TOWARDS A NON-AXIOLOGICAL HOLIST ETHIC

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Over the last fifteen years several authors have argued that the development of an environmental ethic requires the substitution of ethical holism for the atomism or individualism of traditional western ethics. Callicott, for instance, says that atomist moral theories cannot "adequately address what is emerging as the most pressing of all contemporary environmental problems, 'the silent crisis of our time', threatened massive species extinction and the consequent biotic impoverishment of the Earth". In a similar vein, Norton writes that "no ethical system which is individualistic, regardless of how broadly the reference category of individuals is construed, can offer ethical guidance concerning current environmental policy in all cases." Callicott, Norton and others are convinced that only a holist ethic, an ethic that bestows value upon natural wholes, such as species, wildernesses, biocoenoses and ecosystems, can offer a way out of the current ecological crisis.

This claim is debated, though. In his well-argued Man's Responsibility for Nature Passmore has tried to show that "conventional morality suffices to justify our ecological concern" and McCloskey fancies that "one could go on and on, indicating how the issues that are of such concern to ecological ethicists are also of concern to moralists who accept traditional moral theories".

This paper will not take sides in the pro/con discussion about the necessity of a new, holist ethic. Instead, for the sake of argument, it will be assumed that natural wholes (species, ecosystems, ..., the biosphere) indeed deserve moral consideration. The purpose of this contribution, then, is not to inquire into the necessity, but into the possibility of a holist ethic.

The development of a holist ethic seems to be impaired from the outset by the holist assumption that the primary objects of moral consideration are natural wholes; as a result of this assumption, the individuals that constitute natural wholes logically can only
deserve moral consideration in a secondary or derivative sense, i.e. in so far as they are parts of larger wholes. Put otherwise, from a holist perspective it seems that natural wholes have intrinsic value, while everything else (including human beings) merely possesses instrumental value. This outcome is, to say the least, not very pleasant. It could imply, as Johnson has observed, that some bacteria have more (instrumental) value than humans and, hence, deserve also more respect than humans. Or, as Heffernan has suggested: "If the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community is the sum bonum, the best thing we can do is to find some ecologically sound way of disposing of the human race or at least of drastically reducing the human population."

Hence, it is not surprising that no contemporary environmental ethicist holds that natural wholes are the primary objects of moral consideration. Natural wholes are, on the contrary, considered to be morally on a par with their constituent elements. As Callicott expresses it: "An adequate value theory for non-anthropocentric environmental ethics must provide for the intrinsic value of both individual organisms and a hierarchy of superorganismic entities." Thus, the possibility of a holist ethic depends in the end on the possibility of a reconciliation between atomism and holism. Therefore, this paper's inquiry into the possibility of a holist ethic will in the first place be an inquiry into the commensurability of holism and atomism.

II

In "The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic" Tom Regan has argued that the development of a truly environmental ethic presupposes the development of a non-anthropocentric axiology. Although this thesis has of lately been contradicted by a number of authors (see section V) it fairly well indicates the way by which the construction of a holist ethic has generally been approached. This approach has yielded roughly three types of non-anthropocentric axiologies: objectivist, "nonjectivist" and subjectivist ones. Objectivist axiologies will be focused on in the current section of the paper, section III and IV will respectively be concerned with "nonjectivist" and subjectivist value theories.

Objectivist axiologies can be further subdivided into supernaturalist, nonnaturalist and naturalist axiologies. They share the belief that values are "part of the fabric of the world" (Mackie) or, in other words, that they are as much real as, say, the printed matter in front of you. Only naturalists however, belief that
values are also of the same general quality or substance as printed matter, i.e. that they refer to something in the physical world. Super- and nonnaturalist axiologies, on the contrary, rely on metaphysical theories that allow for the existence of non-material worlds. The latter are either spiritual (in the case of supernaturalism) or of an undefinable quality (in the case of nonnaturalism).

The major drawback of supernatural and nonnatural axiologies, as well as of the metaphysical theories underpinning them, follows from their speculative character. As Thomas Hill has put it: "They require strong and controversial premises, and ... they will always have a restricted audience". Therefore, apart from a brief reference in the conclusion of this section, super- and nonnaturalist based, holist ethics will not be discussed here.

Environmental ethics founding father, Aldo Leopold, was the first one to formulate a holist ethic on a naturalist basis. The moral maxim that he propounded, "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise," clearly indicates that he considered the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community not only as natural qualities, but also as positive intrinsic values. It is unclear however, whether these were for Leopold the only intrinsic values in the world; he anyway did not undertake much effort to explain his view on that point, and neither did he pay attention to the problem of the commensurability of ethical atomism and holism. These shortcomings are largely compensated, though, by the writings of later authors who tried to fit Leopold's ideas into a philosophically more accurate mold.

