INTRODUCTION: PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Morality is one of the preferred domains of reflection by professional philosophers. It is fair to say that their contributions have not much concerned the area of practical morality, which was largely left to educators, clergymen and other people in guidance of dependent groups. Still, when a scientific study of morality was first attempted psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists alike turned to moral philosophy in order to clarify the object of their study. Thus Durkheim and Piaget relied on Kant’s moral theory in order to guide their investigation of moral development and education. It has been pointed out that the roots of Dewey’s theories on valuation and the basis of his educational projects are to be found in Hegel’s philosophy. Westermarck, a distinguished pioneer of the comparative study of moral thought and conduct has drawn on emotivist philosophical theories to formulate his views on the cultural relativity of morals. In fact, there is hardly any empirical work on morality which is not in one way or another indebted to moral philosophy.

Of course, the converse is also true. Philosophers have always been careful to base their ethical theories on observations on moral development and interaction and have always tried to make their theories fit those facts. Since the rise of metaethical theory with H. Sidgwick and G. E. Moore, however, philosophy has tended to neglect empirical findings on the subject of morality. Recently this trend has been reversed. Several philosophers have urged moral philosophy to become more practical, more realistic in a psychological and educational sense. Bernard Williams, for instance, in his widely acclaimed Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, denies that practical moral guidance can be derived from the general definition of ethical concepts. Similarly, Stephen Toulmin holds
that metaethics, taking as its model the mathematical pattern of formal
deductive reasoning, increasingly estranged from actual practical rea-
soning.

Recently, approaching the subject from different angles, a number of
important attempts have been made at bringing together both disciplines.
Thus, starting in 1977, MOSAIC (The Morality and Social Action Inter-
disciplinary Colloquium), an international group of psychologists, educa-
tionalists and philosophers, has done much to stimulate philosophical
reflection in the field of moral psychology. And there are a number of
similar examples of philosophers, psychologists and educationalists ac-
tually working together in moral psychological and educational research.
Recent bibliography confirms this growing scholarly interest in bridging
the gulf between moral psychology and philosophy. The numerous referen-
ces in the major publications in the field as well as in the readers men-
tioned in note 5 testify to the breadth and depth of the philosophical
‘restructuring’ of moral psychology and education.

This is not the place to review the literature on the subject. Yet, I
would like to mention some very recent publications although in doing so
I risk committing gross injustices by ignoring important contributions.
Paul Crittenden has tried to uncover the assumptions of the great his-
toric philosophers on the subject of moral development and how these
assumptions are reflected in their moral theorizing. Crittenden makes one
aware of the extent to which the major moral philosophies (utilitarianism,
kantianism and various brands of deontological theory, emotivism, etc.)
depend on intuitive presuppositions on the nature of moral development.
Recently, Owen Flanagan has published a sort of summa of his earlier
work that now can be seen as a persistent attempt at relating philosophical
theories of the self, personal identity and theoretical ethics to empirical
research on the social construction of the person, the nature of the emo-
tions and of cognition, on personality, etc. Similarly, Thomas Wren
has criticized, from the point of view of philosophy, the assumptions
made by the most influential schools in moral psychology on the nature
of motivation.

There should be no doubt that the work of Lawrence Kohlberg has
been an important impulse to this vigorous interest. To many, his work
has assumed the nature of a paradigm for their field. However, its in-
fluence as a kind of negative paradigm, as a target for criticism and a
standard for improvement, has been even more obvious. By using sophis-
ticated normative models, derived from ethical theories such as Rawls', Hare's and Harsanyi's, and by clearly stating the philosophical presuppositions of his approach, Kohlberg has marked the path for further research and reflection. Thus, much of the attention of scholars in the field is presently being directed to a number of outstanding questions in his work concerning the interface of philosophy and psychology/educational science. Without claiming exhaustiveness I would like to indicate a number of these problems.

(1) First, there is Kohlberg's assumption of the primacy of justice in moral reasoning development. Kohlberg considers his theory to be a 'reconstruction' of the kind of reasoning used by subjects to solve conflicts about the 'right' course of action. His notion of moral development invariably leading to a final ideal stage, whose definition has been mainly taken from John Rawls' *Theory of Justice*, presupposes the validity of that normative ideal. This 'reconstructive' approach to moral development understandably invites criticism from the point of view of alternative conceptions of normative ideals. The best known challenge to Kohlberg's theory is Gilligan's view that there are two moral 'voices'. Gilligan believes that an ethics of care and responsibility is needed to complete an orientation to moral problems centered on the notion of justice. But there are other challenges as well, all taking their starting point from alternative philosophical conceptions of morality, e.g. 'aretaic' moral theories, in particularly virtue ethics, Humean emotivism, ethical centering on the 'personal' component of morality, etc.

Also related to this assumption of the primacy of justice are epistemological problems concerning the definition of stages as 'unitary reasoning structures' and concerning the assumption of there being a developmental continuity, and not just a mere sequence, between these stages. These epistemological problems may indicate that the stage theory needs to be revised in important ways.

(2) Another cluster of philosophical problems centers on Kohlberg's cognitivism and his insistence on the primacy of reasoning. Many people believe there is more to moral development and education than reasoning alone. In short, some of the psychological premisses of Kohlberg's theory invite further philosophical discussion.

