ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE TRAGIC

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It is difficult to prejudge whether tragicality is a value, perhaps it would be best described, after Scheler, as a phenomenon, or even an event that occurs in the "life" of values. At any rate, its semantics is multifarious and includes: reality - man's consciousness - works of art. In this respect tragicality may be treated as a metaphysical, outlook-on-life or an aesthetic category. Principal decisions in the sphere of axiology, concerning the manner in which values exist, determine whether the discussed phenomenon is "located" within the world of physical objects, among ideas, on an historical, social, moral or aesthetical plane, or else within an individual's psyche. Ever too often one of these planes is absolutized.

The so-called controversy over the tragic which has lasted for several centuries in European thought concerns, above all, the following problems: whether the tragic is a metaphysical category (i.e. an essential feature of the world), or whether it is barely one of aesthetics (i.e. to be found in works of art), and: whether it is an objective or subjective phenomenon.

If there is no certainty as to whether the world is tragic, and if also we are not sure whether the tragic as an aesthetic value objectively exists in a work of art, let us begin our discussion at the point which, it seems, arouses least doubt: there exist people who believe that the world is tragic, whose outlook on the world is "tragic".

We shall ignore here a revision of the various theories concerning outlook on the world, and seeking the meaning of this concept shall simply go to its sources. The term Weltanschauung is ascribed to Schleiermacher and means: die Welt anschauen — to perceive and recognize the universe in its "sensory detail". A commentary to this concept of outlook on life may be found in Dilthey, according to whom outlook on life is never exclusively the product of thought
but is chiefly the result of life experience, and the very passing of
that experience into consciousness requires a prolonged and arduous
effort.

If it is so, then what is the tragic experience which underlies the
"tragic outlook on life"? What is the "sensory detail" in which
consciousness recognizes the tragic laws of the universe? In order to
answer this question we must first polemize with M. Scheler's
conception of the tragic, expounded in his work “On the Pheno-
menon of Tragicality”. (Bemerkungen zum Phaenomen des Tragi-
schen).

On all German thinkers, Scheler contributed most to “objecti-
vization” of the phenomenon of the tragic. The tragic, in his opinion,
is an important feature of the world, given to us without notional
analysis or interpretation: “directly in a tragic event is put before
us some peculiarity of the world, present before our eyes in the
attitude of apprehension inherent in the very event”.1

What is distressing in this formulation is that Scheler, though
he speaks at length about the tragic hero (the tragic situation of a
revolutionary), appoints to man in his experience of the tragic the
role of a spectator — experience consists in looking at something —
and sometimes even permits, as it were, of the possibility that the
tragic may exist without man's participation, as when he says that
such event is tragic when “the same force which enables something
to fulfil some high, positive value (...) becomes in that very same
action the cause of destruction of just that thing as the subject of
value”2 and gives the example of a fire of the heating system
installed to protect a gallery collection from dampness and decay,
a fire that entirely destroys that collection. This event, according to
the philosopher, is tragic in itself and one might suppose that no
"spectator" is needed here.

It appears that Scheler had disregarded the subjective aspect
of the tragic. For it is not the case that a being reveals itself, dis-
playing ready-made, sensible structures, without the effort of inter-
pretations, hypotheses and complements on the part of man. We may
therefore doubt whether what we call the tragic is inherent in the
structure of the world itself. Man finds in it nothing but embryos,
"vestiges" of structures3 which, following the undertaking of the
effort — mentioned by Dilthey — of raising life (due to cognitive,
emotional and volitional manipulations) to the plane of
consciousness, may assume the form of a tragic structure4.

What do we, then, find directly in the tragic experience, what
is the nature of that "vestige" of the future structure, its fragmentary and incomplete outline that reality reveals before man? Most thinkers who take up discussion of the tragic point to a dialectical contradiction underlying that phenomenon\(^5\). It is precisely in experience, which may develop into a tragic experience, that man is given the primary acquaintance with the antinomic contradiction or paradox that are inherent in being itself. The feature of the world which is directly given in experience is not the tragic, but the antinomic, paradoxical, conflicting and dialectical nature of reality\(^6\).

The contradiction of being that reveals itself in experience may, due to the subject's mental activity, be manifested on the plane of consciousness as the tragic, a paradox, the absurd, the comic, catastrophism, etc.\(^7\) We are therefore justified to ask about the conditions necessary for the experience of contradiction underlying the world to become a tragic one.

