THE SOCIAL ACTION FRAME OF REFERENCE: AN HISTORICAL MAP AND ANALYSIS

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I

An unprecedented interest in "social action" theory has developed in Western Europe and North America in the last ten to fifteen years and it can be seen as representing just one of the many attacks that have been mounted on the dominant paradigm of western sociology and philosophy — the structuralist/functionalist school epitomised by the works of Talcott Parsons.¹ It would assist the exposition of what is distinctive about the "social action" perspective if the latter is opposed to the dominant tradition in a brief historical account of certain strands of sociological and philosophical thought. In the process, I will attempt to explain what I understand to be meant by the various but related terms which are found in accounts of the structural — functionalist, and "social action" approaches to the study of society.

Structural-functionalist can be seen as the culmination of a sociological discourse which holds that the social sciences may develop along identical lines as those of the natural sciences. The roots of such an epistemology can be traced, at least, as far back as the mid-eighteenth century when Montesquieu published his L'Esprit des Lois,² and the intellectual history of the succeeding two centuries is littered with the names of those who attempted to follow in his wake. In this context, the names of Henri Saint Simon and his acolyte Augustin Comte are perhaps the most important. Often credited as the founders of sociology,³ both Saint Simon and Comte considered themselves to be positivists and by this they meant that they were intent on a science of society which is free from all vestiges of religion and metaphysics. Only that which is open to the test of empiricism could be added to the sociological body
of knowledge. Pushed to the extreme, positivism became "a doctrine centering on the proposition that only empirical and scientifically useful knowledge deserves the title knowledge at all, and that all competing types of cognition or inquiry belong to more primitive stages of civilization."4

However, as Gouldner has argued, the beginning of positivism was paradoxical "for this beginning could not have been grounded in the very method of observation that positivism's program proclaimed as the basis of its own authority. The separation of positivistic sociology from metaphysics then was a philosophical act, not a scientific one".5 The heir to this sociological tradition was another French man, Emile Durkheim, who went so far as to declare himself a sociological determinist, and was to have a profound impact upon the work of Parsons. The latter, was also considerably influenced by Pareto. It was Pareto, with his grounding in neo-classical economics who suggested the use of the static equilibrium model of mechanics as the basis of a scientific study of society.

II

Writers on organizations who adhere to the positivist tradition are sometimes referred to as behaviourists. At approximately the same time as Parsonian sociology was gaining ascendency, a school of psychology usually associated with B. F. Skinner acquired the same title and importance. A philosophical underpinning was supplied by the doctrine of logical behaviourism.6 Risking an over-simplification, it can be said that behaviourists hold the view that, in principle, the behaviour of man can be studied in the same way as, for example, the chemist studies the behaviour of chemicals in a test tube. At its extreme, behaviourism suggests that men respond to stimuli more or less in a similar manner as a rat in a psychology experiment can be conditioned to press one bar rather than another by administering rewards and punishments to it. Such a view holds out the prospect of reducing the study of the science of psychology to that of physiology, and, in line with the reductionist's dream — to the study of atoms. This, of course, would realise the original positivists' aim of the abolition of metaphysics and with it the time honoured philosophical problem of dualism — the distinction between body and mind.

If the rise of positivism can be dated to the European Enlightenment of the 18th Century, the origins of that body of
thought from which springs social action theory can be traced to the intellectual movement which some have seen as rising in opposition to the Enlightenment, that is, romanticism. Certainly Wilhelm Dilthey, one of the foremost opponents of positivism and, in particular of its application to the social sciences by J.S. Mill, drew on the works of the romantic theologian F. Schleiermacher and the so-called German Historical School. It was against this background that Dilthey was drawn to the study of the importance of hermeneutics (interpretation) as a means of understanding social life, which is to be accomplished by a recapturing from past documents and records the original spirit that animated their authors. Put in another way, the sociologist (social scientists) must engage in a re-enactment (Erlebnis) of the experiences of others. For Dilthey also, the individual's psychic experience was of major importance, in contrast to the positivists' concentration and emphasis on external nature — his maxim became therefore: “nature we explain; psychic life we understand” — empathy.