(3) Kohlberg's cognitivist emphasis has provoked critical examination of the supposed primacy of the epistemic self and of the corresponding conception of moral agency. Accordingly, philosophical positions about
the moral self and personal identity are examined on their relevance to psychological theory.

(4) By introducing yet another ideal endpoint, a seventh stage of ‘ethical’ development, Kohlberg has stirred discussion about the ultimate ‘foundation’ of his views on what is mature morality. The issue turns on the place of moral development in personality development (cfr. J. Loevinger and E. Erikson) and in what Fowler has termed ‘faith’ development. What, it is asked, is the relationship of moral stages — if there are any — to what Kohlberg has called the ‘soft’ stages characteristic of development. Is it possible to make a distinction between ‘hard’ stages of morality and ‘soft’ stages and what are the consequences of an answer in either direction to moral psychology and education? This range of problems includes the question of how a number of traditional types of morality, e.g. the ethics of friendship, agape (universal love), compassion, forgiveness, and ahimsa (non-violence) fit into the developmental picture.

(5) Kohlberg’s claim that moral development is universal, introduces yet another range of philosophical problems. How are some observations of the comparative study of moral development to be reconciled with this claim? For in many cases the ideal endpoint to which moral development tends seems to be inspired by philosophical traditions that are basically different from the Western one’s. Another problem are the seemingly different conceptions of moral agency and ideas about the self underlying the moral experience of the populations studied. The problems, in other words, frequently are on the level of comparing the metaethical theories that explain moral experience and that define what it means for a rule or an action to be considered as ‘moral’ in a given society.

A final problem in the field to which I wish to draw attention is how to bridge educational findings (which frequently are of a more or less intuitive and practical kind) and psychological theory (which becomes more and more sophisticated). What are the implications for educators of all that complicated metaethical reasoning with its attendant psychological research models and findings? Which approach ‘works’ and above all: why? How to translate theoretical approaches in educational precepts and conversely, what can education teach us about the practical soundness of moral philosophy?

The present issue of Philosophica, as well as the next one, is intended to contribute to these ongoing debates. Jan Buelens, the first contributor, reviews recent findings on four strategies available to individual teachers
to influence and change the moral attitudes and conduct of the young. He concludes that the success of individual teachers in moral education, including those profiting from recent advances in psychological theory, is rather limited. Drawing on historical and sociological sources, he points out that schools have apparently succeeded in invariably transmitting those values that are dominant in capitalist societies. Yet, some findings in Turiel's psychological theory are promising: the classroom probably offers a relatively autonomous space in which moral development can be promoted to a limited extent.

Jan van der Ven offers a piece of moral philosophy applied to the educational problem of alcohol consumption. His aim is to evaluate the theoretical assumptions of a public campaign that is being conducted in Holland. The author contrasts two approaches to the value of moderation, namely the idea of moderation as a norm, rule or obligation in the context of a deontological 'morality of law' and the idea of moderation as a disposition in the context of teleological morality of virtue. Illustrating his exposition by historical examples taken from Dutch approaches to education, van der Ven discusses the advantages and drawbacks of value transmission, value clarification and value communication in implementing the two moralities of moderation. He argues that an Aristotelian long-term conception of happiness is indispensable to the support of a campaign of the type launched by the Dutch government.

The article by Hing Keung Ma is an example of cross-cultural theorizing along Kohlbergian lines. The author takes up Snarey's suggestion that pathways of moral development probably are culture-specific from a certain point on. He draws on classical Chinese philosophies (mainly Taoism and Confucianism) to construct a psychological model to be used in the empirical research he is currently engaged in. Compared to Kohlberg's theory his model puts more emphasis on the emotional aspects of moral development.

Robert Carter's contribution addresses the question of the 'seventh' stage. He proposes that what Kohlberg hinted at in postulating an 'ethical' stage beyond morality are the elements of personal integration (feeling, willing and knowing) that are present in the lower stages, but become clearly perceptible only at the highest stages. Morality is always embedded in a 'horizon' of knowing, feeling and willing that provides the justification and motivation to adhere to moral demands. This 'horizon' suggests a foundation beyond reasoning. Focusing on concepts of the self
one sees that the stage sequence also is a sequence of the range of ‘things’ the self identifies with. The author speculates that the seventh stage itself can be divided into two stages, the first of which is formulated from the perspective of the identification of the rational self with the cosmos (cfr. Marcus Aurelius). The second one however is characterized by experiences of self-transformation that move one beyond the self. Carter also draws on Eastern philosophies to state his point.

Ludo Peferoen’s paper addresses a topic central to psychological theories that emphasize the role of the self in morality. He believes that an ideal of personal continuance is a necessary part of a complete moral theory. He then turns to the question whether a particular theory of personal identity commits one to a particular ideal of personal continuance. The author takes issue with Derek Parfit’s idea that adopting a particular theory on personal identity, namely a reductionist one that denies the existence of a persisting self, commits one to fundamental changes in one’s moral beliefs. Peferoen argues that the importance connectedness is assumed to have in reductionist theories actually derives from the importance identity has to us. He concludes by suggesting that the fact that people do care about what kind of person they will be in the future itself may well be part of what makes up the fact of their identity. These issues on moral agency, the self, personal identity and the related problems of moral motivation and action will be continued in the sequel to this volume.

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NOTES

2. After all, the subtitle of Hume’s Treatise is ‘An attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subject’.