The until now most elaborate of these "Leopoldian ethics" seems to be Peter Miller's "value as richness"-theory. Miller himself prefers to label his theory "new expanded naturalism". The label is supposed to indicate that his naturalism departs from the "old" naturalisms "in broadening the pertinent field of investigation of value facts from psychological and social features of human existence to nature at large." At first sight, his theory may seem to have a lot in common with the old naturalisms, for its central norm, the norm of richness, is certainly applicable to psychological states - e.g., to have a rich experience, to live a rich life. Miller indicates however, that the value connotations the term "richness" may bring to mind "can apply quite independently of whether the natural entities are conscious or not". "The idea of richness", he continues, "is a generalized normative concept derived from particular normative judgments about good and bad, better and worse conditions of plants, animals, people and eco-
More specifically, it refers to the quality of an organism's potential and the quality of the realization of this potential.

Miller's expanded naturalism is in a number of ways superior to Aldo Leopold's rather sketchy remarks on his so-called land ethic. First of all, Miller's "value as richness"-theory allows for only one value-standard, and is, thus, easier to apply in practice than Leopold's ethic with its three-legged standard (beauty, integrity, stability). As Miller indicates, his own axiology yields one simple injunction: "Maximize the preservation and production of rich values, while minimizing the evils of their destruction." Secondly, in contrast to Leopold's ethic, Miller's naturalism seems to be able to reconcile atomism and holism: individual organisms as well as superorganismic entities can be richer or poorer in terms of their potential and the realization of their potential. Hence, intrinsic value can be assigned to both natural wholes and their parts. Finally, Miller's theory is definitely non-anthropocentric, while avoiding at the same time misanthropic implications. For in view of the five dimensions of richness which Miller distinguishes (see note 19), humans seem to have more intrinsic value than, say, plants and bacteria.

Notwithstanding these positive points of critique, Miller's naturalist axiology is largely unacceptable. It labours under at least three major defects. Since these flaws are not just typical for Miller's theory but also for other naturalist holisms, they will be dealt with in some detail.

(1) Expanded naturalisms tend to be subject to the so-called slippery slope-argument: by the very fact that they incorporate value-standards that have broader applications than those of old naturalisms, it is more often than not the case that their value-standards apply also to entities they were not intended to be applied to. The richness-norm, for instance, applies not only to humans, animals and plants, but also to, among other things, organs of the human body, industrial companies, nations, human races and even computerized machinery (including nuclear missiles). In other words, all of these entities possess up to a certain degree potentials that can be realized and should, consequently, according to the "value as richness"-theory, be ascribed intrinsic value. This unintended result of Miller's theory is clearly also an undesirable result. For, suppose organs of the human body have intrinsic value; should we not applaud, then, the killing of dying persons, in order that their healthy organs are saved to help other persons? Or, assume that races have intrinsic value; in that case, the morally right thing to do, it seems, is to advocate widespread use of eugenetics and even to endorse
euthanasia—programs that eliminate the weak members of the race. Imagine, finally, that self-guiding nuclear missiles have intrinsic value. Should we, in this situation, not respect their launching, because that is the way missiles realize their potential?23

One could try to circumvent these morally repugnant side-effects of expanded naturalism by employing an argument from nature. It would be unnatural and thus wrong, the argument goes, to assign intrinsic value to, for instance, nuclear missiles, because these are human artefacts and not really part of nature. And, while it may not be unnatural to attribute value to races and organs of the human body, so the argument continues, it is certainly unnatural and thus wrong to try to preserve their value by artificial means, such as eugenetics, active euthanasia and transplantations.

The argument from nature assumes that what is natural is also good. In this way it introduces in a very ad hoc manner an additional value-standard that may moreover be incompatible with the originally proposed value-standard — be it the richness-standard or another standard. Apart from thus weakening the coherence of the expanded naturalism theory, the argument from nature is also dubious in its own right. It implies that everything that is transformed by human action is a human artefact, i.e. unnatural and, therefore, without value. As a further consequence it yields the absurdity that every human action is necessarily wrong. For, every human action transforms per definition what is natural into what is unnatural and thus degrades the value of the world. All in all, the argument from nature certainly does not secure expanded naturalism from its undesirable implications, it merely aggravates them.

(2) As has been observed before, Miller seems to be able to reconcile atomism and holism by maintaining that individual organisms as well as superorganismic entities can be richer or poorer in terms of their potential and the realization of their potential. However, the reconciliation of atomism and holism requires more than just a value-standard that makes it possible to attribute intrinsic value to both individual organisms and natural wholes. It requires also rules that help to decide what course of action to take when the interests of individuals organisms and natural wholes collide. How should one, for instance, act if a dilemma occurs between on the one hand saving an animal species from extinction and on the other hand creating jobs in an unemployment struck region?

It seems that to this kind of questions neither Miller’s theory, nor any other expanded naturalist theory can offer a satisfying answer. The reason for this is that the value-standards they
use are so general that they are only fit to decide *which* entities have intrinsic value, but not *how much* intrinsic value they possess. To be true, Miller’s theory accounts for the fact that intrinsic value comes in degrees, but unfortunately it does not provide us with a calculus that tells us to which degree which entity has intrinsic value. Moreover, there are good reasons to assume that Miller cannot even theoretically provide such a calculus. For “richness”, as Miller handles the term is a highly qualitative term, which does not seem to leave room for the quantifications that are necessary in order to construct a calculus. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that Miller theoretically succeeds in reconciling atomism and holism, this success can only hold as long as his theory is not applied in practice.

