

<sup>(5)</sup> Cfr. De Waele, J.-P., Zur Frage der empirischen Bestätigung psychoanalytischer Grundannahmen, Zeitschrift für Psychologie, Bd. 165 (1961), pp. 90-134. References to publications on this subject up to 1960 are found in this article.

<sup>(6)</sup> Freud, S., Geleitwort zu "Verwahrloste Jugend" von A. Aichhorn, in Gesammelte Werke (= GW.) chronologisch geordnet, London, 1940-52, 18 vols., XIV, p. 566. We had gathered the material for this article from the GW., before we intended to publish it in English. We therefore apologize for the fact that all our quotations are from the original German text. To provide some means of control we shall always add to our quotations the title of the work from which we quoted,

<sup>(7)</sup> Ibid., p. 565.

54 J. Buelens

these words which Freud wrote in 1925 contradict our point of view and are we not looking for something that is not to be found in Freud's writings?

The lack of a systematic treatment of education does not necessarily imply that Freud has nothing to say on the subject: his views on child psychology, on neurotic illnesses, on man in general and on culture and society make it possible to draw some conclusions in the field of education.

Freud in the first place was a physician, and in particular a psychotherapist. The general purpose of medicine can be easily formulated: health, i.e. according to Freud "Leistungs- und Genussfähigkeit" (8). Next to this general purpose of medicine Freud had set himself a more specific aim as a psychotherapist. This aim is expressed in the formula "psychic health", i.e. prevalence of the preconscious on the unconscious (9). Indeed, the degree of submission of the unconscious to the preconscious determines the degree of our mental normality (10). To mark the difference between the unconscious and the preconscious let it suffice to say that an unconscious representation is made of any material, which remains unknown, while a preconscious conception has connections with verbal representations (especially acoustic perceptions) (11). The unconscious contains the drives, while the preconscious is the seat of the intellect. The method Freud invented to make the unconscious conscious, i.e. psychoanalysis, was defined by him as a "Nacherziehung zur Ueberwindung innerer Widerstände" (12). Indeed, the unconscious on becoming conscious brings about feelings of pain and thus resistance arises between the two systems.

Let us put things clearly: the psychotherapist is also an educator, but he is only called upon when things have gone wrong and consequently had better be termed a reeducator. The difference between psychotherapist and educator is not to be found in the fact that the former has got nothing to do with education, whereas the latter has, but in the different character of their educational task. Freud put it this way: "Man darf sich nicht durch die übrigens vollberechtigte Aussage irreleiten lassen, die Psychoanalyse des erwachsenen Neurotikers sei einer Nacherziehung desselben gleichzustellen. Ein Kind (...) ist eben noch kein Neurotiker und Nacherziehung etwas ganz anderes als Erziehung des Unfertigen. Die Möglichkeit

<sup>(8)</sup> Die Freudsche psychoanalytische Methode, GW. V, p. 8; Ueber neurotische Erkrankungstypen, GW. VIII, p. 327; Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, GW. XI, pp. 472, 476.

<sup>(9)</sup> Die Traumdeutung, GW. II-III, p. 584.

<sup>(10)</sup> Ibid., p. 587; Die Freudsche psychoanalytische Methode, GW. V, p. 8.

<sup>(11)</sup> Das Unbewusste, GW. X, pp. 287-8; Das Ich und das Es, GW. XIII, p. 247.

<sup>(12)</sup> Ueber Psychotherapie, GW. V, p. 25.

der analytischen Beeinflussung ruht auf ganz bestimmten Voraussetzungen, die man als 'analytische Situation' zusammenfassen kann, erfordert die Ausbildung gewisser psychischer Strukturen, eine besondere Einstellung zum Analytiker. Wo diese fehlen, wie beim Kind, (...) muss man etwas anderes machen als Analyse, was dann in der Absicht wieder mit ihr zusammentrifft" (13).

Thus education is quite different from psychotherapy because it has to do with other subjects and will have to use other methods, but its purpose is the same: prevalence of the preconscious on the unconscious. Psychotherapy wants to influence thought and by way of thought behaviour.

How can this conclusion be brought into line with the opinion that psychoanalysis does not want to interfere with the patient's view of the world? There is indeed some contradiction in Freud's own statements. He writes for instance in his "Wege der psychoanalytischen Therapie" (1918): "Wir können es nicht vermeiden, auch Patienten aufzunehmen, die so haltlos und existenzunfähig sind, dass man bei ihnen die analytische Beeinflussung mit der erzieherischen vereinigen muss, und auch bei den meisten anderen wird sich hie und da eine Gelegenheit ergeben, wo der Arzt als Erzieher und Ratgeber aufzutreten genötigt ist. Aber dies soll jedesmal mit grosser Schonung geschehen, und der Kranke soll nicht zur Aehnlichkeit mit uns, sondern zur Befreiung und Vollendung seines eigenen Wesens erzogen werden.

Unser verehrter Freund J. Putnam in dem uns jetzt so feindlichen Amerika muss es uns verzeihen, wenn wir auch seine Forderung nicht annehmen können, die Psychoanalyse möge sich in den Dienst einer bestimmten philosophischen Weltanschauung stellen und diese dem Patienten zum Zweck seiner Veredlung aufdrängen. Ich möchte sagen, dies ist doch nur Gewaltsamkeit, wenn auch durch die edelsten Absichten gedeckt" (14) and further "Aber wie immer sich auch diese Psychotherapie fürs Volk gestalten, aus welchen Elementen sie sich auch zusammensetzen mag, ihre wirksamsten und wichtigsten Bestandteile werden gewiss die bleiben, die von der strengen, der tendenzlosen Psychoanalyse entlehnt worden sind" (15).

But next to this rejection of philosophical directing or influencing by way of psychoanalysis we find in 1909: "Eine Psychoanalyse ist eben keine tendenzlose, wissenschaftliche Untersuchung, sondern ein therapeutischer Eingriff; sie will an sich nichts beweisen, sondern nur etwas ändern" (16),

<sup>(13)</sup> Geleitwort zu "Verwahrloste Jugend", GW. XIV, p. 566.

<sup>(14)</sup> GW. XII, pp. 190-1.

<sup>(15)</sup> Ibid., pp. 193-4. Our italics.

<sup>(16)</sup> Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben, GW. VII, p. 339. Our italics.

