ARTISTIC AND AESTHETIC VALUES IN THE AXIOLOGICAL SITUATION

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In considering the nature of aesthetic values we are not going to refer to the numerous, historically known theories on the subject. Instead, we are going to analyze the situations in which values appear and function within man's world, and the conditions that have to be fulfilled for values to come into being and endure.

Aesthetic values are closely related to other values; this is stressed by many contemporary authors who do not make sharp distinctions between various kinds of values. Although these kinds must be differentiated, one must also admit that they overlap, and if we assume that there exists a global system of values within the world of man, such a system is not separated from this world and is inspired and influenced by it. We say, therefore, that values are an essential factor in the human world. The system of values is influenced by the world, because events and changes in the world, as well as events and changes in human culture, cause the emergence of new values and the disappearance of others. Yet this appearance and disappearance do not happen automatically, but because of the behaviour of man as a free and conscious being able to reflect on himself, and to act and to carry his intentions through to a final result. Similarly, within the system of values, different values permeate and influence one another. For instance, aesthetic values are closely related to cognitive, personal and moral ones, personal values are related to moral and cognitive ones; utilitarian values are related to moral, aesthetic, and vital ones, and so on.

Therefore, in order to define the nature of aesthetic values, we must investigate values as such. When we view them against the background of man's world, we see that they do not exist as entities "in themselves", but originate and persist in specific situations consisting of several elements. Each of these elements is
indispensable, but is not yet a value when considered separately. Our first question will be, then: What is such a situation (we shall call it axiological situation)? What are its factors and how are they interconcerned, what is the nature of relationships that occur between them and condition the origin of values?

In most general terms, the fundamental factors of an axiological situation are the world and man, but the question which arises next is, what part of the world and what part of man? We are not speaking of objective and subjective factors because the world of man is saturated and permeated with his “subjectivity”, the attitudes, experiences, and formulations resulting from the various casts of his consciousness, while man, on the other hand, is constantly in touch with things, succumbing to them, introducing them into the realm of his experiences, intentions, and aspirations.

Before we proceed to elucidate this matter, let us add that values differ from things and facts: the latter simply exist, given and complete (defined in every respect, measurable, in causal interdependence, of a necessary nature), while values are that which ought to be -- this “oughtness” belongs to the nature of values and from it springs the postulate of realization addressed to man: only man can fulfill this postulate, only man can create values and maintain their existence. When understood in this manner, values are not things that exist out of necessity: we cannot say that something which exists out of necessity “ought to be”, but when an obligation is realized we say that a state of things or an object of value has emerged, that something has come into being which did not have to do so, and that “it is good” that it has. Thus, the existence which we assign to values is possible, and not necessary. The most obvious example comes from the sphere of moral values: if man were good “out of necessity”, if he could not choose, he would not be a human being in the sense we understand, and he would not be able to create specifically human values. Let us recall here the chief problem of A. Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange: a man who cannot be bad is dehumanized, for he has lost his freedom and possibility of choice. This example serves to demonstrate what we mean by saying that values are not necessary, but belong to the sphere of possibilities. This, however, gives rise to a question: if values are something that ought to be, what decides about this obligation? When we say that man ought to be kind to others, we know that he ought to because by doing so he may realize the superior moral value of goodness; when we say that an artist ought to create works of art that are
perfect, profound, “true”, dealing with important problems, we know that by doing so he may realize the highest aesthetic values — such as, say, beauty. Yet why should these highest values exist? Here is the next question in our sketch. For we believe that it is these highest values that contain, as an essential and inherent one, the feature of “oughtness”: they exist, because they ought to (the question which remains is: For what reason?).

We differentiate between values and goods, following in Scheler’s footsteps and proclaiming ourselves in favour of the standpoint that opposes naturalism: values are not to be identified with particular goods which exist in our culture and which are continually produced by man. Pleasure, life, art, and friendship are all “objects” (in the wide, phenomenological sense of the word) endowed with values, but they cannot be identified with values themselves, also it is true that values are the reason for their existence, that all of them may be the vehicles, as it were, of values.

Values also differ from ideas — the latter, like mathematical ideas, are unchangeable and immemorial by their nature. We may refer here to the phenomenologists’ (Ingarden’s) analyses, which differentiate between ideas and things that last in time, experiences, and intentional objects. Plato’s standpoint may be interpreted exactly as identifying values with ideas. He spoke of the ideas of goodness, truth, beauty; yet there are also reasons to find even in Plato a trace of the distinction that we are discussing here. For, besides immemorial and unchangeable ideas, he also accepted the existence of realized values when ideas partake of things, and things of ideas. This earthly, corporeal beauty would thus be a value, subjugated to the superior idea of beauty.