(3) Naturalisms (and not just expanded naturalisms) have since the beginning of this century been challenged by G.E. Moore’s famous open question argument. Moore argued that, if some natural qualities are identical with values, then it should be nonsensical to question that identity, just as it is nonsensical to ask of an object X that is Y whether it is indeed Y. Now, since it is always sensible to ask about an object that is Y whether it is good or has value, it cannot be the case that a natural quality Y is ever identical with a value. Hence, Moore concluded, naturalism rests on a fallacy.

Whether Moore can really show that naturalism rests on a fallacy is, as Frankena has pointed out, arguable. Without any doubt however, Moore’s critique forcefully confronts naturalism with its own arbitrariness. Naturalism claims to be objective, but when it comes to offering objective reasons for singling out one or more natural qualities as values, these reasons always seem to be surprisingly subjective. As Callicott has observed: “Miller very fully and enthusiastically characterizes or describes ‘richness’, but he does not adequately explain why richness, apart from some subjective judgment or conscious preference is *per se* the ground of intrinsic value in nature.”

In conclusion, it should be observed that the above points of critique do not only challenge the validity of Miller’s theory and other expanded naturalisms, but that they *mutatis mutandum* also question the credibility of axiological objectivism in general. The slippery slope-argument, for instance, is as problematic for super- and nonnaturalist theories as it turned out to be for Miller’s naturalism. For, the former need as well as the latter to develop a broadly applicable value-standard, i.e. a standard that can account for the intrinsic value of both individual organisms and natural wholes. Hence, it is unlikely that they, any better than Miller’s theory, will be able to avoid the dilemma between
either morally repugnant implications or arbitrariness. Axiological objectivism as a whole, then, offers few if any prospects for the development of a holist environmental ethic.

III

The term "nonjectivism" has been coined by Richard and Val Routley to indicate value theories that are neither objectivist, nor subjectivist. The Routleys themselves, though, have done little to justify such a theory. In "Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics" they merely argue for the plausibility of nonjectivism by pointing out the deficiencies of objectivism and subjectivism. Their definition of subjectivism is, however, quite narrow and it can, consequently, be argued that a broader conception of it would easily withstand the Routley's critique. Moreover, their central axiological claim, namely that "there are no values which are entirely independent of a valuer," may, as will be seen in the next section, be incorporated in a subjectivist axiology. "Nonjectivism" then, will be used here in a slightly different sense from the Routley's proposed meaning. Like Callicott, I will use the term to indicate those axiological theories that largely reject "the simple sharp distinction between object and subject (between the \textit{res extensa} and \textit{res cogitans})" and "the ancillary simple, sharp distinction between fact and value (between intrinsically value-free objects and intentionally valuing subjects)."

By far the most popular, though not the only, nonjectivist axiology is build around the thesis that values should be considered as secondary qualities (color, flavor, odor, etc.). Books, as Capra's \textit{The Tao of Physics}, that purport to unfold the ontological implications of the so-called "new physics", have in recent years significantly raised the acclaim of this thesis. It is largely on basis of these and similar publications that J. Baird Callicott has recently argued that quantum theory yields a picture of reality in which "mass and motion, color and flavor, good and evil, beauty and ugliness, all alike, are equally potentialities which are actualized in relationship to us or to other similarly constituted organisms." Put otherwise, according to Callicott, all properties, including values, should be conceived as secondary qualities.

A critical assessment of Callicott's account of the implications of quantum theory would lead us to far here. Nevertheless, it should be observed that Callicott's picture of the world as consisting only of secondary qualities seems incapable of explaining the occurrence of experiences and is, therefore, hardly
conceivable. "Phenomenalism about secondary qualities", as McGinn has indicated", can be correct only because it is not correct for primary qualities. For the disposition in which [e.g.] being red consists needs an explanatory basis of primary qualities (wave-lengths, etc.), and these cannot in turn be construed as dispositions to produce certain experiences -- on pain of there being no non-circular explanation of the occurrence of those experiences".34

The implausibility of Callicott's ontology does not necessarily disprove his point that values are like secondary qualities. Indeed, quite a few philosophers have recently espoused the same point, without clinging to an encompassing, non-traditional ontology.35 Like Callicott, most of these philosophers are attracted by the view that values are neither strictly objective, nor merely subjective.36 However, a closer analysis of the characteristics of secondary qualities indicates that this view is not at all supported by the thesis that values are like secondary qualities.