56 J. Buelens

and the even stronger expression in 1895: "Man wirkt, so gut man kann, als Aufklärer, wo die Ignoranz eine Scheu erzeugt hat, als Lehrer, als Vertreter einer freieren oder überlegenen Weltauffassung, als Beichthörer, der durch die Fortdauer seiner Teilnahme und seiner Achtung nach abgelegtem Geständnisse gleichsam Absolution erteilt; man sucht dem Kranken menschlich etwas zu leisten, soweit der Umfang der eigenen Persönlichkeit und das Mass von Sympathie, das man für den betreffenden Fall aufbringen kann, dies gestatten" (17).

It can be argued here that there is not necessarily a contradiction in Freud's opinions, but that they changed in the course of time. However, this argument is not completely to be held: the strongest expression in favour of exercising philosophical and moral influence on the patient by way of psychoanalysis is to be found in a very early work, but also in his later works (e.g. "Die Zukunft einer Illusion" (1927), "Das Unbehagen in der Kultur" (1930)) Freud repeatedly confines himself to a philosophical position, although one has to admit that he became much more careful as to the relation psychoanalyst-patient.

Another explanation of this contradiction is possible. The contradiction is rooted in Freud's own thought, viz. in the tension between his need for a reliable, i.e. scientific, view of the world and his rejection of the existing, unreliable, i.e. non-scientific, view of the world. Arguments for this thesis can be found in the fact that already as a student Freud had a more than ordinary interest in philosophy. As a matter of fact he attended as a medical student for several semesters the non-obligatory courses of philosophy in Brentano's seminar (18). His sarcastic rejection of speculative philosophy is worded in a text as: "Ich bin überhaupt nicht für die Fabrikation von Weltanschauungen. Die überlasse man den Philosophen, die eingestandenermassen die Lebensreise ohne einen solchen Baedeker, der über alles Auskunft gibt, nicht ausführbar finden. Nehmen wir demütig die Verachtung auf uns, mit der die Philosophen vom Standpunkt ihrer höheren Bedürftigkeit auf uns herabschauen. Da auch wir unseren narzisstischen Stolz nicht verleugnen können, wollen wir unseren Trost in der Erwägung suchen, dass alle diese "Lebensführer" rasch veralten, dass es gerade unsere kurzsichtig beschränkte Kleinarbeit ist, welche deren Neuauflagen notwendig macht, und dass selbst die modernsten dieser Baedeker Versuche sind, den alten, so bequemen und so vollständigen Katechismus zu ersetzen. Wir wissen genau, wie wenig Licht die Wissenschaft bisher über die Rätsel

<sup>(17)</sup> Studien über Hysterie, GW. I, p. 285.

<sup>(18)</sup> Cfr. Jones, E., Sigmund Freud, Life and Work, London, The Hogarth Press, 1956-7, 3 vols., I, pp. 41-2 and 61-2.

dieser Welt verbreiten könnte; alles Poltern der Philosophen kann daran nicht ändern, nur geduldige Fortsetzung der Arbeit, die alles der einen Forderung nach Gewissheit unterordnet, kann langsam Wandel schaffen" (19).

But already in this text and in many more (20) Freud expressed his need for and belief in a scientific view of the world and the force of human mind which will finally overcome the problems that are still emotionally solved. It could be argued that Freud's work consisted for a large part of an attempt to prove his thesis: humanity slowly develops, analogous to individual libidinal development, from an animistic via a religious to a scientific view of the world (21). A depreciation of the first and second phases of this development compared to the third is evident in Freud's mind.

All this goes to prove that Freud had a need to propagate a view of the world by way of psychoanalysis, but his scientific honesty and integrity (22) kept him from going any further than an analysis of facts allowed him to do.

# 2. The purpose of education (I).

After the above-cited remarks it will not be astonishing to find in Freud's writings opinions on education and its purpose as he derived them from his study of man. For the first time Freud explicitly stated the aim of education as follows: "Sie (= die Erziehung) hat sich bisher immer nur die Beherrschung oft richtiger Unterdrückung der Triebe zur Aufgabe gestellt; der Erfolg war kein befriedigender und dort, wo es gelang, geschah es zum Vorteil einer kleinen Anzahl bevorzugter Menschen, von denen Triebunterdrückung nicht gefordert wird. Man fragte auch nicht danach, auf welchem Wege und mit welchen Opfern die Unterdrückung der unbequemen Triebe erreicht wurde. Substituiert man dieser Aufgabe eine andere, das Individuum mit der geringsten Einbusse an seiner Aktivität kulturfähig und sozial verwertbar zu machen, so haben die durch die Psychoanalyse gewonnenen Aufklärungen über die Herkunft der pathogenen Komplexe und über den Kern einer jeden Neurose eigentlich den Anspruch, vom Erzieher als unschätzbare Winke für sein Benehmen gegen das Kind gewürdigt zu werden. Welche praktischen Schlüsse sich hieraus ergeben, und inwieweit die Erfahrung die Anwendung derselben innerhalb unserer sozialen Verhältnisse

<sup>(19)</sup> Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, GW. XIV, p. 123.

<sup>(20)</sup> See a.o. GW. VIII, p. 111; XIV, pp. 377, 379, 380; XV, p. 197.

<sup>(21)</sup> Totem und Tabu, GW. IX, p. 111.

<sup>(22)</sup> See his letter to O. Pfister, in Jones, E., o.c., II, p. 506.

rechtfertigen kann, dies überlasse ich anderen zur Erprobung und Entscheidung" (23).

In the positive part of this text Freud suggests that education should make the individual "mit der geringsten Einbusse an seiner Aktivität kulturfähig und sozial verwertbar". L. Peller (24) did not agree with the way the text was rendered in English, as she cites it from the Collected Papers (25). She suggests the following translation: "to enable the individual to take part in culture and to achieve this with the smallest loss of original energy" (26). Unfortunately Miss Peller cites the original text incompletely and incorrectly. Moreover, we do not agree with her when she thinks it necessary to stress the importance of the word "activity" and translates it into "original energy". When we reconsider Freud's definition of health, viz. "im ganzen uneingeschränkte Leistungs- und Genussfähigkeit" (27) the analogy is obvious between the first part of the latter definition with the former of the educational purpose: "mit der geringsten Einbusse an Aktivität". We think that "Aktivität" and "Leistungsfähigkeit" may be supposed to denote one and the same thing, viz. activity.

The other, and to our mind more important terms ("genuss-, kultur-fähig, sozial verwertbar") are not further specified in Freud's text. However, we can find other passages in his works, from which we may learn more about them.