The answer to this question is rather complex. It seems that the condition necessary for the contradiction of phenomena given in experience to become the ferment of structuring, by the subject, of a tragic construction — is an attitude of commitment on part of the recipient. The tragic will be reached by someone who, while experiencing the paradoxicality of existence, is himself entangled in this paradox, whom this paradox or conflict concerns directly. In short — tragicality is only given to the tragic hero. This truth finds excellent illustration in the well-known painting by Peter Brueghel: The Fall of Icarus. None of those present, except the tragic flier, participate in his accident or share his tragedy.\(^8\) Similarly, tragic experience befalls nobody but Oedipus; the citizens of Thebes partake of the suffering because of the pestilence, they feel terror and fright — but they do not share Oedipus' tragedy. In the experience wherein the contradiction transforms itself, due to the tragic hero, into a tragic structure, one may not be a spectator or a perceiver. This experience is based on participation. When reality had revealed to Oedipus a "vestige" of the antinomy underlying his fate, he said: "I want to fathom the mystery to the end..." and in this way he began his journey in search of the next elements of the tragic structure; having brought it together, at the end of his path, he will be trapped in it. For the experience of the tragic is sometimes perilous and not everyone has the courage to cope with it. It is highly probable that many people never get to know the tragic experience for, at the moment of an acute and unexpected contact with the contradiction of experience, they forsake the journey to
meet the tragic at the very beginning of the way. One may compare here the radically different attitudes of Ismene and Antigone. To Antigone, the fact that her brother’s body is not buried appears as a contradiction that breeds the tragic, lying at the roots of the world in which she lives. To Ismene it is, at best, just another injustice. Through her sister, Ismene perceives an opportunity to “meet” the tragic, yet she retreats from such audacity in panic. It is worth noting that later, when her sister has already buried their brother’s body, wants to die with her. So it is not death that arouses her terror, but tragic death — to which, after Antigone’s solitary deed, she no longer has a right. For it also happens that the man who shrinks from a tragic experience takes his pain, suffering or ordinary despair, these inapt substitutes of the tragic, for the tragic itself.

We must stress here that, when posing the question about how the tragic structure is shaped on the basis of the contradiction of the world given in experience, we would vainly seek the answer by trying to fathom the nature of that very contradiction, given in experience; its description remains meaningless, for it is always a sign that requires complementation and interpretation (e.g. an analysis of the pestilence oppressing Thebes does not suffice to arrive at the more general sense, of which the contagious disease that kills innocent people is but an omen). And these interpretations may vary.

It seems that the qualification of the contradiction given in experience is performed during the peculiar encounter between the subject of experience and reality. The man who is involved in a conflict tries to invest with a sense the several elements that delimit that conflict, relying on all his convictions concerning the world in which he lives. Yet this process of “investing with sense” may not be carried out at random: as the subject brings together a structure of meanings, reality reveals consecutive, new elements the meaning of which must be “fitted” in the created construction. Now, it is somewhere at the meeting point of the sense-making activity of human consciousness, and elements of real facts — that the tragic structure is formed.

It is of particular importance whether the tragic, at which the experience of the primary contradiction is aimed, can be reconciled and “settled” within the man’s former views and convictions. The point is not that the process should be an easy one (acceptance of the tragic as one of the determinants of one’s outlook on life must take a dramatic course), but whether it is at all, in the given man’s
case, possible. If it is not, the experience that leads towards the tragic will be discontinued, and the thought that the world could have a "Janus face" — subdued.

We have so far employed the term "tragic outlook on life" without describing it more precisely. In fact, such an outlook does not exist — one cannot point to a specific aggregate of characteristics distinguishing such a view of reality. The conviction, born out of tragic experience, that tragicality is an important feature of the world, or that tragical events are part of the human condition — may be included in various systems of thought, i.e. the tragic may "settle" within different ideologies: Christian and Marxist, existential, and others. The only condition, it seems, is that these systems be open to paradoxicality, antinomies or the dialectics of existence.

