

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS A TYPE OF REACTION TO THE MINORITY SITUATION. A LITERATURE—SURVEY

Bob Carlier

1. Introduction : Defining the field of investigation.

In order to try to discover some relevant characteristics of collective action an attempt will be made to describe one of its specific forms, viz. social movements. The ample literature on this subject will provide the starting-point for that purpose, although we are fully conscious of the fact that it was impossible to survey the whole range. For this reason two sorts of limitations were introduced : in the first place, the idea of collective action itself, its origins and its justification, has caused a certain selection; secondly social movements are merely discussed as one possible reaction to minority situations, not taking into account the probability that some movements are brought about by other agents and consequently ought to be interpreted differently. Although we should not jump to hasty conclusions, the study and observation of social movements might procure a better insight in the problem.

We shall start by trying to define the minority-status concept (2.1). This status is in contradiction with certain forms of the justice motive, which has a strong determining influence on social action (2.2). Some possible reactions are mentioned, social movements being one of them (2.3). Social movements have been investigated for years in sociology and social psychology, but the investigations and speculations are in some cases ideologically based (3.1). A closer examination of some definitions of social movements (3.2) leads to the description of components in these definitions (3.3), and to the categorization of different types of movements (3.4). Social movements show a more or less organized structure, consequently special attention should be paid to their participants : members (4.1) and leaders (4.2). The special situation of majority-members in

minority movements will be pointed out (4.3). An attempt will be made to single out for discussion a number of factors causing the conversion of social groups into social movements (5.1). In this context the impact of one factor, viz. relative deprivation (5.2) will need a somewhat longer discussion. As social movements are characterized by career features, a static description is impossible (6.1); their failure or success determines to a certain extent their survival, decay or transformation (6.2). In connection with the different forms of collective action, attention will be drawn to the tendencies (7.1) and strategies (7.2) which place social movements in the emancipation process (7.3). Finally we will try to come to some conclusions and to offer some suggestions for further research (8).

2. The situation of minorities

2.1. Definition.

The discussion about the precise meaning of the minority concept will not be opened here (see bibliography nrs. 7, 28, 34). Suffice it to remember that minorities cannot be defined in terms of specific characteristics, as this would presuppose an ethnocentric starting-point; neither does a mere statistical criterion account for the social relevance of the existence of minorities within a given society. Sociologically, minorities can better be defined in terms of power differences: groups within a given social structure, which are subject to discrimination and/or prejudice from more powerful groups on the ground of real or presumed differences which are used as criterion of grouping (7, p. 394). To describe the minorization process accurately, dynamic elements such as grouping, labeling and power balance should be stressed rather than statical data. If one considers the great importance of conflict theory for sociology in general and for the study of minorities in particular (28, 30, 42), the key concepts 'discrimination' and 'prejudice' should be regarded as weapons used by groups in social conflicts. The relationship between both is more complicated than a mere "cause to effect" (the thesis that prejudice develops in order to justify existing discrimination deserves more attention). Newman (28) criticizes the defining of minorities merely in terms of discrimination and prejudice: he considers them as secondary tools in intergroup conflicts (on p. 235 he tries to relate them to different kinds and stages of social conflicts). So he proposes to see minorities as "groups that vary from the social norms or archetypes in some manner, are subordinate with regard to the distribution of social power, and rarely constitute more

than one-half of the population of the society in which they are found" (p. 20). Though the numerical notion of size is reintroduced to a certain degree, this definition has the advantage of stressing the context in which minorization takes place (rather than the consequences) and of giving full weight to such factors as norm transgression and distribution of power which offer an explanation for the contradiction existing between minority situation and the idea of justice in society.

2.2. *The justice motive*

The observations made in 2.1 about the definition of minorities illustrate the fundamental injustice of their situation. Empirical research has stressed the importance of the justice motive in collective action: field work of the Groningen Sociological Institute (5) e.g. concerning participants in local democracy in seven Dutch communities throws light upon equality and inequality as components of the aspiration for a just distribution of goods; it also stresses the necessity of justification — the purpose of the action must be acceptable to large groups — to reach the final stage of collective action (collective attempt to influence public affairs). The idea of justice plays also a part in the eight stages proposed by Schwartz in "The Justice of Need and the Activation of Humanitarian Norms" (33) to describe the process which leads from the initial perception of need to the final social action (at each stage the possibility of the process being stopped must be taken into account). From the ample literature dealing with the justice motive in social behaviour we will only lift nr. 32/2 of *The Journal of Social Issues* (17) which was entirely devoted to this subject. In his introduction Lerner (18) comments upon the different meanings this key-concept can have in philosophical, sociological and sociopsychological investigation, meanings represented in this issue. Schematically he distinguishes three kinds of approach, viz. justice as a manifestation of power (the powerful succeed in presenting as just and righteous their own means to gain and to hold their status); justice as a manifestation of functional requirements of society (norms should have a minimum functionality); and justice as an inevitable manifestation of the human potential (the justice motive is inherent in human nature). To give due attention to these different tendencies he proposes to differentiate between six forms (see table 1, p. 15): justice of need, justice of entitlement, justice of parity, justice of equity, Darwinian justice, and competitive justice. This classification proves that the notion of justice, seen here as a

justification of social action, needs extra analysis and shading. This train of thought makes the distributive justice-notion the central item. Sampson (32) connects this problem with the economic field of human relations; the kind of solution for this problem influences non-economic relations (e.g. in terms of competition, of altruism, of equity). In his second proposition he postulates that just solutions lead to cohesion and order, unjust solutions to personal and social unrest and disorganization. Historically two philosophical currents can be pointed out in the solutions which have been proposed, each of them corresponding to different assumptions about human nature. The concept of equality i.e. different people provided with equal goods, has been very influential since the 18th century. The equity solution, which means distribution according to certain inputs, has often been advocated by social psychologists, although they mostly overlook its cultural determination (history, ideology, politics). Equity can be seen as the psychological result of socialization in a given culture (market economy of capitalism). This is why we prefer to use the equality conception of justice for the description of minorities (in 8 we shall come back to this problem). Its connection with the subject of this paper exists on two levels : it offers a moral justification for the action of social movements, and it provides them with a strong psychological motivation for starting these actions (cf. 5 and 6.1).