According to Freud culture is the result of the individual's inhibition of his drives (28). Individual wishes and social demands are in direct opposition (29), which gives rise to the "Unbehagen in der Kultur". This inhibition may go so far as to eventually bring along an impoverishment of the ego and even neurosis (30).

On correlating these views, viz. that education should enable the individual to take part in culture, and that in order to take part in culture the individual should inhibit his drives, we come to the puzzling conclusion

- (23) Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben, GW. VII, pp. 376-7.
- (24) Peller, L., The School's Role in Promoting Sublimation, *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, XI (1956), pp. 437-449.
- (25) Cfr. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, II (1946), p. 397. The English text runs as follows: "Supposing now that we substitute another task for this one, and aim instead at making the individual capable of becoming a civilized and useful member of society with the least possible sacrifice of his own activity."
  - (26) Peller, L., o.c., p. 448.
  - (27) GW. VIII, p. 327.
  - (28) Die "kulturelle" Sexualmoral und die moderne Nervosität, GW. VII, p. 149.
  - (29) Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, GW. XIV, p. 455.
- (30) Die zukünftigen Chancen der psychoanalytischen Therapie, GW. VIII, p. 109; Die "kulturelle" Sexualmoral und die moderne Nervosität, GW. VII, p. 154.

that what Freud claims to be the purpose of education is what he rejected in the same text, viz. the inhibition of drives!

The only way out can be found by considering Freud's views on culture and society in his time (31): it is evident that he thought of culture as being far too repressive and wanted society to be more tolerant in the matter of morals. The final sentence of the quotation at the head of this paragraph, is relevant for Freud's scepticism as to the practical applicability of his theories in the society of his time. Moreover, in 1910 on the second private congress of psychoanalysts in Nuremberg he explicitly stated that psychoanalysis clearly showed that social reforms were necessary in this society (32). In what direction these reforms should go we can but indirectly derive from other texts (see section III, § 2.3).

The general principle, on which social relations should be based, is "Wahrheit" or "Wahrhaftigkeit" (33), a demand Freud had already made for psychoanalytic treatment from its very beginning (34). This honesty in dealing with others should begin with personal honesty (35) and can only be attained when the intellect (= the preconscious) prevails on the unconscious. Thus the purpose of education and psychotherapy completely coincide and we are back from where we started: the prevalence of the preconscious on the unconscious is as well the aim of psychotherapy as that of education.

# 3. The purpose of education (II)

In 1910 Freud gave another definition of education and its purpose: "Die Erziehung kann ohne weitere Bedenken als Anregung zur Ueberwindung des Lustprinzips, zur Ersetzung desselben durch das Realitätsprinzip beschrieben werden; sie will also jenem das Ich betreffenden Prozess eine Nachhilfe bieten" (86). Some explanations of Freud's views on

- (31) The terms "culture" and "society" are often used promiscuously in Freud's writings. Consequently, "kulturfähig" and "sozial verwertbar" cannot easily be distinguished. We cannot refer to any text by Freud on which a distinction between these two could be soundly based. Cfr. footnote (84).
  - (32) Die zukünftigen Chancen der psychoanalytischen Therapie, GW. VIII, p. 115.
- (33) Ibid.; Zeitgemässes über Krieg und Tod, GW. X, p. 340; Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, GW. XI, p. 450.
  - (34) Ueber Psychotherapie, GW. V, p. 19.
- (35) Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, GW. XI, p. 451. Cfr. the reality principle!
- (36) Formulierungen über zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens, GW. VIII, p. 236.

mental functioning will be required in order to understand the meaning of this second definition.

In the unconscious the so-called primary processes take place. Their action is regulated by the pleasure principle, i.e. these processes strive at gaining pleasure and avoiding pain. Pleasure is experienced when tension in the system decreases, pain when it increases. Psychical activity shrinks from acts which could give rise to feelings of pain (37). The state of psychical rest, i.e. the total lack of tension, the so-called Nirvana principle, was originally disturbed by internal needs. In order to reduce this tension the things wished for appear as hallucinations: the unconscious can do nothing but wish. However, as the expected satisfaction did not come about by hallucinatory wish-fulfilment the necessity to take into account the reality (38) of the external world was introduced. Satisfaction only became possible by action, in its turn prepared by thought: the primary processes governing the unconscious are replaced by the secondary processes of the preconscious. This introduces the reality principle: what is pleasant, is no longer only represented, but also what is real, even if it would prove to be unpleasant (39).

The consequences of the introduction of the reality principle are considerable: perception, and so consciousness, which is linked to it, become important; judgment, which has to decide whether a representation is true or false, i.e. in accordance with reality or not, replaces repression; thought as a preparation for action, i.e. the changing of reality, grows in importance and enables the subject to tolerate tension temporarily. Whereas the pleasure principle can do nothing but wish, the reality principle strives at utility: it does not replace the pleasure principle, but confirms a later, certain pleasure instead of the momentary pleasure which is uncertain because of its possible consequences (40).

Let us now return to the second definition Freud gave of the purpose of education: the pleasure principle has to be replaced by the reality prin-

<sup>(37)</sup> Ibid., p. 231. The German "Unlust" is rendered in English publications as well by "pain" as by "unpleasure".

<sup>(38)</sup> The concept of reality as well as other concepts, have had different meanings in psychoanalytic theory. An excellent survey of the evolution of psychoanalytic concepts is offered by D. Rapaport: The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory, in Koch, S., Psychology. A Study of a Science, New York - Toronto - London, 1959, vol. 3, pp. 97-101. We shall use Rapaport's definition, which he derived from "Triebe und Triebschicksale", GW. X, pp. 211-214: "Reality in psychoanalytic theory designates the external source of stimuli, including the subject's body, but excepting the somatic sources of drives and affects"

<sup>(39)</sup> Ueber zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens, GW. VIII, p. 232.

<sup>(40)</sup> Ibid., p. 236.

ciple. How does this happen (41)? That is the ego's part. To phrase it in Freud's own words: "Es ist leicht einzusehen, das Ich ist der durch den direkten Einfluss der Aussenwelt unter Vermittlung von W-Bw (= Wahrnehmung-Bewusstsein) veränderte Teil des Es, gewissermassen eine Forsetzung der Oberflächendifferenzierung. Es bemüht sich auch, den Einfluss der Aussenwelt auf das Es und seine Absichten zur Geltung zu bringen, ist bestrebt, dat Realitätsprinzip an die Stelle des Lustprinzips zu stellen, welches im Es uneingeschränkt regiert" (42). The ego, centered around the system perception-consciousness, represents the intellect and level-headedness, in opposition to the id, which contains the passions ("die Leidenschaften") (43).