Secondary qualities differ from primary qualities in that they are not intrinsic features of an object. The "redness" of an object, for instance, does not refer to something "in" the object but to a quality of the perception of the object. As McGinn puts it: "Being red consists in looking red."37 This implies that secondary qualities are not tied up with objects in any systematic way and, further, that objects have as many secondary qualities as they seem to have, relative to a specific observer: "... the essential point is that ... the ultimate criterion whether an object has a certain color or taste (etc.) is how it looks and tastes to perceivers."38 Hence, if values are like secondary qualities, there are as many values as there seem to be values to valuing subjects. It becomes then, completely pointless to discuss values; values are simply what they appear to be, and it is obviously absurd to disagree or to be sceptical about appearances being appearances.39

Some authors have tried to avoid this almost solipsist conception of values by arguing that secondary values are not, as is suggested here, primarily appearances. McDowell, for instance, has stated that "secondary-quality experience presents itself as perceptual awareness of properties genuinely possessed by the objects that confront one" and that "there is no general obstacle to taking that appearance at face value."40 Whether this view is correct or not, it apparently assumes a close link between primary and secondary qualities or, more specifically, it presupposes that for any instantiation of a secondary quality, there is one specific ground in the object which explains the perceiver's experience. Thus, if values are like secondary qualities their in-
statiation depends, according to this theory, on the presence or absence in an object of a distinct set of natural properties. Ultimately then, this view boils down to an undisguised axiological naturalism. For, thought it does not equate values with natural properties, it requires that the former are causally dependent on the latter and, hence, it situates the origin of value in the natural world.

Thus, the thesis that values are like secondary qualities leads in one interpretation to an almost solipsist form of subjectivism and in another to an already rejected form of objectivism. It is, hence, clearly unfit as a basis for a nonjectivist axiology. Currently, thus, there is no adequate justification for nonjectivism, and, consequently, also no adequate, nonjectively grounded holist ethic.

At first sight a subjectivist axiology may seem to involve a contradiction in terms, for subjectivism entails that a thing has value if and only if someone values it. Hence, subjectivism implies also the blurring of the radical distinction between intrinsic value and instrumental value: both can only have meaning in reference to a valuing subject. Nonetheless, proponents of axiological subjectivism continually stress that their views do not imply that all values are instrumental values. It is still possible, they insist, to make a difference between, on the one hand, those things that are valued for themselves and, on the other hand, those things that are valued because of their utility. If we value, for instance, a newborn infant, Callicott says, we "value it for itself, above and beyond either its material-economic or psycho-spiritual utility." Subjectivism thus allows at least theoretically for the fact that natural objects and nature as a whole can be valued for themselves, and is in this sense compatible with a holist ethic. Of course, the main problem is not whether subjectivism is compatible with a holist ethic, but whether it can provide the axiological foundation for such an ethic.

In an effort to cope with this problem several authors have suggested that a person's value-system cannot be considered independently from his or her worldview. Facts and values, according to this view, do not live separate lives:

we cannot perceive the world in a purely objective way which is not influenced by our knowledge and beliefs. The way we
perceive the natural environment cannot be independent of our knowledge of biology, even the conceptual models within we think about biology. The way we perceive the environment is affected by the interest we take in it, which is in turn affected by our whole value orientation.\textsuperscript{43}

Hence, whether subjectivism can provide an axiological foundation for a holist ethic depends on whether there exists a worldview that incorporates such an ethic and that is at the same time superior to other worldviews.

Marietta, Rolston, Callicott and others have argued that an ecological worldview meets these requirements.\textsuperscript{44} It incorporates a holist ethic because it bridges the moral gap between man and nature by seeing man not as \textit{apart from} nature, but as \textit{a part of} nature. As Shepard has put it: Ecological thinking ... requires a kind of vision cross boundaries. The epidermis of the skin is ecologically like a pond surface or a forest soil, not a shell so much as a delicate interpenetration. It reveals the self ennobled and extended, rather than threatened, as part of the landscape, because the beauty and complexity of nature are continuous with ourselves.\textsuperscript{45}

An ecological worldview is, the argument continues, also superior to other worldviews. From an empirical perspective, for instance, it integrates recent scientific theories better (e.g. the "new physics") than does the still prevailing mechanistic worldview.\textsuperscript{46} From a sociopolitical perspective, its insistence on planetary instead of narrow nationalist interests, opens up new avenues for the solution of pressing world problems (e.g. the threat of a nuclear war).\textsuperscript{47} And, finally, the ecological worldview also satisfactory reorients traditionally problematic relationships, e.g. between humans and nature (cf. supra), and men and women.\textsuperscript{48}

In order to be able to critically assess the ecological worldview, it is important to focus on its subjectivist basis. For, one might be tempted to think that, because the adoption of a worldview implies discarding the sharp distinction between facts and values, the ecological worldview must be underpinned by an (unarticulated) nonjectivist axiology. There is however, a crucial difference between the subjectivist "worldview-approach" and nonjectivism. The latter implies that, though values are not part of the fabric of the world, they can in principle be grasped by any open-minded person. The former, on the contrary, states that values only make sense in the context of a worldview. Hence, a holist environmental ethic can only be justified contextually, i.e. within the context of an ecological worldview. For those that
do not share this worldview, there are also no compelling reasons to espouse a holist ethic.