Values are different from ideals. Such ideals as happiness, the good of mankind, the achievement of complete knowledge, and the attainment of wisdom, are ex definitione beyond our reach, as the ultimate limit of all aspirations; an ideal always exceeds the power of man. Nevertheless, ideals are among the important factors in the axiological situation: if man did not have ideals to strive for, he would not have the strength to realize values. Values, on the other hand, are something that can be realized; therefore, there is a hierarchy, at least quantitative, within each group of values: something is beautiful, good, useful, to a greater or lesser degree, more or less.

Finally, values differ from our experiences, appraisals, valuations, and from our intents and aspirations — although these factors
are, again, indispensable within the axiological situation. It should be added that often, particularly in modern philosophy, the problems of values are reduced to problems of valuations and values are described as derivatives of valuations, experiences or attitudes, in this way values are subjectivized and relativized, while the problem of their essence is not taken into consideration. Behaviours vis à vis valuable objects are, of course, specifically different depending on the type of value, and they are also evoked by the nature of values. These differences make the philosopher ask: What is it that causes just such behaviours? At this point the problem of the nature of values emerge.

The factors mentioned above are intertwined and cooperate in the origin of values. However, it is not true that the sum total of these factors creates something totally new, bringing values into existence: there is still a superior factor which justifies saying that the highest values ought to exist. It is an appeal to the highest value which is at the same time — although it sounds paradoxical — an ideal. It is humanity. If we want to stay on the grounds of philosophy, without resorting to religion, it is humanity that we have to accept as the highest value, as well as the final premise for all discussion of values. Truth, goodness, beauty and other superior values that we could mention here ought to exist because they strengthen and maintain the value of humanity. If man were to reject these values, his humanity would be degraded. For each of the highest values reveals in some way an aspect of “being human”. Even if we abandon the assertion that man is the highest and most perfect work of nature, then he is at least the most perfect one we know of and about which we can formulate well supported statements based on the experience of both external observation and inner self-reflection.

For values to exist in the world of man, they have to be constantly maintained in their existence. That is, they must be internalized, realized and actualized by man’s conscious acts. All this happens within the axiological situation.

What is meant by an axiological situation? As we have mentioned, its fundamental element is man in contact with the world (viewed in some specific aspect). It is here that certain inconsistencies, contradictions, and oppositions manifest themselves more or less clearly. The source of these oppositions lies in man himself, for it is within himself that man experiences ever new, contradictory aspirations, emotions, and desires and goes through
a variety of irresolutions when he does not know what to choose or why. One could point to several different oppositions and ask which of them is the most fundamental. Such, for instance, is the opposition between I and not-I (where this “not-I” may be either the external, natural reality that forces man to struggle with the elements and to influence the threatening and destructive processes of nature or another man whose aspirations oppose ours); the opposition between freedom and necessity, when we are for ever limited by the outer world, by the processes that go inside our bodies and by the actions of other people, or when we strive to shake off all limitations and bonds, or again, willingly give in to “forces majeures”, surrender, give up the struggle; the opposition between the fantasy that liberates our creative powers and the resistance of matter, things (in the case of an artist: the resistance of his substance, of his means of expression); the opposition between chaos and order; between that which is irrational and that which is fully rationalized; between that which escapes the efficacy of a logical discourse and that which can be formulated and explained with complete rationality. These oppositions could be multiplied; surely, everybody perceives different ones, gets enmeshed in other ones, and during each period of life is most tormented by different oppositions.

The most fundamental opposition, perhaps, is that between I. and not-I; man overcomes it by his acts of cognition, by explaining the world to himself, by seeking its sense — then the opposition fades, and depending on how, and what further factors appear in this connection, either an axiological situation emerges, or simply customary ways of existing in the world are born. Or, possibly, an axiological situation may arise which is identical not with creating values, but with maintaining their existence.