If we compare Freud's first definition of the purpose of education with the second we may conclude that they differ considerably in the phrasing (a result of the evolution of Freud's ideas and concepts), but that their content is identical: they both advocate development of the ego so as to enable it to prevail on the id or as Freud himself formulated it concisely: "Wo Es war soll Ich werden". It should be noted that the topographical representation (conscious, preconscious, unconscious) in the meantime developed into the structural (ego, superego, id)(44).

One more remark should be made here: the prevalence of the reality principle set as the purpose of education has given rise to some misunderstandings. The most important one was that education was equated with adaptation to reality(45). This implies that education gives up "higher" values and becomes socially conservative. This misinterpretation of Freud's definition is due to the fact that adaptation to reality is thought to be identical with the introduction of the reality principle. But in Freud's mind the introduction of the reality principle also means that it is possible to adapt reality to the needs of the individual. In other words, the fact that the individual at a given moment is obliged to consider reality in order to be able to satisfy his needs does not mean that this reality is good. It most certainly is not, according to Freud, because it contains aspects to which the ego cannot adapt itself and stay healthy at the same time. Consequently, social change is required in order to enable the ego to develop normally.

<sup>(41)</sup> We shall only give Freud's later opinions on the subject. For a full survey of the development of the concepts unconscious, preconscious, conscious, reality, ego, id, superego, we refer to Rapaport's study.

<sup>(42)</sup> Das Ich und das Es, GW. XIII, p. 252.

<sup>(43)</sup> Ibid., p. 253.

<sup>(44)</sup> Cfr. Rapaport, o.c., p. 95.

<sup>(45)</sup> Cfr. Kobi, o.c.

## 4. Educability

Education wants to influence the behaviour of the growing child in a certain direction. When this influence is considered to be impossible educability and education are rejected. Consequently, education supposes a view on man as a developing and social being, i.e. a being that does not only develop by itself, but also by its contacts with its environment. If behaviour is seen as the result of internal factors, which cannot be altered by external influences, then education becomes impossible and superfluous.

Freud has been blamed because he is supposed to have supported the first extreme (organic determination) as well as the second (social determination). And yet, he stressed the fact that human behaviour is the result of a combination of constitution and experience(46). And he goes on by apologizing for the importance psychoanalysis has bestowed upon accidental factors as determinants of behaviour, as it could bring something new in the latter respect, and not in the former.

Freud did believe in complete psychical determinism(47), i.e. behaviour which does not seem to be consciously determined, is ultimately determined by the unconscious. According to some educators "no philosophy which considers man as a purely natural object, is able to form the basis of a pedagogy" (48). We cannot agree with this point of view: the fact that a certain regularity or even causality is found in human behaviour does not imply that influence on it has therefore become impossible. Behaviour, according to Freud is overdetermined (or "multiply determined")(49), which means that every behaviour has conscious, unconscious, ego, superego, id, etc. determinants. This determination of behaviour did not keep Freud from influencing it, on the contrary, it incited him to find a new way, psychoanalysis, to modify it in a certain direction. This means nothing else but education, and even a kind of education which poses a lot of supplementary problems, compared to normal education, i.e. the education of incompletely formed and consequently more easily to be influenced children (50). Determination of behaviour is not identical with rigidity or immutability. Starting from a theory, like Freud's, which considers a great number of possible determinants in the formation of behaviour,

<sup>(46)</sup> Zur Dynamik der Uebertragung, GW. VIII, p. 364, footnote 2.

<sup>(47)</sup> Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens, GW. IV, pp. 282-3; Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensens "Gradiva", GW. VII, p. 33.

<sup>(48)</sup> Langeveld, M. J., Beknopte theoretische paedagogiek, Groningen-Batavia, 1949<sup>3</sup>, p. 57. Our translation.

<sup>(49)</sup> Cfr. Rapaport, o.c., pp. 83-4.

<sup>(50)</sup> Geleitwort zu "Die psychoanalytische Methode" von O. Pfister, GW. X, p. 450.

one may be able to explain it and, by changing one or more of its determinants, to influence it.

#### III. The means of education

### 1. The topographic point of view

#### 1. 1. Definition

The topographic point of view stresses the importance of the unconscious as a determinant of behaviour. We already expounded Freud's views on the unconscious and the primary processes (section II, § 3). We explained how unconscious wishes conflicted with the demands of reality, thus causing unpleasure and repression, i.e. the withdrawal of the cathexis by the preconscious. However, repression does not always succeed, e.g. when the unconscious wishes get organic reinforcement. In the preconscious a constant countercathexis is required to hold the unconscious wishes in repression. If this countercathexis is withdrawn the access to motility or hallucination is free (51). The unconscious wishes cannot by definition be directly influenced: the purpose of psychoanalysis consists of making them conscious to enable the individual to condemn them instead of repressing them.

If we render this topographic theory in structural concepts we get the following picture: the id represents the drives, i.e. the ultimate determinants of behaviour, which are unconscious. The ego represents the codeterminants of behaviour, whether conscious or not, whereas the superego forms a special segment of the ego. The ego mediates between the id, the superego and reality, whereas the superego can stand as well on the side of the ego as of the id. As behaviour is ultimately determined by the drives, i.e. by the unconscious, the id, it is necessary for the ego to prevail on the id to arrive at synthesized and controlled behaviour.

We shall now consider some pedagogical implications of the topographic point of view.

### 1.2. The educator

As early as 1913 (52) Freud wrote that only he could be an educator who knew how to empathize with the psychical life of the child. However,

- (51) Die Traumdeutung, GW. II-III, pp. 609-610.
- (52) Das Interesse an der Psychoanalyse, GW. VIII, p. 419.

the ability of empathy is lost, because the educator no longer understands his own childhood. From this Freud concludes that the educator should have psychoanalytic knowledge in order to understand the child better. However, knowledge on an intellectual level is only superficial. There is a great difference between hearing or learning something and really living it (53): to enter into the heart of the matter, the unconscious, one should have experienced it personally, i.e. have been psychoanalysed. This can only be achieved by way of transference (54), which can call up sufficient cathexis to overcome resistances (55). Freud's dislike of moralizing and his disbelief in logical arguments to cure neurosis (56) directly result from this topographic point of view. True conviction can only be acquired by submitting oneself to a personal analysis (57).