2.3. Reactions on minority situation

The injustice inherent in minority situations is not always seen nor experienced as such. Among other things the equity principle may serve as a camouflage for fundamental inequality in goods and power. This accounts for the fact that not all minorities tend towards abolition of injustice. Wirth (45) classifies minority groups according to their final goals, and distinguishes in this connection between assimilationist, pluralist, secessionist, and militant minorities. Concerning ethnic minorities (which have received most attention) Lyman & Douglas (19) enumerate the following ends : incorporation in a larger society; active participation in public life and maintenance of important aspects of the own cultural identity; accent on ethnic identity and creation of new social positions and activities; ties of confederation, combined with territorial and communal control; secession; new hegemony in the existing society. In order to systematize these classifications Simpson & Yinger (34) work with three basic types of response, each of them presenting different forms of appearance : acceptance, avoidance, and

aggression. They always appear in combination, and it is difficult to imagine a case lacking any form of aggression (either manifest or more latent). Much research uses an assimilationistic paradigm as a result of the corresponding ideology (assimilation is "perceived" because it is wanted), but Parenti appropriately stresses the fact, that the idea of counter-assimilation accompanies all sorts of protest (29). As a form of protest is inherent in social movements (cf. 3.3) only those reactions which attack the (unjust) status quo will be considered. From the numerous techniques of social change only those directed towards society (and not those directed towards individual persons, e.g. promoting change in attitude), will be dealt with since social movements can be situated in this context. Participation in social movements comes chiefly from the minority-members themselves; participation by majority-members will receive special consideration (cf. 4.3).

3. *The study of social movements.*

3.1. *Characteristics of this study.*

The starting-point chosen in 2 causes social movements to be seen here as a *part of collective behaviour* (this larger field is also termed mass phenomena, collective dynamics, mass behaviour; it should be distinguished from actions of very small groups, unformed aggregates and social institutions). They need specific investigation, but this is encumbered by the spirit in which the study of mass phenomena is carried out, and this in two ways. In the first place the irrationality of those phenomena has always been emphasized. Instead of being supported by unprejudiced observation they are frequently described through their analogy with individual behaviour. Moreover a parallel is often drawn between collective behaviour and abnormal forms of individual personality (deviance, even neurosis and psychosis). The negative connotations of this approach are apparent (e.g. in the terminology: "crowd behaviour"), and account for the fact that collective behaviour needs explaining in psychological terms. This mere psychological approach and its corollary, neglect of the sociological angle, is regretted by authors such as Banks (2), Weller & Quarantelli (41). It prevails for instance in Cantrill (6), who deliberately chooses concrete examples of movements in which irrational features predominate (lynching mobs, Father Divine, the Oxford Group, the Nazi Party). Yet, he is forced to admit the great importance of the whole social context which makes those movements possible and at the same time acceptable by large masses

(see also 4.1).

The study of social movements is characterized by a second trend, closely linked to the first one, viz. their treatment as a **disturbing factor**. Instead of studying them as part of collective behaviour some authors interpret them as an *element of social change* (Milgram & Toch (26) define them as fitting best the criterion of aiming at change in the world, and qualifying least as amorphous or unorganized). Killian mentions their study as "primarily a study of social change as well as cultural change, of a changing social order as well as of changing values and norms" (16, p. 11).

It should also be remembered that the relation of cause and effect is twofold : social movements are not only underlying conditions of social change, they are just as well results of certain transformations in society; this last feature procures them a social basis in certain parts of the social structure (cf. Gusfield (13)). Sometimes they are aptly compared to material inventions (e.g. Rose (31), Banks (2)), although of course they take place in the non-material layer of society. Much depends on the importance attached to social change in the author's view of society. In sociology functionalistic theory and the often inherent harmony pattern of society have been attacked by authors such as Rex (30) (sociology gives a more adequate study of modern society if centered on concepts such as conflict, imperative co-ordination and balance of power rather than on integration and consensus) and Wertheim (42) (evolution is the normal state of society, always in lack of balance; culminating in accelerated processes, evolution becomes revolution). In this view social change is normal in society, social movements containing germs of innovation. In the typology of social movements proposed by Weller & Quarantelli (41, p. 676) some types have the possibility of creating new norms and new social relationships. Banks (2) regards social movements as groupings of persons engaged in consciously accomplishing desired social innovation.

Many authors, however, starting from the opposite point of view (centered on consensus and harmony), cannot but describe social movements in terms of undesirable disturbance of the social order. This ideological determinant of sociological research explains why American politicology usually represents every disturbance of balance as a threat to democracy.

Since we subscribe to the conflict model in sociology (cf. the definition of minorities in 2.1), we want to dissociate ourselves from a one-sided view of social movements that stresses their irrational character; we prefer to approach them in terms of rational behaviour and to regard them as fulfilling constructive social functions (e.g. in

Marxian sociology social movements are prompted by the historical necessity of bringing about new society).