It is thus in experiencing the tragic that man, entangled in a situation of conflict, using all his intellectual, emotional and volitional powers, makes the effort to discover the more profound and more complete sense of his situation. When, at some stage of his journey, he finds that the unfolding truth contradicts his beliefs (e.g. that about God's omnipresent justice) — he either breaks off the experience, or else, already as the tragic hero, carries it on in the name of reaching the Mystery of Existence, which at the end of the experience appears in the new tragic structure with such brightness that it brings him, like Oedipus, to self-blinding.

The kind of metaphors employed here might suggest that the experience of the tragic has an almost infinite duration in time. Yet the time of the tragic, i.e. the time during which the tragic experience is completed (from the emergence of contradiction till the formation of tragic structure) varies and may also be confined to a single moment — this would be the "moment when eternity strikes", to borrow a phrase from Kierkegaard. Perhaps this is why so many scholars have written that, in the tragic or in a tragical event, we are given — without thinking — "the law of the world"; the time when contradiction reveals itself to man and the time when it is endowed with a tragic sense may merge.

But let us not be deceived into thinking that during such moments existence confides its mystery to man and unfolds its deep sense. Tragicality, which is felt as "inhuman" in the moral sense (the innocent die, murder spreads around) — always has a human face, for it is man who extracts it from existence and introduces to consciousness, and this effort leaves on the created structure an anthropological impress. The well-known Italian theologian, the
Rev. Guardini, wrote of the "loneliness and tragic situation" of God. Such treatment of divine matters is thoroughly human and Guardini himself admits that our "arsenal of concepts" is insufficient to talk about God's tragic position. We must bear in mind that man's sense-creating activity has its limits: thanks to the activity of consciousness we reach, within the created structure, the tragic. Yet the manner in which it is revealed need not be identified with its mode of existence, and we would not like to prejudge here whether the tragic is man's "invention" or "discovery", whether the tragic structure created by man with total and authentically creative involvement of all his mental powers reflects the deeply hidden natural structure inherent in reality itself.

We have mentioned that, probably, the experience of tragicality is not given to many people, that great strength and fortitude, courage and readiness are needed for striving to reach the roots of the paradoxicality or existence. In the tragic experience one cannot be a spectator — unless it is the aesthetic experience of the tragic, possible through art.

It is only in the aesthetic experience that we can "watch" tragedy and commune with the tragic in a contemplative manner. In tragedy as a literary work the reader does not any longer deal with the naked contradiction of the world demanding completion and semantization, but with a ready-made tragic construction, completed and made sensible by the artist. Even if the tragic sense unfolds before the spectator of a tragedy gradually and with his cooperation (which is, however, an activity in the aesthetic sense), still, the recipient is not the subject of the tragic situation, and his effort to "read" the tragic and to experience it is confined to the aesthetic situation and often boils down to following, by the recipient, of the path laid before him by the author or stage-director.

Tragic experience must therefore be set apart from aesthetic experience of the tragic. The former is enacted between the tragic hero and reality, and each consecutive step taken by the hero is a step in the unknown; the latter takes place in the recipient's relation to the work of art, where the spectator follows in the author's footsteps. The gap dividing the tragic hero from the spectator of tragedy marks out the difference between these two experiences. Their mutual bonds are, again, equally strong and give rise to a number of questions: whether at the source of tragedy created as a literary work must lie its author's tragic experience? Whether the tragedian ought to have a "tragic outlook on life" (conviction about the pre-
valence of the tragic in the world)? Whether reaching the tragic in its aesthetic shape is conditioned by previous experiences of tragicality?

Such questions could be multiplied. It is likely that great tragedies may indeed be born only when the artist has experienced tragicality and incorporated it with his previous convictions. It is true that outlook on life expressed in a work need not reflect the artist's personal beliefs, yet it is difficult to assume that they could be radically different, particularly in the case of the tragic, where one deals with questions of ultimate importance to human fate.

On the other hand, as far as the recipient is concerned, it seems that the aesthetic experience of the tragic does not depend on previous tragical experiences and may be shared by all aesthetically sensitive spectators. Moreover, by revealing the total tragic situation and indicating the path leading to its structuring by the tragic hero, such experience enables man to carry the tragical artistic structures recognized and experienced through art over to reality itself — this is the so-called phenomenon of aesthetization of the latter.