The analysis of the educator aims at more than a better insight in the psychical life of the child. It also brings about a better self-knowledge, i.e. knowledge of the deeper motivations of personal behaviour. Through psychoanalysis the educator becomes more normal, i.e. he increases the degree of prevalence of the ego on the id. Only he who can be honest towards himself can be honest in dealing with others and we already explained (section II, § 2) that honesty is a basic demand in a good society.

Self-knowledge also strengthens the individual with regard to his moral convictions and attitudes: he who has been psychoanalysed is permanently guarded against the reproach of immorality — so often made against psychoanalysts! — even if his personal norms differ considerably from the norms commonly accepted in the community in which he lives (<sup>58</sup>).

It is important to note that Freud does not accept current morals as the best, but defends and advocates a morality and an education, based on honesty, i.e. containing knowledge of the unconscious determinants of behaviour. When one has understood his own behaviour in its deepest motivations it becomes possible to get hold on it intellectually, i.e. consciously, and to start with real morals and education. A systematic elaboration of such morals and education is not made by Freud: as a physician

<sup>(53)</sup> Das Unbewusste, GW. X, p. 275.

<sup>(54)</sup> For a definition of transference, see: Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse, GW. V, p. 279.

<sup>(55)</sup> Zur Einleitung der Behandlung, GW. VIII, pp. 477-8.

<sup>(56)</sup> Ibid., and Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose, GW. VII, p. 408.

<sup>(57)</sup> Geleitwort zu "Verwahrloste Jugend", GW. XIV, p. 566; Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, GW. XV, p. 161.

<sup>(58)</sup> Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, GW. XI, p. 451.

he considered himself incapable of doing so and preferred to leave this subject a matter of research for specialized scientists (59).

#### 1.3. Freedom and discipline

"Die Erziehung hat also ihren Weg zu suchen zwischen der Scylla des Gewährenlassens und der Charybdis des Versagens" (60). Absolute freedom and strict discipline are the two extremes in education which by no means yield good results, i.e. "healthy people". Somewhere between these extremes an optimum is to be found where education achieves most and damages least.

Again it should be noted that the attitudes towards freedom and discipline as educational means are determined by the purpose of education. Indeed, if a well-behaved, obedient, submissive child is considered to be the best one could possibly achieve by good education, then strict discipline and an authoritarian behaviour on the part of the educator can certainly be advised as excellent means of education (61). However, submissiveness cannot be a desirable purpose of education, because to obtain it such a high and constant inhibition of drives is required that it will sooner or later give rise to neurosis (62). Incidentally, it is interesting to note how this way of reasoning illustrates what we said about the scientific approach to education (section I). The norm — even negative as in this case — that submissiveness cannot be a satisfactory purpose of education is derived from the observation of reality, viz. that in cases in which submissiveness is attained by education neurosis also arises. Freud's choice of keeping the happy mean between unrestricted freedom and extreme discipline is inspired by his theory that ideal man and society "have submitted their drives to the dictatorhip of the intellect" (63). Inhibition of the drives by external force is explicitly rejected as it brings along a waste of energy which must result in unwanted effects such as psychical illness.

Unrestricted freedom is also considered impossible. The child, who lives in a cultural surrounding which was built on inhibition of drives, has to learn to master its own drives to some degree; if not, life would become

<sup>(59)</sup> Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben, GW. VII, p. 377.

<sup>(60)</sup> Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, GW. XV, p. 160.

<sup>(61)</sup> In the field of sexual and religious education acceptance of and submission to the established ethical code are expected. That is why, according to Freud, these aspects of education show a well-marked tendency to this kind of authoritarian training. Cfr. Zur sexuellen Aufklärung der Kinder, GW. VII, p. 25.

<sup>(62)</sup> Das Interesse an der Psychoanalyse, GW. VIII, p. 420.

<sup>(63)</sup> Warum Krieg?, GW. XVI, p. 24.

impossible for the child itself and for the people in its immediate neighbourhood (64).

In the very beginning psychoanalytic pedagogy, based on Freud's early theories of the aetiology of neuroses, favoured a so-called "free" education, the idea being that all neuroses resulted from traumatic events in childhood and infancy, caused by attitudes and reactions of unknowing parents and educators. Thus, all education had to care for was that no such events would happen in the child's life. In other words, utmost permissiveness was the golden rule of education: social and moral restrictions, the direct causes of neurotic illnesses, were not to hamper the child's free and natural development. The result of these experiments was not in line with what educators expected (65).

According to psychoanalytic views freedom and discipline are rather the problems of the educator than of education. If the educator accomplishes his task well, i.e. based on rational instead of irrational motives, the problem is considerably simplified: he then has learned to accept that the child's freedom consists in its right to the educator's understanding of its disposition and development. Acceptance by the educator of the less pleasant phases of development (66), of aggression as a dispositional factor which cannot be completely repressed, but must get some opportunity of expressing itself (67), does not necessarily mean that indiscipline is approved of. Discipline is brought about by dependence on and identification with the educator: in order to keep the educator's love, which is of vital importance to the child, it is willing to do efforts within the limits of its possibilities, which means among other things that the child is willing to accept some discipline imposed upon him by the educator.

To obtain discipline punishment is much less required than is — or was — generally thought in pedagogical circles: Freud drew the attention to the fact that the child often has a need for punishment arising from feelings of guilt or from masochistic tendencies (68). Further research by psychoanalysts showed that punishment did not follow from rational, but from infantile, drive determined motivations (69).

<sup>(64)</sup> Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, GW. XV, p. 160.

<sup>(65)</sup> Cfr. Kris, E., o.c., p. 626; Bittner, G. & Rehm, W. (Hg.), Psychoanalyse und Erziehung, Bern-Stuttgart, 1964, pp. 21, 26.

<sup>(66)</sup> Zur Einleitung der Selbstmord-Diskussion, GW. VIII, p. 63.

<sup>(67)</sup> Das Ich und das Es, GW. XIII, p. 284.

<sup>(68)</sup> Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose, GW. XII, p. 53.

<sup>(69)</sup> Hitschmann, E., Das Strafen aus analerotischen Motiven, in Bittner, G. & Rehm, W., o.c., pp. 159-164.

Reward and punishment in Freud's mind should only serve the purpose of making it clear to the child that it does not possess the educator's love unconditionally (70). The educator represents to the child reality to which it has to adapt itself. This adaptation does not come along all by itself, but requires some constraint. So education cannot do without constraint, but the educator should be well aware of the reasons why he uses it and keep in mind that the ultimate purpose is to enable the child to control its behaviour by using its own intellectual insight.