Of course, as has already been observed, one could argue that the ecological worldview is superior to other worldviews and that there are, consequently, compelling reasons to adopt that worldview. However, this argument is not very convincing. For, if axiological, deontological and even cognitive standards — pertaining to the integration of empirical knowledge are all context-dependent, it looks, to say the least, very suspicious to maintain that there are, nevertheless, some context-independent standards that indicate that worldview A is superior to worldview B — inevitably, everyone who proclaims such a thing adheres to worldview A.

It seems, then, that the "worldview-approach" yields a moral and cognitive relativism. Traditionally, most philosophers have been anxious to depict such relativism as irrational, supposedly because it falls short of the ideal of universal cognitive and moral truths. But, if, as has been shown in this paper, objectivism and nonjectivism are equally philosophically unsound, it may be rather irrational to stick to the ideal of universal truths and quite rational to accept worldview-relativism. For, as Rescher has pointed out:

We certainly can reason about values and certainly can evaluate them. It is just that we cannot do so on a basis that is not value committed, the reasoned defense of values must itself invoke values.

And further:

In saying that the choice among philosophical positions is at bottom a matter of value, we certainly do not slide or degrade the issue. On the contrary, given the importance of what is at stake with values, cognitive values included, we thereby underscore its transcendent significance.

Notwithstanding the fact that worldview-relativism may by itself be philosophically palatable, it is still doubtful whether it can support an acceptable holist ethic. For, even if one wholeheartedly accepts the ecological worldview, there are few reasons to wholeheartedly accept an axiologically colored holist ethic that is construed on top of it.

It is important to recall in this respect that the ecological worldview strongly emphasizes the insignificance of man's ecological position: man is an intrinsic element of nature, just one more thread in the web of life, just a single link in the chain of
being. From an ecological perspective, then, humans are not an a
pair with the natural wholes to which they belong, they are merely
subordinate particles. Hence, it is hard to see how the ecological
worldview can bring forth an environmental ethic that reconciles
atomism and holism and that, thus, averts the misanthropism of a
purely holist ethic. The conclusion, therefore, must be that sub-
jectivism, its own merits notwithstanding, is as unsuited as an
axiological basis for a holist ethic, as objectivism and non-
jectivism proved to be.

V

As the title of this paper suggests, it would be too hasty to
presume at this stage of the argument that a plausible holist
 ethic is a mere chimera. Indeed, it is conceivable that, while
axiologies are not able to produce an acceptable holist ethic,
such an ethic can be supported in another, non-axiological way. In
order to give concrete form to this idea, it is worthwhile to have
a look first at some features of axiologies in general.
In the last three sections objectivism, nonjectivism and sub-
jectivism have been approached and criticized separately. This may
create the impression that what is wrong or right with them, is
only wrong or right because of what they are separately, not be-
cause they are axiologies. Axiologies share however, some features
which indicate that from the outset the quest for an axiologically
based holist ethic must be flawed.
Characteristically, axiologies divide the world in two kinds of
entities: entities that have intrinsic value and entities that
have merely instrumental value. This division seems to be under-
pinned by a tacitly assumed value-orientation, namely that, until
axiological proof is given to the contrary, entities merely have
instrumental value. Until it can be shown that they have intrin-
sic value, entities are, thus, subject to the will and whims of
humans. Plainly, this hidden value premise contains a strongly
anthropocentric flavor. For, given this premise, it does not need
much argument to show that, as, among others, Hobbes and Rousseau
have pointed out, it is in the interest of every individual human
being to bestow intrinsic value upon other human beings. In view
of this premise, it is however, not clear at all why one should
attribute value to other beings than humans: the anthropocentric
position that is fostered by axiologies is simply too comfortable.
Hence, axiologies seem to be particularly ill-suited as foun-
dations for a non-anthropocentric ethic.
Axiologies also typically develop standards that tell us which
entities do and which entities do not have intrinsic value. Proposing such standards is relatively easy if one wants to ground an atomist ethic — though, of course, arbitrariness always looms in the background —, but becomes quite problematic if one is in search of a holist ethic. For, anyhow, individual entities possess features that are fairly divergent from the features of the wholes they are part of — whether these wholes are considered as systems, communities or organisms. This renders it much more difficult to develop a standard that can unambiguously be applied to both individual entities and wholes (cf. e.g., the problematic character of Miller's theory in this respect). A solution here might be to employ a plural value-standard; but, as is known from the fate of a number of deontological moral theories, this solution as a rule only succeeds in depraving the theory form its attractive simplicity.52