3.2. *Definition of social movements*

As with most concepts the difficulty consists in finding a definition sufficiently general to be used in different sciences (history, sociology, social anthropology, psychology, politicology), without losing its utility as a working concept (among other things it should enable us to delimitate social movements from cognate notions such as e.g. political parties, voluntary associations and pressure groups). A critical survey of the existing definitions leads Wilkinson to a number of characteristics (44, p. 27): "1. A social movement is a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change in any direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into 'utopian' communities (...) 2. A social movement must evince a minimal degree of organization, though this may range from a loose, informal or partial level of organization to the highly institutionalized and bureaucratized movement and the corporate group (...) 3. A social movement's commitment to change and the *raison d'être* of its organization are founded upon the conscious volition, normative commitment to the movement's aims or beliefs, and active participation on the part of the followers or members." The nature of the change social movements aim at, is sometimes a problem. Heberle (14) states that the classical concept of social movements supposes "the creation of an entirely new socioeconomic and political order, especially as concerns the institutions of property and the distribution of power" (p. 430). He calls "protest movements" those phenomena which are more limited in their purposes and in their spatial expansion. In the same order of ideas Blumer (4) distinguishes between "general social movements" (corresponding with general cultural drifts), "specific social movements" (with a well-defined objective and a higher degree of organization) and "expressive movements" (which do not seek to change the social order e.g. religious movements, fashion movements). As they do not aim at social change, we exclude these expressive movements from the social movements.

The direction in which the social change operates is also discussed by some authors. Some of them stress the protest character, e.g. McCree (23, p. 580): "Social movements are the conscious attempt of masses of people to bring about change deliberately in the social structure by collective action. They are engaged in social protest, in processes of reform and revolution." Other authors want to include

movements wanting to resist social change, e.g. Turner & Killian (36, p. 308): "A social movement is a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote a change or resist a change in the society or group of which it is a part."

The most elaborate attempt at definition has been made by Katz (15), who uses a number of factors which form the logically constitutive elements of the concept as well as the historical conditions for the origin and existence of social movements. He suggests that some of these factors can have physical and sociological components, the interrelation of which can be measured with certain techniques. This could be the case with the following factors: *number of participants*, *time* (a certain continuity), and *spatial extent*. Other factors quoted by him are: *the factor mass* (he does not want to include elites and marginal groups), *the factor ties* (between the participants), *the factor "common cause"*, *the factor spontaneity*, *a moral factor* (the conviction to defend a just case), *an emotional factor*, and a *factor activity*. Thus he comes to his definition of a social movement as "a grouping within a certain minimum of time and space of fairly large numbers of people, belonging mainly to the non-privileged or lesser privileged social strata (i.e. the lower and middle strata), who, bound by ties of leadership and in possession of certain minimal means of communication, engage in activities of high intensity, spontaneity and emotional feeling and endeavour to realize a common cause possessing for them moral and possibly other important values" (p. 75). The idea of aiming at social change is not explicitly mentioned here, but it is implicitly present in the circumscription of the participants (lesser privileged cf. the reference to the justice motive).

3.3. *Elements of definition*

In connection with the definitions given in 3.2, especially Katz's, based on the constitutive components of social movements, some complementary elements should be mentioned in view of their utility for the description of origins and career of movements in 5 and 6. From his survey of definitions Killian (16) distils four particular characteristics:

1. The existence of shared values.
2. A sense of membership and participation (this explains why the ruling class often tries to impede communication between minority members).
3. Norms prescribing behaviour which sets the members apart from the nonmembers in society and strengthens the members'

identification with the movement.

4. A structure and a division of labour.

All characteristics should be seen within a pattern of social life containing *conflicting values* which account for both satisfaction and frustration; this frustration can lead to individual nonconformity or to the formation of social movements.

As we chose to study collective action in terms of rationality (cf. 3.1), the factor *profitable to the group* should be particularly stressed (the personal interest of the individual participants varies in nature and intensity, and in a few cases it may even counter common interest, cf. 5). A certain degree of purposefulness characterizes social movements in contrast to mass phenomena such as panic, collective mania or hysteria. The existence of a group-interest within a society with a pluriform value system accounts for the fact that value conflict is one of the preconditions for starting social movements (one of the sources of this conflict is the development of subgroups with deviant norms and values within a given society).

3.4. *Types of social movements*

According to the prominent elements in the concept of social movements, different types can be distinguished (in 2.3 Wirth's typology of minorities — based on their objectives — was mentioned). In order to avoid confusion we need strict criteria (Wilkinson's multitude of types, 44, pp. 46-54, clearly exemplifies this). Mc Kee (23) suggests to classify them by the *institution* they belong to (e.g. political, religious movements), by the *categories of people* concerned (e.g. working-class, peasants, youth and women's rights movements) and by the *extensiveness of their social goals* (e.g. reform and revolutionary movements, specific movements). This last way of differentiating has always received much attention (for reform and revolutionary features we refer to 7.1). In 3.2 we mentioned Blumer distinguishing between general and specific social movements (he discusses their origins, structure, mechanisms and stages in detail), roughly corresponding with what Gusfield (13) calls directed and undirected movements. Killian (16) attaches much importance to the criterion of *value*, i.e. that which determines the goal to be obtained by the voluntary striving of the members: he mentions progressive, conservative and reactionary movements; comprehensive and restricted movements (cf. Blumer, Gusfield); explicit and implicit movements. This explains the somewhat different classification Turner & Killian (36) propose in their extensive work on collective behaviour. Some criteria are considered

as non-operational : the type of activity (political, religious, social), the direction and rate of social change (progressive, conservative, reactionary; reform and revolutionary movements), the objectives (cf. Wirth). This is why they prefer to use three *fundamental aspects* of social movements : value, power and participation. This leads them to three ideal-types based upon the degree to which the movements are oriented towards one of their aspects : so they speak of value-oriented, power-oriented and participation-oriented movements (giving them ample treatment in the chapters 15 to 19 of their work).

4. *The structure of social movements*

4.1. Participants

What was said in 3.1 about a predominantly psychological approach of social movements is even more relevant to the study of their participants' motivation. Especially if the movements show radical features this approach has often been favoured by more conservative authors, who are looking for a "radical personality" (either as part of a general left-wing or right-wing extremism, or as a symptom of deviant behaviour). They often work with a selected group (students, middle class radicals, participants of the first hour), and are not free from a certain conservative bias (cf. the comments of McCormack (22) on the study of American radicals). Cantrill (6) e.g. enumerates various sources of dissatisfaction (Chapter 2) which can lead to a critical situation "when an individual is confronted by a chaotic external environment which he cannot interpret and which he wants to interpret" (p. 63).

