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These two volumes, severally and taken together, continue the tradition set by the previous ones. They give us a cross section of reflections from contemporary philosophers on themes and problems in philosophy. This reason alone would suffice to welcome these two books to any library (whether public or private). In addition—this adds to the pleasure of the reviewer—both the volumes share the characteristic of the *series*: they are all concerned with problems *in* philosophy, problems *about* philosophy and not just those problems of sciences. As a result, the questions asked have a greater scope — a useful and necessary anti-dote for those of us who would like to define philosophical problems as problems of scientific theories alone. However, much like other members, these volumes share the weakness of the series as a whole: when one reads through them one gets the impression that most philosophical thinking is done in America and, to some extent in, Britain alone. The rest of Europe is hardly represented not to speak of the rest of the world. One wonders about the reasons for this curious state of affairs given, especially, the fact that most of the papers in the series are solicited pieces. As a result, the series acquire a peculiarly provincial flavour in its philosophising and the absence of representations from other schools in philosophy become all too glaring.

Most of the contributions collected in “Studies in Epistemology” are concerned with some of the central problems in epistemology: the notion of knowledge, what is it for someone to have knowledge that P and what kind of epistemic warrant (or justification) is there for someone to believe that P etc. It would be useful to sketch the problem, very briefly though, in order to give gestalt to the collection.

Till about 20 years ago, most philosophers had agreed upon as to what knowledge meant. Any belief that P held by a person at time t was considered knowledge iff (i) P is true, (ii) the person at t believes that P and (iii) that the person's belief that P is justified at t. In other words any justified true belief was to be considered knowledge. Notice, here, that the question at issue is more generic and broader than acceptance and rejection of scientific *theories* alone. It embraces all kinds of beliefs: from the belief that Donald Reagan and Ronald Reagan are not brothers to the belief that Earth revolves round the Sun. In 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short article titled ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ which upset the apple cart (1). The article showed, by means of examples which were a bit contrived, that this conception of knowledge was unable to discharge the function it was supposed to. To illustrate it with a more

natural example : consider a secretary who has just come into the office, glances at the office clock, observes that it is 5 minutes to 9 and believes that it is the time of the day. While it is indeed 5 minutes to 9, the clock had stopped, unknown to the secretary, exactly 12 hours earlier. Here is where the Gettier problem arises. (i) It is true that it is 5 minutes to 9 (ii) the secretary believes that it is the time of the day and (iii) the secretary is justified in believing that it is the time of the day because during all the 30 years the secretary has been in the office the clock has never shown itself to be unreliable. Despite all this we would be loath to say that the secretary has knowledge of the time of the day. This problem-type has been immortalised in the literature as 'Gettier problem'.

Most writings in epistemology since then are concerned with meeting this challenge (2). Many solutions have been proposed since then and what we have in this collection is a discussion of some of these solutions.

As I have mentioned already, in the 'standard definition' the adequacy conditions imposed upon any likely candidate to the status of knowledge are two in number. The first is that the belief must be true, and the second is that it must be a justified belief. Oliver Johnson's contribution to this volume baptises these two conditions as the truth condition and the justification condition respectively. He tries to show that there are at least two ways of understanding the justification condition : One could say either that the person is justified in believing that P or that the person must justify it to be true. In the first case the justification condition is severed from the truth condition while in the second it is not. Johnson's argument is that Gettier problem arises only in the second case and pleads for retaining the first definition.

What is it for a belief to be justified? What is a justified belief? What kind of justification are we talking about? Clearly we are talking about an epistemic justification, an epistemic warrant. That would mean that a belief is justified if we could justify the belief epistemically. The strongest epistemic justification that we could provide for believing that P is to show that it is entailed by other beliefs. But this inferential justification for believing that P merely pushes the issue backwards : we have to now justify those other beliefs which entailed P. Justification of these other beliefs require justification of some other beliefs and so on. This state of affairs seem to open up the prospect of a seemingly infinite regression. This problem of 'epistemic regress' confronts any attempt at providing a foundation for knowledge. Avoidance of these problems by avoiding the task of providing justification for knowledge is to embrace the skeptical view of knowledge. All contributions collected here opt for some or other version of foundationalism and are unanimous in rejecting the skeptical alternative.

What are the options open to philosophers who would like to provide some sort of foundation to knowledge? Very broadly, they are two in number : Either deny that the regression of inferential justification is infinite (and viciously circular) by showing that inferential regress sooner or later comes

to a stop with a set of epistemic beliefs which are *basic* in the sense of being non-inferentially justified. Or, deny the impossibility of infinite regression, deny that it is either vicious or circular or both. In the first case, the task is to show what these basic epistemic beliefs are, what characterises them, and how they are justified. In the second case, it is to show that knowledge is founded in the absence of any basic set of beliefs, without there being a termination for the inferential regression. Roderick Chisholm and Ernest Sosa embrace the first and second positions respectively. Sosa contrasts these two options, open to foundationalism, by means of a metaphor: knowledge is either a pyramid or a raft. Opting for the raft metaphor, whose origin is to be traced to Hans Reichenbach, Sosa argues against the objections for infinite regression. Finding these objections wanting Sosa constructs a version of foundationalism, which he calls 'substantive foundationalism', which has surprising affinities with the coherentist conception of knowledge. Chisholm, on the other hand, is busy building up a plausible 'pyramidal' foundation to knowledge. In the essay collected in the volume, he outlines the refinements required by his account. The epistemic warrant for believing in a set of basic beliefs is that they are "self-presenting".