One could argue that the above account of axiologies rests on an unduly restriction of the definition of axiologies. For it is possible to think of an axiology that does not start from the assumption that "in the beginning" there was only instrumental value. Sachsse, for instance, has argued that one should start from the premise that "weil das Sein mehr wert ist als das Nichtsein", everything that "is" should be assigned intrinsic value.53 If by this thesis Sachsse would mean to convey that everything has value equally, the thesis is obviously absurd. If, however, he intends to say that everything has intrinsic value, but that, nevertheless, one thing has more value than another, he has to introduce a value-standard that accounts for degrees of value. And there, of course, he cannot but run into the same kind of trouble as any other axiology.54

Although an axiology that starts from the premise that everything has intrinsic value is, thus, as defective as any other axiology, it may give us a clue where to look for a non-axiological holist ethic. As has been indicated above, standard axiological theories rest on the attitude that everything is allowed, as long as no good reasons are presented to bestow value upon and protect certain entities. An axiology, such as Sachsse's however, seems to rest on the opposite attitude, namely that all entities should be protected from interference, unless good reasons are presented to justify such interference. The Routleys have observed that this attitude is very similar to the respect-view that can be discovered in various non-Western ethics. On this respect view, they say,

one starts from a restricted position, a position of no interference and no exploitation, a position at peace with
the natural world so to say, and allows interference — not as on Western thinking, restricts interference — for good reasons. The onus of proof is thus entirely inverted: good reasons are required for interference, not to stop interference.55

The respect view has definitive advantages vis à vis any non-anthropocentric axiology. First of all, it avoids the problem of having to formulate a value-standard. Strictly speaking, on the respect view no entities have intrinsic value: entities are not respected for what they are, but because of what the person that respects them wants to be. This reasoning may sound opaque; later on, though, its logic will become more transparent.

Since the respect view does not incorporate a value standard, it can easily overcome the apparent incommensurability of atomism and holism. On the respect view there is even no point in making a clear-cut distinction between individual entities and natural wholes, precisely because it does not locate value in any of them. To be true, the respect view creates its own problems. It seems, for instance, to imply an almost lethargic laisser faire, laisser passer-attitude.56 Whether this is indeed so depends however, on the place the respect view occupies within morality and this, at its turn depends on the manner in which one tries to justify the respect view.

Norton has tried to defend a view which is very similar to the respect view and which he has labeled “weak anthropocentrism”. Weak anthropocentrism differs from its strong counterpart, “human chauvinism”, in that it incorporates an “ideal of maximum harmony with nature”. This ideal is, as Norton repeatedly emphasizes, not axiologically grounded: it “need not attribute intrinsic value to natural objects, nor need the prohibitions implied by it be justified with non-anthropocentric reasoning attributing intrinsic value to nonhuman natural objects.”57 Its justification, then, does not rest on a value theory, but on the fact that the ideal is “a fitting part of a rationally defensible world view.”58

Norton’s reference to “a rationally defensible world view” brings again last section’s discussion about the ecological worldview in focus. One might, consequently, be inclined to argue that Norton’s justificational attempt must eventually share the same misanthropic fate as the holist ethic developed by axiological subjectivists. This comparison does not hold water though. The subjectivist construction of a holist ethic fails just because it superimposes an axiological structure on nature: this structure belittles the significance of human welfare — for human welfare is, indeed, ecologically rather insignificant — and, thus, be-
comes a misanthropic straightjacket of human behavior. Norton’s weak anthropocentrism avoids all this. The ideal of harmony with nature does not require an external axiological constraint, but gets its strength from the internal motivation that is yielded by the ecological worldview and, more specifically, by the awareness of man’s position in nature. Thus, the ecological worldview seems indeed to provide a justification for the ideal of harmony with nature.

Nevertheless, Norton’s defense of a non-axiological holist ethic is not entirely satisfactory. For, as has been indicated in the previous section, it is doubtful that there are any compelling reasons of adopting an ecological worldview that lie outside the framework of that worldview. Still, one could raise the question whether there are any reasons of embracing the ideal of harmony with nature that do not presuppose an ecological worldview.

Several authors have argued in this respect that such reasons may be found in the general moral significance of the ideal of harmony with nature. Lloyd Reinhardt, for instance, has suggested that the “ideal of harmony with nature” or, more generally, the “no interference, no exploitation”-attitude should be considered as a (psycho)logical extension of a similar attitude towards humans:

To be glad, to rejoice that the other exists, that the work of art exists, without the desire to consume and possess, these are aspects of an art, the art of letting things be, which is part of the more general and vital human virtue of overcoming the tendency to think of everything in relation to ourselves.”

In a similar vein, Thomas Hill has argued “that indifference to nonsentient nature typically reveals absence of either aesthetic sensibility or a disposition to cherish what has enriched one’s life and that these, though not themselves moral virtues, are a natural basis for the appreciation of the good in others and gratitude.”