But as was pointed out above, psychology was far from immune to the positivists' onslaught, long before the rise of behaviourism. It was left to the Neo-kantian school to counter this development. As the name implies, neo-kantianism returned to the philosophical themes of Immanuel Kant and especially to the distinction he had drawn between facts and norms. Against this background, H. Richert in his works pointed out that historical happenings only become socially meaningful when they are related to normative values which are held over a long period of time. For the neo-kantians the positivist approach to social science ignored this aspect of social continuity and with it the very thing which makes social science (life) itself essentially distinctive: the uniqueness of the human species.

These views led Max Weber to the development of his concept: VERSTEHEN, a term that roughly translates into understanding. It is true that Weber in his later years moved some way towards the positivist position, and, also Parsons derived some of his inspiration from him, but it is important to note the extent to which Parson's development of Weberian sociology is particularly one-sided. On this Rex has this to say, “... there is a world of difference between the constructs of action, interaction and relation as they appear in the work of Weber and Simmel and the psychologically determined action elements which are patterned to fit into the social system in the work of Parsons.” Though both structural-functionalists
and social action theorists may claim Weber as their forefather, it is
Parsons who would appear to have much more convincing claims to
that inheritance.

Yet this does not complete the line of descent for there is one
more important figure to be considered and whose work, perhaps
more than that of any other, provides the point of departure for
contemporary social action theorists. This is Alfred Schutz, a student
of the philosopher Edmund Husserl. Schutz sought to unite aspects
of the phenomenological philosophy of his master with the sociology
of Weber. At first sight the philosophy of Husserl despite its debt
to Dilthey and Richert does not appear to be a fruitful ground for
those opposed to positivism; for its central question — how it is
possible to establish true knowledge, that is, that which is absolutely
certain, beyond all doubt or prospect of revision”,¹¹ echoes that of
the positivists. For Husserl himself, philosophy was itself a science,
providing the foundation for all the particular sciences, though not
essentially proceeding by their methods. The positivists, it will be
recalled, attempted to found a science free from theological and
metaphysical trimmings and impediments. Husserl challenged their
ability to do this by arguing that empiricism itself held certain
immanent presuppositions — *the Lebensweltige a priori*. By this
Husserl meant that whilst positivism claimed to demystify the world
it encountered, it left unexplained and unrevealed certain
fundamental aspects of the so-called common-sense or lay attitudes
towards the world of everyday life. Any particular science entails
some pre-conceived notion such as *health* in medicine, or *force*
in *mechanics*. The task of philosophy is to penetrate these ideas which
are knowable a *priori* and to establish a body of knowledge about
their essences. But this was not an enterprise continued by Schutz.
Along with other followers of Husserl — notably Max Scheler and
Jean-Paul Sartre, an interest was instead developed — existentialism,
in which attention focussed solely and essentially upon the individual
in the “common-sense world”. As Husserl sought to uncover the
presuppositions of empirism embedded in the *taken for granted
world*, so his followers, especially Schutz sought to relate this to the
sociological experience of the self, and in so doing he developed a
phenomenological critique of Weber.

For Schutz, et al, Weber had not penetrated sufficiently the
meaningful acts which occur within the social world. For example,
Weber failed to distinguish between the meaning attached to an act
at its beginning and upon its completion. The two may not, never,
be the same. To assume a homogeneity, is to accept uncritically certain common-sense ideas which may turn out to be mistaken upon closer examination. This is equivalent to the chemist treating two disparate chemical elements homologously as a result of failing to analyse them thoroughly. But for the social scientist this may pose an even greater problem, for the very social phenomena which comprise the object of study may in part originate as a result of common-sense beliefs. The behaviour of the chemists' object of study means nothing, ontologically, to the chemist; in contradistinction, the actions studied by the social scientist almost invariably have a meaning for the agents involved. Social data (data from the social world) therefore can only be fully comprehended hermeneutically and the role envisaged for an empirical social science is that of exploring, describing and cataloguing the constitution of the taken-for-granted world.