Is the process, in which the ability to reach the tragic formed due to contacts with art causes its “introduction” into the structure of reality, a tragic experience in the previously described sense? Well, it appears that an experience of the tragic arisen due to aesthetization of reality (which is an attempt to transfer the tragic in its aesthetical form into the structure of the world itself, treated after the example of artistic structures) is a secondary experience and has neither the depth nor the strength of the primary tragical experience which arises from the shock of standing face to face with a contradiction — as an ontological rule of the world.

It is most interesting, at this point, to compare the tragical situations of Oedipus and Prince Hamlet.

The pestilence that has befallen the innocent citizens of Thebes is this sign of the antinomy of the world that demands unraveling. The prophet Tiresias, summoned for that purpose, directs Oedipus' attention to his own person, speaking the language which befits tragedy — the language of paradox (e.g. “This day will give birth to you and this same will kill you...”). Oedipus, who does not yet apprehend the terror of the situation, hastily makes up its first interpretation: it is Creon who, greedy for power, plots against him in order to dethrone him — accuses of murder. This is unpleasant, but Oedipus quickly accepts such an explanation for it fits within the sphere of human psychology and, although it has to do with treason
on the part of a relative – can be fully grasped by the mind. At the moment when Oedipus has made firm his conviction as to Creon’s teachery, enters Jocasta who reveals the details of Laius’ death. This new element cannot be included in the previously outlined semantic structure and Oedipus abandons this path (we do not know if it would have lead to the tragic) to begin, as a tragic hero, his tragical experience: the conversation with Jocasta initiates the creation of a tragical structure. In the case of Oedipus, the deeds have already been done – the tragedy occurs only when Oedipus enters the path of discovering their significance. (Therefore it is not possible to seek the tragic within the sphere of deeds themselves). He knows now that he has killed Laius but is not weighed down with this news – the final sense of the created structure has not yet been fulfilled. Oedipus pursues the mystery further... “now that I have so far fallen into fright”. He collects next elements and arranges them into a tragical sense; he moves about in darkness, every step reveals a fragment of the unknown. When he learns that he is not the son of Polybosus (this facts complements the meaning of the element discovered earlier – that he had killed Laius), Jocasta, who accompanies him on the “expedition in search of the tragic” cries out: “Do not explore it; (...) I beseech you, don’t do it.” Yet Oedipus carries the tragic experience through to the end; when all elements, extricated with great expenditure of the will to learn, and of emotion, from the events of his own life assume the shape of a tragic structure – and when the deep meaning of the latter is revealed – Oedipus blinds himself. Oedipus’ tragic situation appears at the point of junction of objective facts and the consciousness of the tragic hero who complements and co-creates their sense.

The tragic situation of Hamlet is entirely different. His mother’s “incestuous” marriage, the appearance of a ghost – are signs of the contradictions that tear asunder the world in which the Danish prince lives. When Hamlet learns from his father’s ghost about the murder and the duty to seek revenge – he enters the path of a tragic experience, but his path will be totally unlike King Oedipus’ “expedition in search of the tragic”. As soon as Hamlet finds out about his uncle’s crime, he maps out before him the whole tragic situation in which he is to play the part of a hero. He pre-meditates his destiny before anything is done. This means that upon the first given element — a vestige of antinomy — Hamlet has hastily built a whole tragic structure (the tragicality of revenge) instead of undertaking the difficult and perilous effort of putting together the senses of all,
successively extricated from the sphere of facts, elements. Such a hasty superimposition of tragic structure over the first, and sole, element disclosed by reality may endanger the authenticity of the whole future experience.

Ever since Goethe, all interpretations of Hamlet have aimed at answering the question: why does he put off his revenge, what is the true cause of postponing the deed? Or to formulate it somewhat differently: why Hamlet does not continue the tragic experience which must be completed with his participation? Answers to this question have been as varied as they have been numerous: causes have been sought in external conditions, in the state of his soul, in his character and disposition (a pessimist, a sceptic, a melancholic), in moral scruples, etc.

Careful reading of Shakespeare warrants yet another interpretation. Let us take a closer look at the Prince of Denmark: he is an educated man, and his education also included aesthetic culture. He is a lover of the theatre which he has frequently visited while in the capital. He is familiar with plays and greets actors like good friends. He has his own views concerning the actors' acting and the nature of theatre itself, which can be seen in the advice he gives to the actors before the play starts.