#### 2. The psychosocial point of view

## 2.1. *Definition* (71)

The psychosocial point of view states that all behaviour is socially determined. According to Freud the drives are the ultimate determinants of behaviour. A drive is defined as "die psychische Repräsentanz einer kontinuierlich fliessenden, innersomatischen Reizquelle" (72). Consequently, drives constitute a constant internal source of stimuli and form the borderland between what is psychical and what is biological. In studying the drives Freud hoped he would find a means to bridge the gap between speculative psychology and strictly scientific biology, thus realizing his initial aim, viz. turning psychology into a natural science.

In the first formulation of his drive theory, before 1920, Freud postulated two kinds of drives: ego or self-preservative drives and sexual drives (73). To assure its existence the helpless child is obliged to direct its ego drives at certain objects. These objects, the person(s) in its immediate neighbourhood, are the same as those its sexual drives are initially directed at. This relation creates the need to be loved, which will persist during the whole lifetime (74) and makes behaviour socially determined.

The social determination of behaviour is also clearly shown during the so-called Oedipal phase: the parents are the objects the libidinal, i.e. the expression of sexual drives, and the aggressive drives, i.e. the expression of ego

<sup>(70)</sup> Formulierungen über zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens, GW. VIII, p. 236.

<sup>(71)</sup> Cfr. Rapaport, D., o.c., pp. 101-104.

<sup>(72)</sup> Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, GW. V, p. 67.

<sup>(73)</sup> We do not think it necessary to follow the development of Freud's theory of drives in detail as it does not alter in any way his views on the problem we are dealing with here, viz. the social determination of behaviour. A concise summary of this development was given by Freud himself in Jenseits des Lustprinzips, GW. XIII, p. 66.

<sup>(74)</sup> Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, GW. XIV, pp. 186-7.

drives, are directed at. As a result of this phase structures like the superego, identifications in the ego, are formed which will determine further behaviour (75). Thus conscience, a function of the superego, which is so important in moral education, is also a result of the social determination of behaviour.

Let us now turn to some pedagogical implications of the psychosocial point of view.

# 2.2. The relation parents/educator - child

In Freud's view the first relation between the parents, usually the mother more in particular, and the child is very important: they teach the child to love, so that later object choices and new relations are copied on the initial mother-child relation (76). Anna Freud, Dorothy Burlingham, René Spitz and others have confirmed and elaborated this thesis (77). The child's relation to a love object in the first years of its life determines the way in which it learns to control its impulses. In the eye of Freudian psychoanalysis these first years, until the end of the Oedipal phase (0-5 years), are of exceptional importance to character formation and the attitudes towards others. A consequence of this view is that education in the family is the most important of all, and that school education in the kindergarten comes next in importance to it. School education from the time it becomes compulsory by law is pedagogically far less important. Indeed, the relations established in these new surroundings will be mainly inspired by earlier relations.

In ego formation the mechanism of identification is of great value in this early period. Identification here consists of the fact that the child takes the parent of the same sex as an ideal. The child wants to be like the parent, it wants to form its ego in imitation of the object (78). Identification precedes the Oedipus complex and prepares it. Next to identification with the father — for the boy — there is his sexual object cathexis of the mother. These two, identification and sexual object cathexis, for some time exist side by side, without causing conflicts. When psychical life is more synthesized they meet at last and so the normal Oedipus complex arises:

<sup>(75)</sup> Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, GW. V, p. 90.

<sup>(76)</sup> Ibid., pp. 123-4, 130.

<sup>(77)</sup> Freud, A. & Burlingham, D., Infants without Families, the Case For and Against Residential Nurseries, New York, 1944; Spitz, R., Hospitalism, An Inquiry into the Genesis of Psychiatric Conditions in Early Childhood, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, I (1945), pp. 53-74. Other contributions to this subject are found in the different volumes of this annual.

<sup>(78)</sup> Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse, GW. XIII, p. 126.

consequently, identification from its very beginning has an ambivalent character (79).

The process of identification, which according to Freud, is easily repeated in later situations, especially when a similarity is perceived with a person who is not the object of sexual drives, is important to school education (80). In adolescence identification with teachers — not the same as the so-called "Schwärmerei", which we'd rather consider to be a form of idealization (see further) — is very important in pedagogical respect, because the possibility of the adolescent being influenced by such an object of identification is strongly increased. In primary education too identification processes often clearly show in the relation towards the teacher.

Identification should not be mixed up with idealization: in the former the object is put in the place of the ego, whereas in the latter it is put in the place of the ego ideal or the superego (81). The erection of the ego ideal, the representative of the relation with the parents, is a projection of the lost narcissistic love of childhood, when the child was its own ideal (82). Idealization leads to the overestimation of the object, which is for instance typical of being in love. But the same applies to other phenomena as well, which are as important in adolescence, viz. idolizing and submissiveness to leaders. Seen from this angle it is interesting for the teacher to know which persons are idolized or chosen as leaders by his pupils, because this knowledge offers him an insight into the ideals of the young and eventually enables him, if leaders from the peer group are concerned, to influence his pupils more easily in an indirect way. Indeed, direct intervention in this case is of little value, because one of the functions of the ego ideal lies in testing reality (83). As the idolized object has taken the place of the ego ideal the ego of course holds this perception to be real! The way out of this impasse is only to be found in influencing the idolized object or in putting other objects, which the educator considers to be more valuable, in the place of the idolized, which is not exactly an easy task.

#### 2.3. The relation social environment/culture - child

We already said that according to Freud culture (84) has neurotic effects for the individual and that therefore social reforms are necessary. In what

- (79) Ibid., pp. 115-6.
- (80) Ibid., p. 118.
- (81) Ibid., p. 126; Zur Einführung des Narzissmus, GW. X, p. 161.
- (82) Zur Einführung des Narzissmus, GW. X, p. 161; Das Ich und das Es, GW. XIII, p. 264.
  - (83) Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse, GW. XIII, p. 126.
  - (84) As said in footnote (31) culture is not defined by Freud. The only definition of it

direction these reforms should go Freud never explicitly stated. On the contrary, he wrote (85) that utmost care should be taken as to social reforms on a psychoanalytic basis, because psychoanalysis can show where social norms go wrong, viz. by postdiction, but it cannot predict whether certain changes in society will not bring about other, more harmful effects.