This common-sense world is a short hand way of alluding to the method by which the individual constructs a typification of the phenomena and the interactions of everyday life. Three processes are primarily at work; (a) the reciprocity of perspectives, (b) the social distribution of knowledge, and (c) the social origin of knowledge. What is implied is that individuals draw on a stock of knowledge which comprises: "... what is supposed to be known in common by everyone who shares our system of relevances, the way of live considered to be the natural, the good, the right one by the members of the in-group", so as to construct a model (typification) of reality as a guide for action and orientation. And so far as many phenomenologists are concerned, reality is socially constructed.

Two points are relevant here. First, the primacy of language as the typifying medium brings phenomenological sociology close to developments in post-Wittgensteinian analytical philosophy where emphasis has also been placed on language (verbal and symbolic) as the means of transmitting an understanding of rule-governed meaningful acts within human society. Secondly, the insistence upon the importance of the stock of common-sense knowledge, Schutz, et al, in everyday life has elicited the criticism that sociology (social science) implies a consensus within society and that it is therefore necessarily conservative. But if any element of consensus implies conservatism then all sociology (social science) must be so labelled, for even so adamant an opponent of the social action frame of reference as Hyman is forced to agree that: "the sociologist's point
of departure, certainly, is that men’s social actions are not merely random or idiosyncratic, but can normally be related to the pressures inherent in the situations in which they find themselves. Sociological analysis is indeed possible only because men tend to act in similar ways when confronted by the same type of social situation. However, the actor’s definition of the situation serves to partially rebut the conservative argument and has been extensively used by social action theorists. W. I. Thomas has insisted that it is a fallacy for social scientists to impose their meanings upon observed facts, only the agents could enunciate upon them for, “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences”. Ironically, this acceptance of a relativist position has led to criticism from the other extreme; that at least in principle, social science may provide no consensual foundation at all on which to erect a science of society. This is a critique to which I shall return in due course.

III

Certain features of the social action framework for the study of organisations will now be examined. David Silverman, arguably, the foremost exponent of the phenomenological approach to the study of organisations has provided the essence of the social action framework when he stated: “The overall set of expectations and meanings through which the members of organisations are able to act and to interpret the actions of others is a social construct. While they may find it politic to pay lip-service to the intentions of the founder or of other great men (especially in attempting to legitimate a course of action which is far removed from those intentions), the present participants continually shape and re-shape the pattern of expectation by means of their actions. For, as they act, they validate, deny or create prevailing definitions of the situation. In doing so, they are influenced by the changing stock of knowledge in the wider social world, by their own particular interpretations of the situation, and by the form of their attachment to the existing system...”

It will be convenient to examine what is distinctive in the work of social action theorists by counter-posing some of their views against those of the structural-functionalist theorists and in the process I will attempt to develop some of the arguments raised in the citation from Silverman.

I will begin with the concept of reification. It is the tenet of many of those opposed to the systems theorists that some of the
latter have tended to attribute certain qualities to organisations which they do not possess; and in the process they commit the sin of reification. For Hyman, et al, it is to attribute an objective and independent identity to social processes and institutions which are in reality the product of human activity — thus diverting attention from the human agencies involved. In other words, this effort amounts to: treating as an object something which is not an object.

But how does reification arise in some treatments of organizational theory? For Silverman, it is the result of studying organisations teleologically, that is, studying them as if they function so as to obtain some specific goal. Silverman argues further: many organisation theorists have had few qualms about considering the goals of enterprises and observing the functions certain factors perform for these. In doing so, they have emphasized the unintended and impersonal nature of the processes through which organisations maintain themselves and adapt to their environment. This often implies a reification of organisations, in the sense that they are conceived as things which are separate from the definitions and purposes of their members. This misconception about organisations has as its origin the drawing of analogies between organisations and biological systems. Of course the use of analogy can provide the social scientist with a heuristic devise and indeed some form of abstraction from reality is almost certainly necessary if one is to make sense of the multifarious activities which comprise the social fabric. Problems arise, however, as has been frequently noted, when the act of abstraction is forgotten and spurious conclusions are drawn about and concerning the concrete world. For the systems analyst this usually occurs when the analogy with a biological organism is spuriously extended to suggest that the state of an organisation may correspondingly be considered in fundamentally the same manner as a doctor examines a patient and that the organisational goal provides a referent with which to judge the health of the system in comparison to others.