When the players arrive at the castle Hamlet, tormented by thought of the crime and revenge, is sincerely pleased. He wastes no time in ordering an actor to recite a fragment of the play about Priam’s killing by Pyrrhus and queen Hecuba’s despair. He admires the actor who forcefully enacts the passions of the fictional hero of the tragedy of which he, Hamlet, can be but a spectator.

This is where the whole mystery of Hamlet, the hero incapable of acting, is hidden. He cannot cope with the terror that seizes him at the thought of entering an authentic tragical experience – how gladly would he exchange it for an aesthetic experience of the tragic in which he would not have to be the tragic hero, but only a spectator. The players who have arrived create for it a suitable opportunity. Hamlet orders them to enact a play about murder before the king and the queen. He believes in the power of aesthetic experience which is to make the monarch confess his crime through uncontrolled behaviour. Hamlet trusts in the effect of the play more than in meeting his father’s ghost, although the meeting has had metaphysical power: “The play’s the thing/Wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the king”.

In fact, Hamlet has known for a long time that it was his uncle
who committed the murder. Whatever the king’s reaction to the play, it does not prove his guilt — not more than the proofs that have been collected so far. Hamlet does not need the play to provoke his uncle; he needs it himself in order to, within the aesthetic experience, get used to murder — which, after all, he has to commit himself too.

Due to the aesthetic experience Hamlet’s will to act, worthy of a tragic hero, is increased. Directly after the performance he shouts: “now could I drink hot blood, And do such bitter business ...”. Yet he is summoned by his mother; on the way to her quarters Hamlet meets his uncle. He is ready for the assassination: “Now might I do it (....) And now I’ll do ’t...”. But the king is lost in prayer and Hamlet foreshares his murder. The Polish actor K. Adwentowicz, trying to find a clue to Hamlet’s behaviour, came to the conclusion that he did not kill his uncle so as not to destroy the beauty of the scene of a praying man. Murder and prayer do not go well together (in the aesthetical sense); Hamlet, in his own words, would have killed had he met the king “drunk asleep”, “in his rage” “in the incestuous pleasure”, or “swearing”. “Hamlet’s faith and religion was beauty” — said the actor.

It is difficult to explain this scene otherwise. For, a moment later, Hamlet does not hesitate to kill Polonius (whom he takes for the king) when he finds him eavesdropping disgracefully. So it is not that murder does not fit Hamlet’s ethical sense — it is at odds with his sense of the aesthetic.

Aesthetization of his own tragic situation does not relieve Hamlet of his role of a tragic hero, but it is a sort of a fit-on, a dress rehearsal of the tragedy to come. Yet, to the very end, Hamlet would rather remain a spectator and not a hero. At the moment of his death he addresses the people around him with some reproach: “You that look pale and tremble at this chance, That are but mutes or audience to this act...”. It is in the word “but” that Hamlet, the tragic hero in spite of his will, puts all his sorrow.

King Oedipus boldly and without hesitation enters the tragic situation whose final sense, which he uncovers step by step, is revealed to him at the end of his path. Prince Hamlet is aware, from the very beginning, of the tragic structure in which he has to play the part of a tragic hero; in apprehension of the suffering and pain of the tragic — he resorts to art in order to alleviate his fright and to strengthen his spirit before the dead that awaits him. Still, such aesthetization of the tragic means its weakening and no matter what
one says about the difference between the ancient and modern forms of the tragic — nothing equals the terror and fright with which Oedipus makes his way towards the end of his tragic experience.

Does it imply that we, people of modern times who have been brought up on art, are doomed only to inauthentic experiences of the tragic? Such a conclusion would be extremely precipitate. Wealth of contacts with art does not weaken the will to enter an authentic tragical experience, for it can be logically assumed that Oedipus, the king of Thebes, was a regular patron at the Greek theatre. But tragic experience means entering “a border-line situation” (Jaspers’s term). A man may live all his life without an opportunity to experience the tragic, but also entangled in the contradiction that initiates tragic experience, he may retreat in fright seeking shelter and consolation within its milder forms, connected with aesthetization of the tragic structure.

The transfer of discussions over the tragic from the ontological plane onto the ground of experience does not mean that the phenomenon in question becomes subjectivized. We must state it clearly that the subjectivization of tragicality leads directly to its annihilation. It is enough to assume that the hero did not collide with the real antinomy of events but found himself ensnared by his own delusions — for the tragic to disappear, leaving only its components: despair, sadness or sorrow.