This psychological treatment of social movements and of their participants presents several shortcomings. The over-accentuation of non-rational (and even pathological) motives has already been mentioned. On the other hand some factors are often neglected e.g. the common interest (cf. 3.3), the "fraternal deprivation" (cf. 5.2), the impact of interaction and social role-playing, the importance of the total situation (Turner & Killian (36), p. 432 note two important considerations : the gratifications of movement participation must outweigh the gratifications available to the participant from more conventional activities, and each adherent must adjust himself to whatever reaction his associates may have to membership in the movement - in other words, the respectability accorded to the movement affects participation). In order to provide a sociological and historical framework for the study of social movements, Mc

Cormack (22) argues for a greater interest in the motivation of the masses (those who participate only in a period of marked social and economic upheaval or/and those who come from lower-income groups). As three kinds of motivational factors explain why people join social movements, viz. personality characteristics, social context, and ideology as a response to the situation (Mc Laughlin (24), pp. 69-71), one wonders why only the first item has received so much attention.

4.2. *Leadership*

The predilection of many authors for a psychological and rather person-centered approach of social movements is reflected in the importance attached to the study of leadership, especially since Weber's valuable, but somewhat one-sided description of the charismatic leader. Blumer distinguishes between different sorts of leaders according to the type of movement and to the stage of its career (pace-makers, prophets, reformers, statesmen). More research should be devoted to the social context in which the "message" of leaders becomes meaningful to the people (cf. Friedlands plea for a sociological concept of charisma (11)).

4.3. *Participation by majority-members*

Questions about the character of participation of majority-members in minority movements have been put forward by Marx & Useem (21). They try to answer them by testing some statements by means of three examples of social movements (civil rights, abolition of slavery, untouchables in India). After comparison they note frequent conflicts between majority and minority members in movements where the main object is to change the minority-group conditions. Conflicts arise mainly in connection with four items :

1. Ideological positions : minority activists show more radical and more militant attitudes towards the specific struggle against minority oppression, whereas outsiders often tend to associate with the broader design of political movements, sometimes even losing sight of the specific object (this explains the widely held opinion that minorities should fight for themselves since they not only experience the oppression, but can already partly free themselves by their struggle).

2. Privileged position of outsiders who join the movement with more experience (e.g. in writing, organizing, strategies, raising funds). Unwillingly they confirm the existing discrimination (they hold more

important positions and prevent the minority members from developing new attitudes). As they are not confronted with the problems and as they can always leave the movement, they show less commitment to its specific ends.

3. In spite of their excellent intentions, the majority-members can hardly fail to bring the existing cultural prejudices into the movement.

4. Dynamic aspect as a consequence of these conflict themes and of changing relations during the existence of the movement: outsiders often play a stimulating role in the initial stage of the struggle (the more so as the oppression is stronger and as the minority members have no opportunity to protest), but their share decreases as the movement develops. Sometimes they are excluded by an aggressive minority and turn to separate actions.

These data deserve closer investigation, and the authors suggest further research on other movements (e.g. men in feminist movements, non-workers in workers' movements, colonials in nationalistic movements).

5. *The origins of social movements*

5.1. *Causal factors*

Inquiring into the causes of transformation of minority groups into movements we meet the distinction between objective and subjective conditions which has become common knowledge in connection with the study of revolution (in chapter 8 Wertheim (42) speaks about situational and psychological aspects).

5.1.1. *Objective factors*

As they are closely connected with the specific situation the objective factors are less open to a more generalizing description than the subjective factors. This causal aspect of social movements is probably only fit for the study of specific elements in relation to a specific movement.

Yet, a number of circumstances are mentioned by some authors. Braam a.o. (5) refer to the *deterioration* of the situation; they note, however, that the threat of deterioration and the correlated fear (anticipating the psychological factors) can be more effective than a real worsening of conditions. This accounts for the fact that the degree of threatening is used as an important variable in their empirical studies. *A breakdown of the system of social control*

(sometimes interpreted as inadequacy of communication) promotes forms of collective action contesting the establishment. The rise of a social movement proves that the *channels available for social protest and change are obstructed and/or inefficient*. "Movements are bred out of human experience about what action will *not* alter their circumstances; thus, it comes about as a conscious cognitive assessment of much that has already occurred in the collective life of those who constitute a social movement" (Mc Kee (23), p. 585).

5.1.2. *Subjective factors*

With reference to the work of Braam a.o. it has already been suggested that social movements are brought about not so much by the objective situation as by its subjective correlate: people experiencing their situation as dissatisfactory. Abeles' investigations about black militancy (1) bring him to the conclusion that the economic situation of the blacks has improved in absolute terms, but that the "dollar gap" between whites and blacks has increased in a same time period, thus creating a feeling of *dissatisfaction*. This observation does not deny or belittle the importance of structural factors, it emphasizes that these factors act through the perceptions and evaluations of minority-group members: they compare their circumstances not so much with an objective standard, but rather, with a social standard or reference group(s) as to prestige, power, and/or material goods. This cluster of attitudes about dissatisfaction (a more detailed discussion on relative deprivation and rising expectations will follow in 5.2) predisposes people to participation in social movements, its form being determined by other, more objective factors (social climate, history, personality). Abeles thinks that the factor "feeling of dissatisfaction" is particularly potent among leaders but not among followers, and that it only plays an important part during the early stages of a social movement. It should also be stressed, that the comparison process need not be centered around the individual. A *collective sense of a shared lot in life* (condition of membership) seems to be a more powerful source of discontent and militancy than personal deprivation (cf. Abeles' "fraternal deprivation"). Another causal factor should be added, viz. the *belief in the possibility to act collectively towards new goals* that will bring a new life to the oppressed minority.