Vis à vis the world, which appears to be the playground of various oppositions, man adopts all kinds of attitudes: he perceives the possibility of overcoming the oppositions in order to better adapt the world to his spiritual needs (for adaptation to material needs he creates values insofar as it becomes the basis for the realization of spiritual needs); affluence, welfare, and so on are treated as vital values when they are founded on an aspiration to realize higher values, and when due to them these “higher” needs are realized. Thus, an intention is born to make positive changes in the world, in the name of an ideal such as happiness, the well-being others, wisdom, knowledge, and so on.
Man does not directly set for himself the task of realizing a specific value — if he does, the value fulfills the function of an ideal and, therefore, a values other than he intended one is realized — or, in an extreme case, no value at all is realized and the axiological situation is not established. This is the case with hypocrisy as discussed by Scheler, a phenomenon embodied by F. Mauriac in La Pharisienne. Whoever wants to be good at any price follows some example, imitates something, abandons his authentic self and enters the sphere of sanctimony. When man aims directly at serving others, at helping them in need, recognizing the authentic demands of their personalities with regard to an ideal which in this case is the good or happiness of others, he then has a chance to realize the value of goodness (as a moral value). Neither the aim nor the ideal itself suffices; one has to undertake action preceded by a decision to carry it through to the end. This is an obvious matter, yet we must stress that this factor essentially belongs to axiological situation. The intent, “a good” one, of course, belongs to it too. Man really does want to introduce to the world some change that would be directed towards something good, he really wants to help his fellow-man, and this is why he undertakes an act that realizes that intent; the intent permeates the design and induces the making of a decision, although the intent itself, no matter how good, does not suffice for the realization of a value; if it is not supported by action, it remains nothing but an experience, an act of consciousness. The “goodness” of intent can be gauged by its position in relation to the superior value of humanity. Therefore, the axiological situation requires not only intent, aim, decision and action, but also being aware of the relation between all of these and the superior value : will our action, instead of doing good, not harm someone? To anticipate the results of one’s own actions is an intellectual factor; its indispensability consists in making sure that a positive axiological situation does not desintegrate, does not become the seat of negative values that destroy the humanity in man. For instance, an intent to make another person happy of any price, realized without full awareness of its relation to the highest value, without anticipating the results, leads — particularly in the case of such relationships as parents—children, teachers—pupils, but also in marriage, in the beginning of a friendship — to the suppression in the other person of his authentic needs, to the warping of his personality, the limiting of his freedom, and thus to the degrading, in the global sense, of the value of humanity whose essential components are freedom, self-knowledge,
and the development of the personality with its unique quality, different in each individual case.

Finally, then, we include in the axiological situation a result compatible with the ideal of humanity. An action based upon good intent but producing a result which is not keeping with that value cancels the sense of the axiological situation — the value has not been realized; evil, instead of goodness, has been produced. We stress this because it is often thought that, especially in the case of moral values, the chief and decisive factor is good intent connected with the subject's volition. Yet man has not only the ability to want something, but also to discern situations, to anticipate effects, and to reason out what changes in the world and particularly in other people can be brought about by his actions. By including the result of human action as an indispensable component in the axiological situation, its complement, we also point to the tragic status of the man who wants to realize values by producing goods; since the axiological situation arises against the world's background, it is mixed up with all sorts of processes that are necessary in character and therefore, often without human blame, a result intended as value-making is not achieved, or the result achieved is negative, destroying some value. Sometimes the new value is other than that intended, for instance, ardent striving to realize some new idea, an invention, may fail — only to arouse in others a desire to take up that same effort, to carry on the undertaking; it may command respect for human perseverance which is one of the personal values (a soldier defending his fatherland may die, the enemy may gain the victory, yet the value of heroism remains).

The case is similar with aesthetic values. They are realized in a situation (which is a particular kind of axiological situation), where the chief factors are: the artist, a work of art and the recipient, and the result which emerges in this situation is an aesthetic value. If an artist is full of unusual, interesting ideas, but is unable to find an expression for them, creates no work, does not make these ideas accessible to others — aesthetic values are not realized; the very intention to create something great and beautiful, even when most sincere, does not suffice: the artist must make attempts to realize it, attempts crowned with a result, a work which is given to the recipient to be experienced. The latter, however, also has his duties: he has to interpret the work, understand it, experience it according to its value and qualities. Aesthetic values, like all other values, must be realized by someone who is gifted with talent and skill, and who
has a personality that enables him to take up the effort of creation. Just as the man who meets with kindness (a moral value) at somebody else’s hands is obliged to accept it and display kindness in return, so the man who is shown confidence is obliged to respect it — and if he scorns another man in front of other people, he commits the act of destroying value.

The next question is: What types of values are there? Does each variety of values (vital, utilitarian, technological, personal, cognitive, moral, aesthetic, etc.) find its counterpart in a different opposition inherent in the world, in specific intentions and aims, in suitable modes of realization, and finally — in particular modes of actualization (i.e. different ways of allowing for them in our lives and of reacting to them)? These questions go beyond the scope of the present paper; we shall therefore focus our attention on aesthetic and artistic values.