Lawrence Bonjour, in his contribution, subjects another species of foundationalism to critical scrutiny. This 'species' tries to solve the epistemic regress by arguing for a set of basic beliefs and its difference, from, say Chisholm's version has to do with the property of these basic beliefs. The basic belief, according to this version of foundationalism, is either nomologically certain or else it is highly probable that the basic belief is true. But, this belief in the truth status of the belief in question *does not* belong to the set of beliefs embraced by the knower. The truth of the belief is an excellent reason to accept a belief as basic – but the *knowledge* of the truth status of the belief in question is *external* to the person who holds the belief. Bonjour tries to argue that this externalist conception of justification should be rejected.

Alvin Goldman attempts to show that externalism need not be rejected. In fact, he would like to show that only externalism can offer anything approaching a theory of justification. He distinguishes between two aspects of the problem of justification: one aspect where the principle of justification specify those features of beliefs which confer epistemic status on them and the other aspect where the principle is so designed as to guide the knower in regulating or choosing his or her beliefs. The second aspect is regulatory in nature and Goldman argues that externalism is able to give us the most reasonable principle for this aspect.

Robert Audi, in his contribution, restricts himself to analysing the nature of 'defeated knowledge', that is "... a justified true belief that would be knowledge if it was not undermined by one or another kind of untoward circumstance" (p. 75). George Papas talks about cases where a person who had justification or evidence for a belief does not have it anymore at a later time.

The truth condition is discussed, from different points of view and in different formulations, by Carl Ginet, Gilbert Harman, Keith Lehrer and it

would be impossible to speak about their contributions in the space of this review.

Contributions from J.F.M. Hunter, Panayot Butchvarov and Fred Dretske take up the issue of the nature of 'belief'. What is it for a person to believe that P? What is believing? What kind of entities are believed in? These questions inevitably raise the problems of intentionality, cognitive states, consciousness, etc.—problems which these contributions try to shed a light upon. To speak of these kind of issues is to speak of the problem of the 'mental' and the 'physical'. David Rosenthal, in his paper, takes issue with eliminative materialism viz., the view that 'mental' is in principle eliminable from scientific discourse. The opponent of Rosenthal is Rorty directly and Feyerabend indirectly. Nicholas Rescher, Simon Blackburn and Joseph Margolis take up, in their respective contributions, the issue of the relation between our knowledge of the world and the world as it is. After a period of dormancy, the belief that the world we know is structured by the conceptual schemes we have has rapidly gained ground. One of the problems that such a belief brings along has to do with the possibility of arbitration between two conceptual schemes. Rescher takes up this question and suggests that appraisals of conceptual schemes must be detached from semantical considerations altogether and sees in human 'praxis' such a semantically neutral arbiter. Both Blackburn and Margolis focus upon the issues that underly the recently intensified discussion about the realist assumption of knowledge (3). Margolis tries to identify the cognitive issues at stake in the dispute between the 'realist' and the 'idealist' while, Blackburn focusses more upon the notion of convergent realism.

Though I have not been able to mention all the contributors to this volume, much less discuss the contributions of those mentioned, what I have said must be enough to give one an idea of the wide variety of issues that are handled in this very rich collection. As must be fairly clear by now, most of the discussions contained in this volume is to be squarely located — one way or another — in the mainstream of Anglo-saxon philosophy. This Anglo-Saxon philosophy is the *explicit* theme which unites the contributions to the 6th volume titled "The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy".

The scope of this volume is equally broad as well: There are discussions about Brentano (by Chisholm), Frege (by Benacerraf, Parsons, Lockwood, White), Ryle (by Weitz and Vendler), Austin (by Bird), Wittgenstein (by Klemke, Bamborough, Hudson), Quine (by Chihara, Stroud). Apart from discussions of specific aspects of these thinkers there are discussions of *themes* in Analytic philosophy: the idea of atomic propositions (by Sommers), the idea of logical forms (by Hochberg), the theory of definite descriptions (by Devitt), the theory of sense-data (by Bird), on epistemic attitudes and mental phenomena (by Barcus and Searle respectively), on ontology (by Bergmann and Campbell), on fallacious inferences (by Massey), and a personal recollection of the Vienna circle by Ayer.