5.1.3. *Structural conditions for the emergence of social movements*

Morrison (27) claims that the involvement in a power-oriented

movement presupposes that the participants on the one hand realize their unfavourable situation as members of a group discriminated in society, and on the other hand that to be effective a solution should be structural. In this connection he mentions five structural conditions which combine some of the objective and subjective factors :

1. a large population experiencing the relative deprivation;
2. close interaction, communication, and proximity;
3. high role and status commonality e.g. class consciousness;
4. a stratification system with clear status boundaries and visible power differences between the strata;
5. the presence of much voluntary association activity in a society.

5.2. *Relative deprivation and rising expectations*

It has already been noted in 5.1 that the actual situation of a group is less instrumental in generating and focusing discontent than the perception of this situation by the members of the group. This explains the importance all authors attach to the factor "relative deprivation", whether or not in combination with the notion "rising expectations". Relative deprivation is closely connected with the concept of reference group, derived from it in Stouffers well-known study about "The American Soldier". Runciman (31a) distinguishes four elements in the concept of relative deprivation :

1. A does not possess x;
2. A sees other people (including himself in the past or in the future) possessing x;
3. A wants x;
4. A sees the possibility to get x.

As manifestations of discontent he mentions dissatisfaction with the own position within the group ("egoistical form") and dissatisfaction with the position of the group within society ("fraternalistic form" cf. what Abeles (1) calls fraternal deprivation). A person or a group can feel deprived in several — sometimes overlapping — fields (organic, psychic, economic, social, ethical). With special reference to the study of political violence Gurr (12) makes relative deprivation a central theme in his investigations. He defines it as the "actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities" (p. 24). Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled, value capabilities the goods and conditions of life they think they are capable of getting and keeping. Reference items may be their own past condition, an abstract ideal, the standards articulated by a


leader, or — most of all — a reference group. He distinguishes different patterns of deprivation (decremental, aspirational and progressive deprivation), and devotes a chapter (pp. 59-91) to information on the intensity and the scope of relative deprivation. His statements about the determinants of the intensity are based on the analysis of an important number of empirical research studies. He works with four determinants (three of them inherent in the structure of society) :

1. the degree of relative deprivation : the greater the discrepancy we see, the greater is our discontent;
2. the value salience : the greater the importance we attach to the values affected, the greater is our discontent (cross-national surveys indicate that economic values are likely to be predominant for most people);
3. the number of opportunities : if we have many alternative ways of trying to satisfy our expectations, we are likely to defer discontent over our failures; if we have few alternatives, we are likely to feel the anger of desperation;
4. time : if our anger is denied expression in the short run, it intensifies before it subsides; the greater its intensity, the longer it subsists.

Several authors have noticed the connection of relative deprivation with the notion of cognitive dissonance; Morrisson (27) e.g. interprets it as a special type of cognitive dissonance "in which there develops the belief in a legitimate expectation and, simultaneously, the discrepant belief that there is a high probability that the expectation will not be fulfilled" (p. 109). Relative deprivation is also a central element in the theory on revolution proposed by Davies (8) and based on three examples (Dorr's rebellion of 1842, the Russian revolution of 1917 and the Egyptian revolution of 1952) and on some secondary material (Wertheim (42) doubts the universal validity of this theory, cf. pp. 257-260). It is illustrated by the J-curve (p. 87) : (Figure 1, p. 50).

It has already been stressed in 5.1 that mere discontent does not generate social movements (Gusfield (13) reminds us of Hobsbawm's studies on all sorts of rebellions which did not lead to real movements). External attribution of the responsibility for the deprivation (e.g. blaming the social system) can effect the politicization of discontent by suggesting the idea of group actions in order to remove its causes. Morrisson (27) outlines two preconditions for this evolution : the desires involved must become (1) legitimate expectations that are (2) perceived as blocked. In the condition of

Figure 1 Need satisfaction and revolution.



legitimacy we recognize the justice motive from chapter 2.2. There is a relationship of mutual feedback, adjustment, and learning between the development of a legitimate expectation (i.e., the translation of a desire into a legitimate expectation) and the subjective as well as objective probability that the expectation will be fulfilled (Morrison illustrates this relationship by a scheme on p. 107). This development can be occasioned by several agents, e.g. contact with a new reference group (underdeveloped countries coming into contact with rich countries); certain transitions being blocked (from blue collar to white collar). The lack of precondition (1) in the most deprived strata of society is largely responsible for the fact that social movements, as a rule, do not spring from there.

6. *The course of social movements*

6.1. *Process of growth*

As social movements are based on intra- and intergroup relations of their participants, they naturally evolve through different stages. This requires a permanent formulation, revision and reformulation of values and norms. This evolution has often been described (e.g. the elaborate description by Blumer (4)). It should be remembered that the career of a movement can show various patterns, and that it depends no less on the reactions of the surrounding society (going from unworried tolerance to threatened intolerance) than on its own

dynamics. Only a few prominent moments of this career will be outlined here.

6.1.1. *The beginnings* are always characterized by vague feelings of unrest and dissatisfaction in a number of people, feelings which may be formulated and made operative by some pace-makers. This social unrest, possibly leading to a more generalized popular excitement, has often been described in somewhat vague terms, ("milling", agitation, restlessness), owing to the lack of organization and formalization of movements in their initial stage. The principal media of interaction are conversations, readings, talks, discussion and the perception of examples.