Analysis of experience reveals that tragicality has its objective (contradictions in the sphere of real phenomena) and subjective (putting the tragic structure together from the meanings assigned to facts) side. If it is true that the conflicting nature of its phenomena is part of the essence of the world, then the tragic appears at the time when “the drama of breakup” rises, by means of active consciousness, from the macrocosm to the individual’s microcosm, so that it can then appear on the aesthetic plane — in experiencing works of art. It does happen, too, that the tragic experienced through art is then introduced into para-artistic structures, in the process of aesthetizing reality.13

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NOTES


2 Ibid., p. 12.

3 This term, as the terms: structuralization of reality, deep structures, come from M. Golaszewska’s work: *Aesthetics of Reality*, Warszawa 1984. The present discussion owes much to the latter work. Golaszewska presents a thoroughly motivated viewpoint that behind vestigial structures are hidden deep ones, reached by man in the process of aesthetizing reality. As far as the tragic is concerned, we shall refrain here from ontological solutions and restrict ourselves to describing its experience.

4 We shall omit a closer definition of the notion of tragic structure. It has been described many times over. The elements comprised by this semantic structure are: tragic hero, fate, death, tragic necessity, tragic guilt, tragic knot.

5 E.g. P. Szondi in *Versuch über das Tragische* demonstrates that dialectic structure serves as a basis for almost all definitions of the tragic, from Schelling to Scheler.

6 These terms are applied here synonymically. Their detailed differentiations, which can be found in a number of valuable works are immaterial for a general discussion.

7 The difficulties which arise here result from the lack of suitable terminology. Some of the listed categories serve both the description of certain features of reality itself, and their notional formulation. E.g. H. de Lubac differentiates between real paradox (inherent in reality) and paradox of expression (on the plane of thought). In his opinion, paradox is present in reality before it comes to exist in thought. Cf. H. de Lubac, *Nouveaux paradoxes*, Paris 1955, p. 37.

8 This does not stand in opposition to the generally accepted interpretation of the vision of human indifference to the misfortune of others. The figures present on the canvas do not react to Icarus’ fall — but if they did, their reactions might consist in compassion or even co-suffering; yet they could not participate in experiencing the tragic, which is exclusively the experience of Icarus, the tragic hero. It is symptomatic that Scheler links the tragic with the process of getting nearer to the sun and simultaneously receding from it (the closer the sun, the quicker melts the wax that holds the wings
together), and not directly with the tragic hero. For the tragic to occur, according to the philosopher, "no particularly human matters are needed". M. Scheler: On the Phenomenon..., op. cit., p. 12.

9 Characteristically, within the ground of both Christianity and Marxism long-lasting controversies have been going on as to whether the tragic is possible in these systems. In both cases the tragic is defended by those who, more keenly than others, perceive and stress the dialectic nature of reality.

10 A phenomenon observed and described by M. Golaszewska in: Aesthetics of Reality, op. cit. There are, however, some differences of approach. M. Golaszewska employs this term in its broad sense, to denote the authentic effort of a man striving to discover deep structures of reality. Here, basing on the notion of aesthetization that has been widely and thoroughly described by the author, we are making use of one of its narrower meanings: that of superimposing ready-made structures, experienced and recognized through works of art, onto vestiges of natural structures. The authentic effort of structuring is then substituted by escaping to something which is already well-known and ready-made.

11 This interpretation also serves to explain certain questions regarding the composition of the play. Why would Shakespeare have built up the scenes with actors (first the recitation of a fairly long episode about the killing of Priam, then the disputes concerning acting, the performance itself also protracted) if their function were only to have provoked the king? Would so much space in the tragedy be taken up by scenes that barely confirm what we have known since the first pages of the play? From the point of view of composition, this is unjustified. The fact that Hamlet trusts the impact of aesthetic experience more than the ghost's words indicates that the introduction of a stage performance into the play has a far deeper sense, related to the play's general idea of depicting a man faced with the tragic.

12 Contradiction as the source of tragical structure may be perceived within ourselves (F. Schiller wrote much about the tragicality of man's inner dilemma) for each man is a particle of reality. This, however, does not lead to subjectivism in which tragicality is deprived on its real subsoil due to which the process of shaping the tragical structure is not arbitrary.

13 This text was translated by Jerzy Wójcik.