It was noted above that for Husserl the concept of health even in medical science is a presupposition and in fact medical sociologists who hold to an action frame of reference argue that states such as health and sickness (as opposed to that of disease) are themselves subjective social constructs. It is therefore almost superfluous to add that the application of such concepts to the study of organisations can serve only to confuse rather than to explain and illuminate. Unfortunately, much of the literature on organisational
behaviour is replete with the diagnoses of *sick* organisations, made by innumerable Charlatans trading under the name of consultants and are never short of the latest remedial patent medicine.

The danger in such an approach is that it is apt to suppose that the *goals* of the organisations are — at best — the same as those of the people involved in its operations, or — at worst — that organisational goals are superior to those of the actors where such objectives do not coincide. In the latter situation it is but a short though most pregnant step to maintain that deviant goals ought therefore to be made congruent with those of the organisation. It is perhaps needless to say that in such cases the ends can quite readily be seen to justify the means.

However, if the *sick* organisation analogy is sustained it can be further argued that the consultant should concentrate his attention on manipulating its unhealthy constituent parts, that is, people and technology, for the culturally sustained concept of sickness absolves the patient — the organisation, from moral approbation and instead sanctions the treatment of its ailing members. This practice is well discerned by Stephenson: "Attention has already been drawn to the tendency of consultants to assume that their values are right and that others must change. This leads to a conversion type situation, the minority seeking to convert the majority ..... The consultant intervenes in the unhealthy organisation according to their literature. This use of medical terminology is interesting as it suggests in the first place a set of criteria against which organisations can be judged to be either healthy or not. Clearly there is a basic assumption that those values are right and other values are wrong and that those who hold to the latter values are unhealthy. But his estimation is capable of being contested by his clients. The medical patient can rarely argue with his doctor because the nature of the case is incontestable, but in the area of values no such position exists."

Although it must be said that not all systems theorists are unaware of the misconceptions that can arise from the *teleological trap* it is nevertheless one of the features of the social action approach that such errors are ruled out by the precept that all definitions of the situation are valid. Thus, for example, the actions of the Nigerian Civil Service Union (NCSU) during the May 1981 industrial dispute cannot be accepted or regarded as *non-rational* for they served to achieve the goals of the work group, though not those of the parent organisation as defined by the Nigerian Labour Congress, NLC. In Silverman’s words, ‘there is not one rationality
— residing in an organisation or the official goals of the system, but a multitude of rationalities each of which generate the in-order-to motives of the participants and allows them to make their own sense of the actions and intentions of others.”

IV

The concentration upon the actor’s definition of the situation has resulted in some social action theorists developing an interest in the attitudes which people bring with them to their place of work. Although some industrial sociologists, e.g. in Britain have been steadily moving towards a similar position it is probably true that the so-called Affluent worker studies conducted by Goldthorpe and his colleagues in Luton in the 1960s represent a major break-through in this respect. In an explanatory article Goldthorpe argued that earlier writers had tended to ignore the important variable of “the orientation which men bring to their employment and which mediate between the objective features of the work situation and workers’ actual experience of, and reaction to, this situation”. He went on to state that, .... if the orientation which workers have towards their employment is to be regarded as a crucial independent variable relative to what occurs in the work situation, then to account in turn for the particular nature of this orientation, in any given case, must mean investigating other, non-work aspects of the social lives of the workers involved ..... whereas the conceptualisation of the social life of the enterprise entirely in ‘system’ terms is a tempting invitation to study this without reference to the structure of the wider society in which the enterprise exists”.

Such an argument has implications not only for industrial sociology but also for the more general study of industrial relations. It is an approach which is seriously at odds with the continuing orthodoxy in his field which is a derivative of the Parsonian structural-functionalist sociology. Nowhere perhaps is the clash between conflicting definitions of a situation seen so dramatically as in an industrial action. The May 1981 industrial dispute between the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and the Federal government clearly exemplifies this problem.