6.1.2. *Growth of the movement*

In a further stage we come across developments such as the *formation of an active nucleus* (leaders, action-committees etc.), and *the mobilization* of larger numbers by means of propaganda, demonstrations, gatherings, all sort of actions promoting a wider belief in the justness of the case and leading to active participation, recruitment of partisans, elimination of opponents). Van Doorn (37) enumerates different means of mobilization: economical resources (capital and labour), physical power, social energy which should be freed, transferred and raised (promoting factors are the influence of leaders, the existence — or inducement — of a critical situation, permanent warming-up through many discussions — in little groups — about ends and means). He regrets the poor scientific interest in the mobilization moments compared to the attention paid to the loss of dynamics (oligarchizing, bureaucratizing). He argues that it is mobilization that determines the organization, and not the reverse. Yinger (46) comes to the conclusion that increase in income, in education and in social power results in greater militancy; he illustrates this statement by data about tendencies in the Black Power Movement (p. 334).

The development of what Blumer calls "*esprit de corps*" (4, pp. 14-17) — the sense which people have "of belonging together and of being identified with one another in a common undertaking" — reinforces the new conception that the individual has formed of himself, as a result of his belonging to the movement (development of in-group / out-group relations, formation of informal fellowship association, participation in formal ceremonial behaviour). It results in the moulding of a "*morale*" (pp. 17-19), a kind of enduring collective purpose that gives persistency and determination to the

movement. It proceeds from a set of convictions about the justness of the cause and the ultimate attainment of goals.

6.1.3. *The role of group ideology.*

All these factors come together in the shaping of a group ideology, a set of ideas expressing the sense of grievance and injustice, providing a specific criticism of the existing social structure, and projecting goals which are to be sought by collective action (Mc Kee (23) cites Bell's formulation about "the conversion of ideas into social levers", p. 601). Turner & Killian (36) see the sense of value ("a feeling for a certain direction of social change") as the vital element in the ideology and in the program of social movements (p. 352). In some cases the ideology is derived from a transcendental source of authority (cf. Watsons paper on the Black Muslims and Ras-Tafarians). At any rate it provides the protest movements with an alternative set of beliefs. Wertheim (42) refers to the existence of contrapuntal values in all societies, a potential threat to the establishment if they evolve to a more or less coherent system of countervalues publicly professed by a social category (pp. 356-359).

The difficulties of developing a dissenting ideology should not be underestimated. Referring to Gramsci, Maravall (20) calls attention to the fact that the dominant ideology — by which the ruling class interprets and presents its own interests as general interest — permeates the whole society. The majority attacks each single contest in different ways: by negative definitions of antagonistic ideologies, by controlling information and expression in order to limit their spreading, and — if manipulation fails — by repressive sanctions.

6.1.4. *Organization*

All social movements tend towards more organization (a certain degree of organization was regarded as typical for them in 3.2) in order to reach their objectives.

This implies the development of operating tactics and a division of tasks, and results in a tendency of the movement to become institutionalized (amongst other things the different ties with political parties and with pressure groups should be gone into). This may carry possible factors of division and disagreement: it might even lessen the effectiveness of a movement as this depends on the unity and cohesion of its members.

Such transformation need not lead to conservatism. This is why Zald & Ash (47) object to the almost exclusive use of the

Weber-Michels model to describe the career of social movements (routinization of charisma, oligarchization, shift to organizational maintenance). Transformations are also influenced by external factors such as potential supporters of the movement and the reactions of society. In internal processes, alternative issues may exist as well (e.g. by schismogenesis and factionalization, by alternating leadership).

6.1.5. *Life-cycle of the movement*

The consecutive moments of the career of social movements are analogous with the stages in the life-cycle of the revolutionary process as it was outlined by Hopper (14a). The author describes this process in four successive stages, each stage containing elements preparing the following one :

1. the preliminary stage of mass excitement and unrest (milling process; the dominant social form is the anonymous and unorganized psychological mass with little interaction; through their marginal position the alienated individuals cause a beginning of social disorganization because of the disparity of attitudes and values);

2. the popular stage of crowd excitement and unrest (social contagion; breakdown of old behaviour patterns; preparation of new patterns; esprit de corps);

3. the formal stage of the formulation of issues and formation of publics (fixation of motives and definite formulation of aims; development of an organizational structure with leaders, a program, doctrine, and traditions; devices that are effective in developing group morale and ideology);

4. the institutional stage of legalization and societal organization (transformation from out-group into in-group; new social order).

Hopper indicates for each stage the characteristic conditions, the typical processes, the effective mechanisms, the types of leaders, and the dominant social form. It is regrettable that the paper remains fairly abstract, and that it shows some deviation towards organical analogy, a characteristic of beginning sociology. Wertheim (42) aptly remarks that this model (like most speculations on revolution) implicitly starts from the opinion that revolution means a rupture of the harmony, stability and equilibrium of society; for him revolution is a special form of normal evolution and social change (pp. 246-59). Notwithstanding its shortcomings, Hopper's model can be inspiring for the study of social movements in process.

6.2. *The question of success.*

Failure and success constitute crucial aspects of social movements, although it is problematic to define them. Depending on the perspective of the observer, success may either refer to the perpetuation of the movement itself and of its organization (usually implying gain and extension of participants) or to the achieving of its objectives, and this may lead to the dissolution of the movement (Van Doorn & Lammers (38), p. 294, call movements "self-liquidating social systems"). This explains the shift which some movements make from value-orientation to the accentuation of persistence, prominence and power of membership and organization. Turner & Killian (36) speak about "control movements" if the value objectives are left very flexible or undefined, about "counter-movements" if the principal objective is to oppose and defeat another movement, and about "separatist movements" if stress is laid on reducing or eliminating the power of the dominant group by achieving some degree of separation (usually not revolutionary since the value system of the parent body is not really challenged) (chapters 16 and 17). In all these cases the idea of societal reform is sacrificed to the power of the group or modified in its interest. This tension between the value-orientation of a movement and its power-orientation, together with the possible shift in orientation, accounts for many troubles and conflicts within the movement.

