Given the popularity of the domain and the multiplicity of approaches to it, it seems already an endless task to write a proper (and reasonably sized) introduction to the philosophy of mind. Brook and Stainton however, aim for more. Their Knowledge and Mind is intended to cover, at an introductory level, both epistemology and philosophy of mind, as well as to discuss, in passing, some metaphilosophical issues.

The first chapter explores the domains at issue: the central questions of both epistemology and philosophy of mind are put forward, and for each question sample answers are introduced. E.g., the question with respect to the nature of knowledge is illustrated by the "justified true belief"-account of knowledge. And the fundamental difference between Descartes' dualism and Hobbes' materialism serves as a preliminary indication of the scope of the mind/body problem. In the epilogue to the first chapter, the basic logical tools of the trade are introduced. Useful distinctions such as that between a valid and a sound argument are carefully drawn and illustrated. Furthermore, three argument forms are spelled out: modus ponens, modus tollens and hypothetical syllogism.

Chapter 2 and 3 constitute the part of the book devoted to epistemology as such. Chapter 2 deals with skepticism. The authors explain its challenge at length, i.e. there is no non-circular way to justify the inference from how things seem to be to how they really are. Five objections to external-world skepticism, including an appeal to direct perceptual realism, are considered and criticized. In the epilogue to chapter 2, Gettier's counterexamples to the "justified true belief"-account of knowledge are discussed. In this context the authors suggest that a satisfactory solution to Gettier's problem is a prerequisite for a knock-down argument against skepticism.

Chapter 3 focuses on knowledge of language. Firstly, some arguments are discussed to the effect that at least some of our knowledge of language is not acquired by experience but is, rather, innate. Subsequently, some arguments for and against the idea that thinking is just a kind of inner speech are evaluated. Finally, Fodor's Language of Thought (LOT) is passed in review.

Chapters 4 to 6 constitute the part of the book devoted to the philosophy of mind. Chapter 4 covers the metaphysics of mind. After a pre-
liminary discussion of the identity theory and functionalism, the notion of a "criterion" is introduced and it is argued that a criterion of the mental is needed before the debate between dualists and materialists can be resolved. Several criteria for mentality pass in review: since non-spatiality seems to be too broad (some purely physical things also lack precise location) and intentionality too narrow (bodily sensations and mood states do not seem to have intentionality, yet seem to be candidates for being part of the mind), introspectibility is put forward as an adequate criterion. If the criterion is carefully supplemented, the authors suggest, it also covers truly unconscious states, albeit in the sense that if one were to become aware of them, it would be by becoming able to introspect them. The bulk of the chapter, however, is devoted to the introduction of the various positions on the mind/body problem. Three kinds of dualism are distinguished: substance dualism, property dualism, and explanatory dualism. As far as materialism is concerned, the notions of "type identity" and "token identity" are invoked to clarify the differences between the identity theory and functionalism, and it is described how eliminative materialism evolved into neurophilosophy.

In chapter 5, some of the positions on the mind/body problem are evaluated. Firstly, four arguments for dualism are easily dismissed. Secondly, the authors apply Occam's razor to the debate between dualists and materialists. They argue that the burden of proof is on dualists: they have to produce reasons for believing that apart from matter, something else exists too, whether it is something immaterial or some kind of non-neural property. The rest of the chapter is devoted to the debate between functionalists on the one hand and "neurophilosophers" on the other. The chasm between these two approaches is illustrated by the fairly recent debate about whether the mind does its cognitive processing symbolically or nonsymbolically.

Chapter 6 deals with another metaphysical question altogether: the problem of determinism and free will (although the authors avoid the murky notion of "will" and use the term "choice" instead). Firstly, the three main positions (i.e. hard determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism) are carefully introduced by spelling out the agreements and disagreements among them. Subsequently, it is noted that Frankfurt's second-order-desire model of free choice leaves out deliberation, and a sophisticated compatibilist model (SCM) is proposed that supplements Frankfurt's model with deliberation. Finally, two powerful objections to
SCM are discussed.

In chapter 7 and 8 the links between the two domains are further analyzed. Chapter 7 deals with the problem of other minds. The authors argue for an inference-to-the-best-explanation approach to the problem. We do not observe the mental states of others directly. Rather, we ascribe mental states to others in order to explain the behavior we observe.

Finally, chapter 8 discusses the prospects of attempts to naturalize epistemology and mind. In both cases, the authors note some obstacles. The key obstacle to the project of answering epistemological questions by turning to science is that questions about knowledge inevitably raise value issues, and that science is not designed to answer such normative questions. One of the questions the authors raise with respect to attempts to naturalize the mind is whether there can be a scientific theory of meaning and processing of meaning.

Knowledge and Mind makes a number of sophisticated debates in epistemology and philosophy of mind accessible for beginners, without oversimplifying them (though some positions on the mind/body problem, such as epiphenomenalism, are too easily dismissed). The book can also serve as an introduction to philosophy per se, since it includes the necessary clarifying and stimulating metaphilosophical asides.

However, I have some reservations with respect to the topics chosen. E.g., one can hardly claim that a chapter on skepticism, one on linguistic knowledge and yet another on the problem of other minds, together constitute a full introduction to contemporary epistemology. One of the central questions raised in the first chapter is “What is knowledge?”. The long-standard response (i.e. the JTB-account) to it is mentioned and Gettier’s counterexamples are briefly discussed in the epilogue to the chapter on skepticism. But that is all Knowledge and Mind has to offer as far as the nature of knowledge is concerned. One might wonder why the textbook doesn’t even mention (let alone discuss) other well-known (and fairly recent) theories of knowledge, such as the defeasibility theory, the causal theory, the reliability theory, the counterfactual theory, and the explanationist theory. In any case, the lack of an adequate treatment of central issues such as justification and the structure of knowledge, seems a lost opportunity.

Moreover, it is not entirely clear to me why topics such as “linguistic knowledge” and “free will” have been included. In the preface, the authors motivate their choice by claiming that, in their experience, these
problems, unlike the more abstract ones such as skepticism and the mind/body problem, capture the imagination and attention of nearly anyone. Moreover, they suggest, these topics bring students to see the relevance of empirical work to philosophy. But, in my experience, these arguments apply equally well to completely different topics, such as perceptual knowledge.

Nevertheless, *Knowledge and Mind* is a useful textbook. Teachers can easily solve the problem that some pivotal issues are not or insufficiently dealt with. And the fact that some topics that are discussed extensively seem to reflect the idiosyncratic interests of the authors, doesn’t necessarily diminish the value of *Knowledge and Mind*, since it adds up to the originality of the textbook.

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