The dispute can be seen through the eyes of the different labour groups of participants. And translated into technical sociological language this means looking at the dispute from the standpoint of social action theory. The parent union — NLC, declared the trade
dispute. But several member unions viz Civil Service Union, Banking and Allied Workers' Union, Postal Workers' Union, Union of Railwaymen, etc., all refused to go along with the parent union. From this the following among others can be deduced: (a) the several unions quite genuinely and sincerely saw the strike in utterly different lights, (b) what was real for one union was quite different from what was real for another union or the parent union, (c) most importantly, it illustrated the way in which union officials and rank and file members, the way in which one union and another, may define the same situation differently.

Of course similar analyses have long been commonplace. But where these have been of a Marxist persuasion it represents a considerable revision of certain earlier, and often cruder, versions of the role of trade unions in Marxist thought. This raises the interesting question of the relationship between Marxism and phenomenological sociology. With their common origin in idealist philosophy it would indeed be surprising if there were no points of relationship between them. The mutual points of interest arise in the concept of reification and in an issue to which I have yet drawn little attention — the phenomenologists' insistence upon the social construction of reality. Although attempts have been made to fuse elements of Marxism with those of phenomenology, these necessarily emerge from a particularly Hegelian reading of Marx. Or, tautologically, such synthesis do not adhere to the acceptance of an epistemological rupture between early and late Marx as proposed by the French philosopher Louis Althusser.

The idea of reification enters Marx's work in the very early *Critique of Hegels' Philosophy of Right*. There we find Marx attacking Hegel's speculative philosophy in much the same way as the theologian Ludwig Feuerbach had done. For the latter, Hegel's logic constantly mystifies by inverting the subject and predicate and to arrive at reality we must therefore reinstate them in their correct loci. Thus in his *Essence of Christianity*, Feuerbach claims that instead of God creating man, as Hegel maintains, it is rather man who in fact creates the idea of God which he then alienates from himself and endows with reified qualities. Marx takes up this argument and exposes Hegel's doctrine of the state to it, but according to several commentators, Malley et al, it is an important aspect of Marx's thought for it provides the basis upon which he begins his attack on conventional economics and it remains thus a constant theme throughout the works of his maturity. Hence the concept of the
“fetishism of commodities” developed in the Das Kapital is found in embryo in Marx’s realization that in Hegel’s inverted logic man does not dominate private property — as he ought, but rather that the converse is indeed the case. More to the point: “... it is not simply the theories of Hegel and the economists which are upside down, but reality itself... Marx does not confine himself to criticism of Hegel’s logical mysticism or of the Divine Trinity of political economy (capital, land and labour) but goes on to explain the fetishism of thought with reference to the fetishism or mysticism built into social reality”.²⁰

In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, later developed in Das Kapital, Marx argues that in the productive process under capitalism the labourer not only produces the commodities from which he later becomes estranged, but also produces and reproduces the social relationships of capitalist production — those of capitalist and labourer. What is important in this process is that it is often hidden from the labourers view: “Men do not therefore bring the products of their labour into relation with each other as values, because they see these objects merely as the material integuments of homogenous human labour. The reverse is true: by equating their different products to each other in exchange of values, they equate their different kinds of labour as human labour. They do this without being aware of it.”.²¹ This process is quite clearly analogous to the paradox discerned by Berger and Lukman that, “man is capable of producing a world that he then experiences as something other than a human product”.²² Similarly, some phenomenologists, Gotti — Ottilienfeld, et al, have drawn attention to the ability of men to construct their own laws, economic, political etc., and subsequently to treat them as inviolable.

To what extent are the tenets of Marx and the phenomenologists compatible? It is after all arguable that the latter remained enmeshed in the very idealism from which both Marx and Feuerbach thought it necessary to “materialise” Hegelianism. Martin and Fryer have suggested that the phenomenologists’ “... emphasis upon the importance of understanding of actors definition of the situation, and the manner in which shared definitions and meanings become institutionalised, is important; a valuable corrective to over-deterministic formulations derived from systems theory. It directs
attention to the influence of extra-organisational factors, especially
cultural norms and values, and to the different meanings which may
be given to the same phenomena. But concentration upon social
action and meaning structures in these terms can be carried to
extremes, involving an exaggerated voluntarism, almost idealism.
Silverman’s analysis contains clear echoes of kantian philosophy.
The social world is manipulable to a variable, often only limited
extent; some structures of meaning cannot be sustained because they
conflict with the meaning structures of others, or with external
objects. It is erroneous to see social action as an automatic playing
out of role expectation, or as a mechanical reaction to situational
restraints; but it is equally erroneous to limit sociological concerns
to systems of meaning. Social action theory in these terms provides
an inadequate basis for explaining action, that is, the behaviour of
actors forced to reconcile their interpretations of the situation with
those of others, and with the external constraints of geography,
of scarce desired objects etc.....”