Another difficulty in the delineation of success lies in the possibility that movements and their ideology may be mere epiphenomena and that social change has other causes (examples in Banks' paper on feminism (3)). More research should be done on the conditions of success of movements and on the factors involved (e.g. type of action, duration). One of the fundamental questions raised by Braam a.o. (5) concerns the degree to which participation in collective action may engender new inequalities. Some power strategy must be developed in order to bring about success, be it the application of Machiavelli's precepts or of Sjoberg's mathematical formulation (36, pp. 374-382). Although partial successes may be obtained, social movements can only realize their objectives of social change by fighting for political and economical power, and by creating the objective conditions for a new value system.

7. *Scope of social movements.*

7.1. *Tendencies*

In order to delimit the scope of social movements we need criteria. Those concerning the type of conflict, the preservation of identity and the scope of social change are most widely used.

7.1.1. *According to the type of conflict*

Newman (28) devotes the fourth chapter of his book on minority groups to the elaboration of a study of social conflict that does not operate in terms of consensus, harmony and stability. He distinguishes first between **consensus-bounded** conflict (remaining within the institutional framework for conflict prescribed by society and within the norms embodied in its institutions) and **consensus-projecting** conflict (transcending the routine channels for conflict in society). In imitation of Simmel and Coser he proposes a second distinction, viz. between **variable-means** conflict and **rigid-means** conflict (the groups' predilection for one or the other type of conflict is meaningful regarding the position of that group in the social structure, especially in the stratification system). The combination of both criteria leads him to classification in several tables and to a series of theoretical propositions about the general tendencies and variations in social movements. Much attention is given to such factors as relative power, reward parity and reward deprivation, and competition (pp. 137-180).

7.1.2. *According to the preservation of identity*

Many studies on minority problems present the notion of *assimilation* or *integration* as the final objective; they fail to draw attention to the fact that this idea really emanates from the majority and from its system of interests and values, even when it is expressed by the minority. In its extreme form this notion amounts to the complete absorption and disappearance of the minority group; at any rate it implies an adaptation to the norms of the majority, which is a confirmation of its authority. It consolidates and ratifies the existing conditions, and matches the integration model in sociology (cf. 2.3. about the assimilationistic paradigm and about the notion of counter-assimilation).

The opposite tendency consists in the *efforts of the minority to preserve its own identity*, be it within a society characterized by (cultural) *pluralism* (cf. Newman (28), Chapter 3), or in the form of *separatism* (In Chapter 17, Turner & Killian (36) deal with separatist movements aiming at the "maintenance or attainment of [its] separate identity as a group to such a degree that this preoccupation

shapes the entire character of the movement", p. 384).

Both tendencies can be seen as stages in an interaction process between different groups; the tendency prevailing at a certain moment depends on the power balance within the conflict situation. In every struggle for emancipation (see 7.3) some elements refer to the own group and its values, while other ones have recourse to majority values. Every social movement is time and again confronted with the question how strongly it should stress its own identity, and how far it can go in adopting values, norms and means of the opponents. These tendencies can be seen as two elements of dialectical process, and as such they might bring about a new type of society where both the majority and the minority are different from what they were.

7.1.3. *According to the scope of social change*

The social change which all movements pursue, can either take place within the bounds of the existing social system (*reform*), or it can upset the whole social structure (*revolution*). Both tendencies can occur in all movements, and it is not always easy to distinguish between them, partly because the majority presents all protest as an attack on the whole system. Blumer (4) uses five criteria to differentiate between the reformatory and the revolutionary perspective in social movements: the scope of objectives (a specific phase or limited area / the entire social order); the vantage point of attack (the prevailing code of ethics / a new scheme of moral values); the respectability (by making use of the existing constitutions / underground activity); the general procedure and tactics (influencing public opinion / making converts, usually amongst the underprivileged themselves); the functions (to reaffirm the ideal values of a given society / to establish a new set of values).

The initial purposes of minority movements frequently present a reform character: they try to abolish prejudice and discrimination and tend towards an ideology of equal rights and equal chances. The revolutionary viewpoint generally springs from a total or partial failure of these endeavours, or from a thorough analysis of the conflict situation. Some objective and subjective conditions should be fulfilled to bring about this evolution. In order to avoid utopianism social movements should reckon with more or less objective prerevolutionary circumstances. Wertheim (42) mentions in Chapter 8 situational aspects, accelerators, and psychological components which are the counterpart of the situational aspects and correspond with the countervalues in society. The principal

subjective conditions for a revolutionary perspective are : a minority fully conscious of its own predicament; a growing solidarity within the minority group and with other oppressed groups (against the divide-and-rule policy of the majority and against intra and inter competitive struggle); the realization that minority actions are interwoven with some aspects of the struggle of classes.

7.2. Strategies and tactics

The previous remarks took us already to the strategic level (see also what was said on minority reactions in 2.3). In this paper we abstain from going into the problem of strategics since it is our opinion that all statements in this matter should be founded on concrete material, and that strategies vary according to circumstances and to the specific movement implied. We will restrict ourselves to a few examples.

Regarding the situation of the Catholics in the Netherlands Thurlings (35) has done historical-sociological research on different types of strategy (going from assimilation to pluralism). He associates some typical attitudes of minorities with the corresponding strategies, and elaborates a scheme with some possible feedbacks (p. 193). He mentions five strategies which are as much determined by the attitudes of the participants as by the social context :

1. underground strategy characterized by isolation and careful cooperation,
2. strategics of independence,
3. pragmatistical break-through,
4. ideological break-through,
5. ideological dialogue.

This model applies especially to ideological minorities; to a large extent it remains within the existing system. The same objection applies to the work of the authors of "Collective Action" (5), who indicate three phases through which action groups pass : an initial phase, growing action, outward activities. For these activities they suggest a number of ways and means (influencing the existing balance of power, utilization of the channels of communication, using arguments, appeal to experts).