We have adopted a distinction made by many aestheticians, though in a different manner. Ingarden thought that artistic values are instrumental and serve the manifestation of aesthetic ones — the latter, being absolute, constituting the ultimate goal of art, require no justification; they are served by artistic values, which at the same time determine the aesthetic values and provide them with an existential foundation (the other, equally indispensable foundation, being the aesthetic experience of the subject in whom the aesthetic object constitutes itself). According to Kulka, artistic and aesthetic values are largely independent of each other; the latter may appear without the former, and vice versa. Artistic values consist in the introduction of some novelty in the posing or resolving of a definite artistic problem, the other values appear in the sphere of perception, in that which is given directly. It is also here that we ought to mention the conception of Beardsley, according to whom aesthetic values lie in the sphere of direct sensuality: two objects that do not differ in the field of sensual data possess the same aesthetic value. For Hermeren aesthetic values may, but do not have to, be a component of artistic values. In criticizing Beardsley conception Hermeren says that it is very difficult to establish an identity in direct perception: an original work of art, as seen by someone who is not an art expert, may be identical with a copy, whereas the expert will notice all the differences that decide the artistic form of the work.

According to our conception of values, we shall look for oppositions at the basis of artistic values. These oppositions will be such
as that between the existing materials and the idea, conceived by the creator; that between the conception of the work and the means of expression selected by the artist; between existing kinds of art and styles, and the original design or the new artistic problem (such opposition can be inferred from Kulka); between the existing world and the world that is being designed; between the indefinite and the definite; between these aspects of reality that can be scientifically described, categorized, summed up in verifiable theorems, and the regions related to fantasy, feeling and convictions that cannot be described with any accuracy or scientifically explained with finality; between the visible and invisible world; between the static and ready-made, and the dynamic, the becoming.

A work of art, the carrier of artistic values, does not belong exclusively to any of these spheres. The artist submits neither to the one nor to the other, but in creating the work of art finds ways to transform these oppositions or to synthesize something new.

The most fundamental artistic values are: originality (novelty), mastery of execution and the importance of ideas presented in the work. All these values are mutually intertwined and in each particular case they are mixed in different proportions. The complete absence of any of them significantly lowers the artistic value of the work, yet it does not obliterate it fully if this absence is balanced in a large degree by some other value. For instance, originality in avant-garde art is sometimes so distinct, so strong, that it counter-balances a lack of mastery in execution. It follows that artistic values are gradable: a work may be more or less original, it may contain more or less important ideas, it may be executed with more or less mastery. All these artistic values may be connected with various sides of the work of art: that is, novelty and originality may lie in the manner in which the work presents important ideas, in the means of expression, in the technique, or in some detail. It must be borne in mind, however, that a work of art is an "organic" whole and everything in it should be contribute to making an uniform unity (Osborne speaks of artistic objects as Emergent Wholes8). Therefore, if an innovation does not influence the work as a whole, then it is scarcely possible to grant it artistic value only because this innovation can be distinguished as a detail which matters little for the whole.

Let us linger for a while on one of the oppositions: that between the artistic vision, design, conception, and the matter, that which exists in the physical world. The very conception of vision is
not yet the work, it does not constitute, if taken in isolation, an artistic value; not does the material, no matter has new and original. The existing things, as such, hold no ready-made artistic values, although they contain para-artistic structures, such as rhythm, successiveness or various structures, symmetry, asymmetry, concentric or dispersed arrangements. It is only after the opposition in question has been overcome, when the vision or conception has been embodied in matter and the para-artistic structures have been exposed, that an artistic value is born; the connection with the physical world is particularly strong here: it is matter, the physical factors, that make the vision accessible to the recipient.

From another point of view, artistic values are treated as a body of structures which order the world; we think, on the one hand, of the existing world with its numerous elements that appear to our perception as inexplicable, accidental, unorganized, producing the impression of chaos, and — on the other hand — of the ordering schemes of the mind that express reality when scientific knowledge is created. We also have to remember here that the tendency to bring order to the world is deeply rooted in man, who does not want to be lost in chaos. The search for order is at the same time the search for the sense of things. One of the ways to order the world is to assume a cognitive attitude which causes the emergence of logical order and of structures, bringing the multiplicity of single events together into facts, binding facts together as types, constructing notions and wholes of a higher order such as hypotheses and theories. All generalizations and systems of theoretical knowledge are nothing but attempts to bring some orderliness into reality, to establish causal nexuses and hierarchies among objects, to classify them (in philosophical, ethical, ideological and other systems). Orderliness is created by bringing to light repeatable, schematic structures, stereotypes and rules which function in social life. One such attempts is ordering the world by means of artistic structures.

Let us go back to the initial situation, when on the one hand we have a multifarious and varied mass of phenomena responsible for evoking feelings of anxiety and unpredictibility — and on the other hand, a schematic reality that results from the ordering connected with social life and science. Against such a background, artistic structures would play the role of introducing a new order, one that is neither stable nor schematic. Artistic structures are functional, purposeful, “rational”, for it is due to them that man sees the world as “tame”, close, where man can find his place and feel “at home”.