The central problem in the tension between culture and the individual lies in the cultural demands, i.e. inhibition of drives, on the one hand, and the individual striving at sexual gratification on the other hand. But this tension also has its positive aspects: as full gratification cannot be attained for the sexual drive it — or part of it — is sublimated and by this sublimation (86) ever greater cultural products are created (87).

This process already begins in the latency period, in which sexual energy is still constantly provided, but used for other than sexual aims. Dislike, shame, aesthetic and moral ideals date from this time and result from the process of sublimation: they are reaction formations to the fact that sexual inclinations in the latency period are useless and perverse (88).

The question arises whether it is advisable or not to stimulate this process of sublimation. Freud at a time seemed to favour the view of sublimating the sexual drives as much as possible, especially by means of education (89). He understood that society even wants to go further and completely suppress the sexual drive, especially when it emerges as reproductive drive, so as to make it compatible with social demands (90). But morality which prescribes inhibition of drives without considering the individual possibilities of sublimation, is doomed to fail, as well as any morality which does not take reality into account. As the possibilities of sublimation largely vary from one individual to another Freud warns the physician — and we

in psychoanalytic terms seems to be that of Roheim, G., The Riddle of the Sphinx, London, 1934, p. 216: "By culture we shall understand the sum of all sublimations, all substitutes, or reaction formations, in short, everything in society that inhibits impulses or permits their distorted satisfaction". (cited in Kroeber, A. L. & Kluckhohn, C., Culture, A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions, New York, (1952), pp. 116-7.

- (85) Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens, GW. VIII, pp. 87-8.
- (86) Freud defined sublimation as follows: "Ablenkung sexueller Triebkräfte von sexuellen Zielen und Hinlenkung auf neue Ziele". (Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, GW. V, p. 79).
  - (87) Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens, GW. VIII, p. 91.
  - (88) Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, GW. V, pp. 78-9.
- (89) Das Interesse an der Psychoanalyse, GW. VIII, p. 420: "Die Erziehung sollte sich vorsorglich hüten, diese kostbaren Kraftquellen (= die sexuellen Triebe des Kindes) zu verschütten und sich darauf beschränken, die Prozesse zu befördern, durch welche diese Energien auf gute Wege geleitet werden."
  - (90) Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, GW. XI, p. 322.

may well add the educator — to be careful with this method: the idea of using analytic — and pedagogical — treatment in view of sublimation is always commendable, but most certainly not always advisable (\*1).

Another reason to be careful is provided by the fact that the conflict between sexual drives and cultural demands does not always end in the sublimation of the drives, but as well in repression and neurosis. The latter possibilities — Freud is following here a Darwinistic line of thought — will constitute the way out for the weaker. A certain amount of gratification of sexual drives is necessary if humanity is not to be afflicted by collective neurosis and even to come to an end as a result of a steady cultural development (92). Thus Freud once more stresses the need for social reforms, which, though this is not explicitly stated, will have to develop in the direction of a greater tolerance in sexual matters, as well for the child as for the adult.

Education being the representative of cultural demands, will have to consider this. It claims too much, moralizes too much and in doing so is mistaken in its demands: instead of teaching the young what people are like, instead of preparing them to existing realities such as sexuality and aggressivity it prefers to put before them a world full of moral obligations, which they are supposed to fulfil without considering factual data. To say it in Freud's own words: "Die Strenge der ethischen Forderungen würde nicht viel schaden, wenn die Erziehung sagte: So sollten die Menschen sein um glücklich zu werden und andere glücklich zu machen; aber man muss damit rechnen, dass sie nicht so sind" (93).

Cultural development according to Freud is analogous to individual development, but their aims are opposite: grouping into ever larger units for the former, i.e. the altruistic tendency, and individual fulfilment of happiness for the latter, i.e. the egoistic tendency. In this respect culture, i.e. society, behaves contrary to psychological insight by not taking into account the psychical possibilities of the individual. It acts as if the ego could accomplish everything that is asked of it, as if it could master the id without any restrictions. If society cannot attain what it desires along the usual lines, it calls upon its last resource, viz. morality: this is nothing but a therapeutic attempt to attain what is asked for by way of a command of the superego (94). But morality is also doomed to fail if it does not take human nature into account.

<sup>(91)</sup> Ratschläge für den Arzt bei der psychoanalytischen Behandlung, GW. VIII, p. 385.

<sup>(92)</sup> Beiträge zur Psychologie des Liebeslebens, GW. VIII, p. 91.

<sup>(93)</sup> Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, GW. XIV, p. 494, footnote.

<sup>(94)</sup> Ibid., p. 503.

Culture, morality, education all claim too much from man. Changes are needed to bring their demands in line with human possibilities, i.e. to make them more realistic. According to Freud we can only hope that the altruistic force in man, "the eternal Eros", will be able to face aggressive and self-destroying drives (95).

## 3. The genetic point of view

#### 3.1. Definition

The genetic point of view claims that "all behavior is part of a genetic series, and through its antecedents, part of the temporal sequences which brought about the present form of the personality" (96).

The genetic point of view is not to be mixed up with the psychosocial: it does not state that behaviour is the result of cumulative experience alone, nor that it is inherited and follows a set scheme. It wants to consider both environmental and constitutional factors. It does claim that present behaviour should be explained in the light of past behaviour. As is known Freud introduced this point of view when he became aware of the importance of infantile experience in the aetiology of neuroses. This discovery brought along considerable implications for education.

#### 3.2. The special character and importance of childhood

Freud certainly was not the first to stress the special character of child-hood, but few have done it so systematically and convincingly, nor have any shown so clearly its importance for later behaviour. Already in his works before 1910, we find many contributions to the study of this period in human life (97). Freud's ideas on this subject directly or indirectly influenced the interest in and the study of childhood. In psychoanalysis a special branch of research was even created, viz. child analysis: the names of Anna Freud and Melanie Klein are linked with this direction in psychoanalysis.

It is evident that education, which is mainly concerned with the child, took a great interest in these findings: whereas psychoanalysis could not do without a knowledge of infantile experience and reactions to understand

<sup>(95)</sup> Ibid., p. 506.

<sup>(96)</sup> Rapaport, D., o.c., p. 86.

<sup>(97)</sup> A.o. his Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, Zur sexuellen Aufklärung der Kinder, Ueber infantile Sexualtheorien, Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben. In other works of this period he frequently mentions the importance of infantile experience.

and cure the neurotic adult, education in Freud's mind was to be prophylactic with respect to neurosis (98).