Meulenbelt (25) deals with the same subject in a more penetrating and more radical way. When she proposes strategics for the feminist movement she tries to link feminism and socialism. She rejects one-sided strategics which tackle only one aspect of the problem and by doing so neglect the connections with other aspects. For that reason she prefers a multiple line of approach which consists of three

overlapping parts : proceeding from specific women's needs, an autonomous women's liberation movement, policy of making allies (in left-wing political parties, trade-unions and similar organizations). Meulenbelt's scheme can successfully be applied to other minority movements because of its combination of three crucial factors : insight in one's own situation and needs, cooperation of those directly concerned, awareness of links with a wider social context.

7.3. The place of social movements in the emancipation process.

The difficulty of defining the concept of emancipation can be ascribed to subjective appreciation of its nature and results, and to the experience that all liberation movements are in danger of creating new forms of domination and servitude (43, p. 231). It undoubtedly indicates a negation of the social status quo, condemning minorities to remain in an inferior position. This situation has concrete repercussions on their pattern of behaviour, of expectations, of opinions and of feelings.

Van Doorn & Lammers (38, pp. 292-295) state that the endeavours by the minority members to change their situation also effect their general attitude. It has been noticed indeed that participation in social movements can raise the participants' self-confidence. It also brings about an intensification of interaction with opportunities for more solidarity and grouping and for the development of their proper cultural identity.

Wertheims circumscription of emancipation (42, pp. 50-59) approaches the Marxian notion of the abolition of alienation. It includes two aspects :

1. a physical aspect : man's progressing freedom from nature (natural forces should always be reckoned with);
2. a social aspect : liberation from men-made servitude.

Contrary to the generally assumed attitude of adaptation to the status quo, he considers emancipation to be the essence of evolution. Consequently it can be used as a criterion to evaluate social movements (cf. Katz's definition (15)).

8. Concluding Remarks

This review of the literature on social movements may not have completely clarified the problems involved. At least it may have called attention to the complexity of the subject, to some erroneous tendencies in the field, and to some aspects that need further investigation.

6.1 Several authors stress the fact that the whole problem requires more *empirical research*, and regret that they are obliged to found their statements on far too few concrete data; neither does general theory meet their expectations (Banks (3), Katz (15)). More empirical study on specific movements might certainly reveal the parallels between social movements and the structure of society within which they exist (e.g. Watson (40)).

8.2. The study of social movements leads to the *rejection of the functionalist approach*, since it cannot really explain social change. The central question remains : why are some parts of a social system more open to reform efforts resulting in radical changes of the social structure ? The protest character of social movements requires a different outlook on society : the *conflict model* should prevail on the consensus idea. Social movements "suggest how much any society is less an integrated social system and more an historical product of group conflict and domination, in which some segments of that society may have never accepted as fully legitimate its institutions and values" (Mc Kee (23), p. 606). Reference could be made here to the ideas of Wertheim (42, 43) on values and contrapuntal countervalues in society, and to the last chapter of Turner & Killian (36) where they stipulate once more the conditions for collective behaviour : "widespread discontent *and* the availability of new cultural perspectives that suggest new possibilities for coping with discontent" (p. 523).

8.3. Some authors (especially Banks (2)) repeatedly advocate an approach of the subject in *more rationalistic terms*. Being historically determined, social movements (like scientific discoveries and technical inventions) should be studied in correspondence with their function in the emancipation process. Their ideologies should be related to the historical moment, to their constituting groups, and to the public addressed. According to the same rationality-principle the question should be asked how the urge to change the value patterns of the majority partially or totally can be justified.

8.4. *The justice motive* (cf. 2.2) has proved to be a valuable approach to the study of social movements, though the discussion on the concept of equality remains open (cf. Lerner (18), Sampson (32), Walster (39)). Deutsch (9) distinguishes between economically-oriented, solidarity-oriented and caring-oriented societies; internal conflicts are possible since they all combine these three characteristics. This leads him to three propositions;

1. In cooperative relations in which economic productivity is a primary goal, *equity* rather than equality or need will be the dominant principle of distributive justice. (Deutsch considers this condition to be dysfunctional since it implies the domination of economical values and the greatest reward for the most powerful, even when their inputs are no longer productive).

2. In cooperative relations in which the fostering or maintenance of joyable social relations is a primary emphasis, *equality* will be the dominant principle of distributive justice.

3. In cooperative relations in which the fostering of personal development and of personal welfare is the primary goal, *need* will be the dominant principle of distributive justice.

E. & G.W. Walster in their paper "Equity and Social Justice" (39) state the absolute necessity for minority groups to attain power. They start from a definition of equitable relationship: "the ratio of one person's outcome to inputs is equal to the other person's outcome / input ratio" (p. 21, mathematical formulation on p. 22). Inequity leads to exploitative encounters and distress, which can be reduced by the restoration of actual equity or by the restoration of psychological equity (several studies describe the techniques of such proceedings, usually without mentioning the dangers of manipulation and the possible camouflage of injustice). Social philosophers have taken divergent positions on the equality-proportionality controversy (the authors enumerate a number of factors influencing the choice in concrete situations). Since society through its ruling class can define anything as a valuable input, it is in fact power that determines the meaning of social justice. They come to the following conclusions: "There seems to be little chance that the majority will recognize the claims of exploited minorities unless these minorities can amass sufficient power to enforce their demands for equal treatment. Minority members can (and have) used a variety of techniques to make majority members realize that sharing with them is a more profitable strategy than hoarding. They can use praise, passive resistance, sabotage, moral opprobrium, or moral approbation. But unless the minority has some real power to affect the outcomes of the majority, the case seems hopeless. The powerful can probably always generate a philosophy to satisfactorily justify the most unequal of outcomes." (p. 39).

8.5. Wertheim (43) blames the groups which consider themselves as élite for their tendency to undervalue *the dynamics of the masses*. Consequently, the role of emancipation in the moulding of world history is often underestimated, not only in social sciences, but even

by those who play a part in it. The study of social movements can contribute to the right evaluation of this role.

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