Let me very briefly outline the ideas contained in some of the articles. In his article on Frege, Benacerraf is concerned with the idea commonly held by philosophers that Frege was the first logicist who met Kant's challenge by showing that propositions of mathematics are not synthetic but are really analytic. Benacerraf shows that such is far from being the case and that what Frege did was not to enter into philosophical dispute about the nature of mathematical propositions (viz., whether or not these are synthetic a priori judgments). Rather he attempted a proof of "propositions that had yet to be proved, that he believed *could* be proved, and that he believed *should* be proved" (p. 33) in mathematics. Benacerraf's contention is that this way of conceptualising the problem effectively displaces the question from the arena of philosophical discussions. Parson's article on Frege has a much more restricted scope: he wants to see whether Frege's doctrine of indirect reference and sense offers a solution to the 'paradox of analysis' and ends up by concluding that it does not (4). Resnik tries to assess the influence of Frege on the formation of analytic philosophy and concludes that Frege's philosophy of mathematics was more important than his philosophy of language to his successors. In an all-too-brief survey he relates Russell, Wittgenstein and Carnap to Frege's thought and traces the influence of the latter upon the former. Moravcsik tries to compare Chomsky with Frege and comes to the surprising conclusion that despite the prima facie opposition between the two there are elements of deep similarity in terms of their approach to the study of languages.

The contribution of Lackey is about an unpublished book of Russell. Written in 1913, partially published in the pages of *The Monist* in 1914, this book reveals a not-so-familiar Russell struggling with mental phenomena conceived in those terms whose ancestry stretches back, not to Berkeley and Hume but, to Meinong and Brentano. Lockwood gives a sympathetic treatment of Russell's neutral monism i.e., Russell's belief that the world was not made out of either mind or matter but out of a neutral 'stuff' which was like some kind of an ancestor of both. Though Lockwood's own sympathies lie with Russell he does not evade the difficulties such an account creates for explaining the 'mental'.

Of the essays on Wittgenstein, Hudson's essay tries to explain Wittgenstein's attitude towards religion. He shows that Wittgenstein attributed to religious thought the same role he had attributed to 'fundamental propositions': they constitute limits to thinking. Bamborough's task is to draw a similarity relationship between Pierce and Wittgenstein. He comes to the conclusion that there is more to this attempt than is evident at first glance and that Pierce and Wittgenstein are actually some sort of kins. And then there is Klemke's essay on Wittgenstein. Klemke takes up Popper's reading of Wittgenstein and also his challenge to the wittgensteinians. Klemke comes to a similar conclusion about Popper's reading of Wittgenstein, arrived at by experts on Plato, Hegel or Marx, that Popper misrepresents and misunderstands his opponents. Klemke wishes that Popper "...would stick to the areas in which he is competent... as a critic of

Wittgenstein (and Plato, Hegel and Marx, one may add – *reviewer*) his remarks are worthless and can only lead to more confusions and misunderstandings. Hence, if I may paraphrase a famous statement in the *Tractatus*, I offer this advice : Whereof one does not have the competence or knowledge to speak one ought to remain silent” (p. 260). Amen !

I have not been able to do justice to most of the articles in this collection – including the discussions on Quine’s naturalised epistemology, or Searle’s discussion of the mental phenomena within the analytic philosophy, or the discussion of the absence of theory of fallacy within philosophy of logics. The scope of the volume is simply too broad to allow of any detailed discussions.

In conclusion, I would like to make a suggestion or two to the editors of the series. To begin with, the studies are a bit incoherent. The themes that unite the diverse contributions are so broadly defined that there is simply no coherent structure that animates these volumes. Perhaps, it would be better if the editors (for their planned volumes) formulate the themes in a more succinct fashion in the form of specific problems rather than leave it as loose as it is now. While generality is a virtue, these is only a thin dividing line between that and nebulousness. Nebulousness *qua* theme results in narrowly conceived projects (*qua* individual contributions) resulting in a severe restriction of the impact and effectiveness of the volumes. Take the 6th volume for example whose theme is “The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy”. That means any question, or any aspect of the mainstream philosophy during the last 100 years !

Secondly, it would be better if future volumes are prefaced with an editorial introduction linking up each of the contributions to the other and to the thematic question.

Thirdly, the focus of the “Midwest Studies” is not clear to the reviewer : the impression that I get is that the editors are trying to tread a path which is mid-way between the focus of a philosophical journal and that of a thematically unified *studies*. Thematically unified but otherwise unconnected contributions are best left to the existing philosophical journals : in a studies which appears only once a year it merely reduces its usefulness. The latter requires a greater cohesion and a compromise can only affect adversely.

All these reservations notwithstanding, these volumes are an essential collection to any serious philosophical library. One could go back to these volumes several times and read them each time with great pleasure and ‘profit’. Reasonably priced and well produced, they are a financial and aesthetic reward. The articles collected are all of a high quality – a serious representation of some of the best thoughts on the subjects. One awaits eagerly for the next volumes of the series.

NOTES

¹In *Analysis*, 23 (6), 1963, 121–23.

²Some articles about this problem are collected in Roth, M. D., and Galis, L. (Eds.): *Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge*, New York, Random House, 1970.

³See, for example, Laudan's "A Refutation of Convergent Realism" and Newton-Smith's "In Defence of Truth" both published in Jensen, U. J., and Harré, R. (eds.): *The Philosophy of Evolution*, London, The Harvester Press, 1981. Laudan's article is reprinted with a slight change of title in *Philosophy of Science* 48 (1), 1981, 19–49.

⁴The paradox of analysis arises when substitution of identicals (which have the same sense and reference) in a true argument procures a false statement (in arguments of the sort '..... is an analysis of').