Therefore, it is of primary importance that the educator should gain an insight into the course of human, and especially infantile, development. It is necessary indeed for the educator to know what behaviour he may expect of a child in a given phase, so that he may direct his educational efforts in accordance with it. Development is not a process solely determined by internal factors and therefore progressing automatically till maturity is reached. Disturbing factors can cause certain reactions and forms of conduct to be fixed; regression to earlier modes of conduct is even possible. A general description of the constitutional or environmental conditions, i.e. the disturbing factors, which can be held responsible for the fact that a state of health, i.e. unrestricted ability to work and enjoy life, is never attained was given by Freud in his paper: "Ueber neurotische Erkrankungstypen" (99). His conclusion is that neurosis is a result of a psychical situation which may be acquired in different ways; the opposition between heredity and experience is insufficient to explain how neurosis is brought about.

To education these data may be of some importance, viz. where learning or behaviour disturbances are concerned. At the present time it is practically impossible to individualize school education on a large scale in its curriculum, methods, etc., but it is not impossible to pay more attention to so-called problem children in the classroom. The first condition to cure these cases and to reintegrate them in the educational activities is to consider their problems genetically: as long as the real reasons of their abnormal behaviour are not known so-called educational measures as punishment, exclusion, etc. are only quack remedies with a minimal chance of lasting success.

#### 3.3. Development and education

In the field of developmental psychology Freud's main concerns were with sexuality: intellectual, social and moral development of the child are not systematically dealt with in his work. Yet, from his views on sexual development and education some general principles can be derived for psychoanalytic education.

As a rule one may say that education has to take biological development into account so as to follow it and see that all phases are gone through (100).

<sup>(98)</sup> Das Interesse an der Psychoanalyse, GW. VIII, p. 420.

<sup>(99)</sup> GW. VIII, pp. 322-330.

<sup>(100)</sup> Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, GW. V, p. 78.

Development is considered to be a sequence of phases, which necessarily follow upon each other in a certain order. This order is not contingent or arbitrary: it is impossible to jump a certain phase.

We can now turn to the more specific area of sexual education and see in how far Freud's general principle of education coincides with his practical advice in the field of sexual education. It has to be stated that this aspect of education is not a desirability, but a necessity if children are to be educated to become independently thinking human beings (101). We know how highly Freud thought of the force of the human intellect and if it is agreed upon that the intellectual abilities should be developed, then the necessary conclusion should also be drawn: sexual education has to start as early as in primary school. Already then questions are asked, an internal need for knowledge and a sexuality exist by that time. Sexual education will begin with sexual instruction, i.e. the information-dispensing of the biological knowledge which is required, and before the child enters the "Mittelschule", i.e. before the age of ten, the social meaning of human sexuality has to be explained. The moral obligations of sexuality should be dealt with at about the time of confirmation, i.e. the age of fourteen. And Freud goes on, thus stressing the genetical approach to education: "Eine solche stufenweise fortschreitende und eigentlich zu keiner Zeit unterbrochene Aufklärung über das Geschlechtsleben, zu welcher die Schule die Initiative ergreift, erscheint mir als die einzige, welche der Entwicklung des Kindes Rechnung trägt und darum die vorhandene Gefahr glücklich vermeidet" (102). The danger, which Freud mentions here, is the exaggerated importance attributed by the child to all sexual matters, because parents and teachers omitted to satisfy its intellectual curiosity.

We think it is not too extravagant if we extrapolate from this text on sexual education to education in general, viz. that the latter in its curriculum has to take into account the possibilities, i.e. the degree or phases of development of the child. The contents of education, based on knowledge of developmental psychology, can be generalized. But educators should not forget that development has external as well as internal determinants: normality, i.e. accordance with an expected degree of development, is a

<sup>(101)</sup> Zur sexuellen Aufklärung der Kinder, GW. VII, p. 25. According to Freud there are two ways to keep children from intellectual independency, viz. by leading them astray in sexual matters and by intimidating them in religious matters. It is interesting to note for Dutch readers how in this paper Freud's ideas on sexual education are inspired by what Multatuli wrote on this subject in his letters, Cfr. ibid., pp. 20-1.

<sup>(102)</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

relative concept (103). Relativism is not only characteristic of normality, but according to Freud also of morals (104) and happiness (105).

By way of a conclusion it may be said that, whereas knowledge of the child's development may yield general rules for the contents of education, the daily practice of education will have to consider individual variations, if it is to be valuable for each pupil.

#### IV. Conclusion

We shall not end this paper in the usual way, viz. by summarizing what was said above. This would constitute an almost impossible task as our comments on Freud's views on education are already very concise. We think it more useful to add some remarks on the aim of our study and on the research that may still be done.

Education is highly in need of a general theory on man. Without this no scientific approach to it is possible as education aims at:

- 1. changing human behaviour, and changes cannot be brought about unless one knows about the mechanisms that give rise to behaviour;
- 2. changing it in a certain direction, which implies that one has to avail oneself of a theory in which is explained why and how human behaviour has to develop in a given direction.

We have considered it worthwhile to investigate Freud's theories in the light of these reflections, because he claimed to be able to change human behaviour and to have good reasons for doing so. Yet, there is still much controversy about the scientific value of his theories and as long as this question is not definitely settled, no valid conclusions can be inferred from them.

Furthermore, we have only investigated Freud's works — we headed this paper "Freud and Education" — whereas important contributions to psychoanalysis, and especially to ego psychology, the most interesting field for education, have appeared later on. There is much to be done, if one wants to have a complete survey of the pedagogical value of psychoanalysis as a whole.

Last but not least we would like to state explicitly that we did not intend by any means to imply with this paper that only psychoanalysis — or Freud

<sup>(103)</sup> Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, GW. V, pp. 98, 106, footnote; Der Wahn und die Träume in W. Jensens "Gradiva", GW. VII, p. 70.

<sup>(104)</sup> Die "kulturelle" Sexualmoral und die moderne Nervosität, GW. VII, p. 155.

<sup>(105)</sup> Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, GW. XIV, p. 442.

— can be of any importance to education. On the contrary, it is our personal conviction that research in various fields is required before one can start with a theory on education. Education and ethics need many more scientific data, before they can be of value in practice. However, we prefer the long and difficult road of science to the shorter, but hazardous way of speculative, even if seemingly brilliant, theory.

Jan Buelens

Acknowledgement: We wish to thank Simonne De Smet for her kind help in correcting the English text of this paper.