Authors, such as Janna Thompson, A.T. Nuyen and Ernest Partridge have even gone further than that by defending the claim that an attitude of respect towards nature is a prerequisite of achieving what Aristoteles called “the good life”. As Nuyen has expressed it: “If we desecrate the environment, if we wipe out species of plants and animals, if we destroy or damage objects of beauty, we will have not just impoverished our own natural home, but impaired the human good. We will have hurt human integrity and dignity.”
All the authors just mentioned discern a strong link between a person's attitude towards nature and a person's moral character. The notion "moral character" is vague, though, and not very popular in contemporary ethical theorizing. Hence, one could argue that a reference to a person's moral character in order to justify the ideal of harmony with nature merely begs the question. Put otherwise, it simply transforms the original problem into a more general problem: the question, what reasons there are to embrace an ideal of harmony with nature, now becomes the question, what reasons there are to embrace an ideal of human virtuousness.

It seems that roughly two reasonable answers can be offered to the latter question. The first answer is backed up by an essentially conservative view of morality. According to this view, morality is primarily a system of rules, meant to prevent that humans harm each other — in Freudian terms: morality is the superego that constrains the destructive tendencies of the id. From this perspective, the ideal of human virtuousness can only be of secondary moral significance. Acts that promote this ideal are, thus, not morally required, but so-called morally supererogatory acts.63

The second possible answer is fostered by a progressive view of morality, such as provided recently by several feminist ethicists.64 On this view, morality is not so much a system of rules as of relationships that are built on responsibility and caring. Moral agents are, thus, not considered as potential offenders of rules, but as potential contributors to projects that promote the harmonious living together of human beings. From this perspective the ideal of human virtuousness is essential to the very idea of morality. Hence, acts that promote this ideal are not just morally, supererogatory acts, but exemplify what it means to have a morally good character. The earlier quoted statements of Reinhardt, Hill and Nuyen should be understood from within this viewpoint.

Instead of defending either the conservative or the progressive view of morality, I will argue that both views are complementary. There seem to be at least three, closely interdependent reasons why this is so. They will be merely presented here. Their defense would require a paper in itself.

First of all, taken separately, the conservative and progressive view of morality seem to have both on their own terms morally undesirable implications. To defend this claim with respect to the conservative view, it suffices here to refer to the well-known fact that the bulk of contemporary publications in moral theory content themselves with showing that (conservative) moral theory X or Y yields immoral implications A and B — the contributions in
this volume are no exceptions to this rule. With respect to the progressive view the claim is more difficult to defend, simply because so little has been written about it. Nonetheless, the danger is not imaginative that the progressive view's insistence on the importance of personal relationships is prone to encourage an insular perspective on the environment that might result in a complacent and in the end self-destructive laissez faire laissez passer attitude.\

Secondly, both the conservative and the progressive view of morality have difficulties in accounting for the complexity of psychic and social reality. Or, put otherwise, they unwarrantedly reserve morality for only one segment of this reality. On the conservative view psychic reality tends to be reduced to a mixture of self-interest and reason and social reality to a mixture of conflicting interests and "law and order". On the progressive view, the other sides of psychic and social reality tend to be overemphasized: psychic reality is narrowed to a matter of caring and Verstehen and social reality to a matter of personal responsibility and loyalty.

The first and second reasons indicate that, taken apart, the conservative and progressive views of morality are deficient. These are, then, mainly negative reasons in favor of the idea of the complementarity of both views. There is, however, also a powerful positive reason to believe in this complementarity: one could consider the progressive view of morality as a depiction of the ideal state of morality and the conservative view of morality as at the same time a necessary condition for the realization of that ideal state of morality and a constant inhibition to the process of realizing that ideal state. This almost dialectic relationship between the conservative and the progressive view of morality can be further clarified by returning to the ideal of harmony with nature.

On the complementary view of morality this ideal has neither a supererogatory, nor an obligatory character. It should instead be regarded as a mirror of the ideal state of our relationship with nature and, as such, also as a motivational impetus to transcend realistically the human chauvinist legacy of the conservative view of morality. To transcend anthropocentric morality in a realistic way involves an attempt to demolish the obstacles that inhibit the realization of the ideal of harmony with nature without thereby destroying the conditions in current morality that make such action possible. In concreto it implies that one should avoid, on the one hand, a back to nature rhetoric, and, on the other hand, a reformist policy on utilitarian basis. In other words, one should try to develop a personal-political praxis that situates itself
between so-called deep and shallow environmentalism.

One might argue that all this is very nice in theory, but very vague when it comes to providing concrete arguments for the protection of nature. It seems not of much help as a basis for an environmental ethic. This argument however, is wrongheaded in a double way.

First of all, it overlooks the basic thought of the foregoing reasoning, namely that morality is not once and for all times fixed, but is, on the contrary, continually "on the road". Thus, on the complementary view of morality it does indeed make no sense to talk about an environmental ethic as an unchanging behavioral code for our interaction with the natural environment. An environmental ethic should instead be regarded as a cluster of guiding principles that are continually subject to rearrangement and revision.