While it is true that a social action perspective taken to
extremes would be as one-sided as positivistic approaches, there is
in fact no reason to suppose that all adherents must necessarily go
so far. Moreover, and surely, one of the assets of the social action
approach is that it questions just how immutable certain “external
constraints” actually are; or more precisely, just what human action
may be able to accomplish so as to change them. Thus while it may
be the case that redundancy experienced in Kano (Northern Nigeria)
may be less palatable than a similar situation developing in say
Asaba (south of Nigeria) this does not mean that such geographical
data cannot be radically altered by, for example, government
regional policy. Regional unemployment is a social fact rather than
a geographical one.

Of all the criticisms levelled at the social action framework, the
most ingenious has been that arising from Freudian psychology and
derives from the notion of the subconscious. It asks, how do we
know that an actor’s definition of a given situation is in fact reliable
— that he does not, subconsciously, have another motive for a unit
act or a reason for failing to do something which he will describe as
the outcome of forgetfulness. The answer, quite simply, is that we
do not, may never, know. But at least, in this respect, social action
theorists are no less well placed than their rivals. Unless, of course,
the latter are consistently able to make correct objective imputations
in imposing their definition’s upon such situations. On this claim,
though tentative, phenomenologists are decidedly sceptical.

The other kind of danger is, if, to all intents and purposes, we can in fact find an infinite number of situational definitions, will the social action approach not simply regress to a scientific nihilism? This in fact can only be an objection in principle. The social world itself is a testimony to the phenomenologists' claim that we are able to construct typifications so as to make social life much more meaningful. Furthermore, is not such an agnosticism, in any case, the quintessence of scientific enquiry? In the last resort what exactly can we know that is beyond all doubt or prospect of revision? The hypothetico-deductive model of scientific advance proposed by K. Popper holds that our knowledge can only be, at best, tentative, for the true scientist is always trying to refute his hypothesis, rather than to prove them. In essence, does this not mean again in principle, that even positivistic scientific tenets can never be certain for it is always conceivable that a new, or rival hypothesis may be formulated on a given subject, just as yet one more person whom we cannot just conveniently label deviant, may wish to define a situation for the social action researcher?

In sum, I have tried to argue that the fundamental difference between social action and rival approaches to the study of society in general, and organisations, e.g. trade unions etc., is one which lies rooted in the philosophy of the social sciences. This alone is almost guaranteed to ensure that practitioners in the field of organisational behaviour would treat the merits of a phenomenological perspective with needless disdain. Moreover and notwithstanding recent research findings and developments to the contrary, phenomenology represents a conceptualisation of the social sciences. The result may well mean that the insights of the social action perspective will remain ensconced in an academic milieu, whilst those whose lives are largely lived out in economic organisations of one kind or another, are subjected to the pronouncements (and subsequent actions) of those who claim to be more positive and, certainly find it more lucrative to do so.

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NOTES

1 See for example, T. Parsons: The Social System, Glencoe, Free Press, 1957.


3 Traditionally, the credit has been given to Comte, but it is becoming more generally realised that Saint Simon was the original thinker, Comte the Synthesiser.


8 It is true, however, that Dilthey accepted the precision and certain elements of the empiricism of Mill. For a revival of the hermeneutic tradition, see the various works of Hans-Georg Gadamer, especially his Truth and Method.

9 Ibid.


11 For a critical introduction to Husserl's work and an excellent bibliography, see R. Waterhouse: Husserl and Phenomenology in Radical Philosophy, spring 1977.


15 Ibid., p. 219.


17 D. Silverman, op. cit., p. 194, (emphasis in the original).


19 Ibid., p. 241.


21 Ibid., p. 38.