Secondly, the argument wrongly assumes that the complementary view of morality does not offer us concrete arguments for the protection of nature. To be true, this view cannot tell us that species and wildernesses have intrinsic value and should, therefore, be preserved. But, it can convincingly show the link between the ideal of harmony with nature and the ideal of human virtuousness and invoke the latter as a reason to, for instance, preserve wildernesses and species. It can also defend the ideal of harmony with nature in the framework of an ecological worldview and contrast the strengths of this worldview with the weaknesses of other worldviews. Of course, to be successful these arguments should already up to a certain degree be shared by the audience they are addressed to; the purpose is to link the familiar with the unfamiliar. That is precisely the reason why the development of an environmental ethic is necessarily a very gradual process.

VI

This paper set out as an inquiry into the possibility of a holist environmental ethic and, more specifically, as an inquiry into the commensurability of holism and atomism. Sections I till IV formed in this respect the negative or destructive side of that inquiry: one by one the attempts to erect a holist ethic on an axiological basis were rejected and later on it was shown that axiologies are by their very nature unable to reconcile atomism and holism. Hence, the inquiry became a search for a not axiologically based environmental ethic.

At first, the ideal of harmony with nature seemed a suitable candidate as a basis for such an ethic. It became clear however,
that this ideal cannot be straightforwardly justified and treated as a basis for a “here and now”-environmental ethic. The ideal of harmony with nature emerged as an ideal in a very literal sense, i.e. as something that in its perfection can guide but not rule our behavior. It thus exceeds the limits of moral philosophy: the latter is always bound to make compromises that on the one hand transcend the boundaries of the old, human chauvinist morality and can, on the other hand, only dimly prefigure the new ideal set before us. Moral philosophy becomes not the less important for it. While it may no longer reveal moral truths, it can still reveal the (psycho)logical connections between ideals and certain current moral practices. In this way it can provide an indispensable rhetorical tool in the continuous personal-political enterprise of building and rebuilding an environmental ethic.

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NOTES

6. In order to avoid elaborate phrasing I will often use “holist ethic” and “holism” instead of respectively “holist environmental ethic” and “environmental ethical holism”.
7. In accordance with Goodpaster’s terminology, “X deserves mo-
ral consideration” means here “For all A, X deserves moral consideration from A, where A ranges over rational moral agents and moral consideration is construed broadly to include the most basic forms of practical respect”. (Kenneth E. Goodpaster, “On Being Morally Considerable”, Journal of Philosophy 75 [1978], p. 309).

12. The classification is Callicott’s. See his “Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics”, Environmental Ethics 7 (1985), pp. 257-275. The boundaries between objectivism, nonjectivism and subjectivism are not always very clear, especially since some authors seem to switch from one position to another. Rolston, for one, has at one moment defended objectivism (e.g., in “Duties to Endangered Species”, Bioscience 35 [1985], pp. 113-128), but seems most of the time to stick to a kind of nonjectivism (“are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?” Environmental Ethics 4 (1982), pp. 125-151).
19. Miller distinguishes five dimensions of richness that together should give a full-fledged account of what it means for organisms to be richer or poorer in potential and realization of potential than other organisms. Organisms can (1) be richer or poorer in resources, depending on their “access” to those materials in the environment necessary for the realization of
their potential. They can (2) also be richer or poorer in terms of development and accomplishment, i.e. in terms of the degree to which they develop and realize their potential. Further, (3) they may be richer or poorer with respect to the diversity of their (potential or actual) functions – cf. Aristotle's ranking of humans, animals and plants). Since these functions can be more or less integrated, organisms can also (4) be richer or poorer in terms of integration and harmony. Finally, (5) organisms can also be richer or poorer in their utility for others. See for all this Miller, "Value as Richness", pp. 107-110.


22. See ibidem, p. 113.


24. How should one, for instance, compare the richness of an organism's resources and the richness of another organism's functions?


31. Rolston has in most of his writings defended a nonjunctivist axiology. But, since his value-theory remains largely implicit (cf. note 12), the assessment of its merits would require a (for this paper) too close textual study.


33. Callicott, "Intrinsic Value ...", p. 271.


42. That is the reason why the Routleys' main thesis, quoted in the previous section, can be thought of as a subjectivist thesis.


46. See on this Callicott, “Tertium Organum” and McLaughlin, “Images and Ethics of Nature”.


54. I leave it up to the reader to point out the weaknesses in Sachsse's axiology: its basic tenets are enwrapped in this passage: "a) Sein ist mehr Wert als Nichtsein, b) mit der Kompliziertheit nimmt der Seinsgehalt, die Seinsdichte, die Konzentration von Sein und der Seltenheitsgrad von Sein zu. Das Seltene hat von Natur aus einen höheren Wert, weil es schwerer ersetzbar ist. Und das Komplizierte ist seltener, weil es mehr Unterschiede zu anderem Kompliziertes hat. Daher der unersetzliche Wert eines Menschen". (Ibidem, p. 35).


56. This critique has been elaborated by Richard A. Watson in his "A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Biocentrism", Environmental Ethics 5 (1983), pp. 245-256.


60. Thomas E. Hill, "Ideals of Human Excellence ...", p. 216.