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Perhaps the source of artistic values is the desire to make the world "one's own", fitting the most human, individual needs. Thus, art appears to include those factors that escape scientific knowledge: instincts, emotions, faith, myths, the secrets of human consciousness, etc. By structuring these factors, art makes them belong to man's world.

The application of artistic structures to ordering the world is the initial stage of creating aesthetic values. These structures have to take an intersubjective appearance, become included in the object constructed by the artist in such a way that man can experience, through them, some specific quality of the world related to the manner of feeling and seeing expressed in the work. A new opposition emerges here: between "rationalized" artistic structures and non-rational human convictions; it is overcome when that which is non-rational becomes formulated as a quality of the world. When experienced directly, the world appears to us as awesome, threatening, magnificent, yet each time in a qualitatively different way. In the case of perceiving the aesthetic values of nature we deal with an opposition between structures that are not artistic but para-artistic, and the non-rational aspect of the world.

To understand artistic structures themselves is not the same as to experience aesthetic values — these structures can be interpreted by an expert, a theoretician who says, for example, that the work has been executed with mastery, is new and original, that its ideas are important, these values manifest themselves when, through artistic structures, some non-rational aspects of the world is perceived. Therefore, in order to describe aesthetic values, one has to investigate which aspect of the world is perceived, which of its qualities has been conveyed.

Let us return again to artistic values. Each attempt to order the world has at its disposal some scheme, selective by the nature of things, and therefore it leaves out the remainder that does not fit into that scheme. This is also the case with artistic ordering. Thus, when some elusive aspect of experienced reality is worded as a metaphor, a sort of "artistic rationalization" is performed, something is brought closer before our eyes, something is ordered, though this ordering is so different from scientific descriptions that are far removed from directly experienced reality. Yet even an artistic description is unfit to provide an absolutely faithful equivalent of the wealth of experiences and of the respective aspects of reality. Thus, artistic rationalization leaves behind it a certain
background of things that are inexpressible. This factor of the work belongs to the "world of a work of art", being related to a specific quality which has no name and is inexpressible (in the sense of artistic rationalization) and that which is non-rational (that inexpressible background). Both of them are necessary for the aesthetic value to constitute itself, but the value cannot be reduced to either. Thus, aesthetic values are a negation, as it were, of the order provided by artistic (and para-artistic) structures. Aesthetic values, however, do not lead us to that primordial, undifferentiated chaos; we are dealing here with attempts to reach the essence of reality, or at least some vital aspect of the world which reveals itself through non-rational convictions concerning its nature. This gives rise to new ways of interpreting and ordering the world as we see it directly, not through schemes but through directly experienced qualities. It is here that we arrive at the fundamental nature of aesthetic values: they are subjective-objective; an adequately sensitive person and a suitably equipped object are both needed for these values to arise. There must be a human consciousness which is searching for and able to "decipher" artistic structures in their proper function of uncovering the inexpressible background, able to perceive and feel all that escapes this artistic ordering and namely the non-rational factors of the human world in all their importance and significance.

Each variety of aesthetic value demonstrates different qualities of the world, different possibilities of experiencing it, assuming towards it an attitude of acceptance or rebellion.

The next question is, what aspects of the world are revealed by aesthetic values? To what non-rational convictions can we assign such values as beauty, ugliness, loftiness, tragicality, comism, charm, or naïveté?

We shall distinguish two groups of aesthetic values, depending on world outlook as determined by non-rational convictions: 1) values through which we see the world as friendly, accepted, arousing our approval and admiration, attracting us; 2) values that disclose the unfriendly, hostile aspect of the world as arousing our fear and rebellion, as unacceptable and repulsive. Artistic structures expressing these two aspects of the world are, of course, totally different. Yet we cannot ascribe harmony or beauty to the former, and expressiveness or ugliness to the latter. For we can be fascinated by both beauty and ugliness; the latter aspect of the world may also attract us, whereas the former may arouse our indifference as being too perfect, too far removed from the nightmare of everyday
Thus, to demarcate aesthetic values, we need more determinants than these two contrasting ones. While looking for them, let us remember that the fundamental opposition within the sphere of aesthetic values is that between the rational and the non-rational (the domain of feelings, convictions and intuitions, of that which is unascertainable but constitutes real experience which is related to the way of perceiving the world). Here we have convictions about the world perfection, or its basic imperfection; about its might or weakness; its superiority or inferiority in relation to man; its friendliness, hostility or indifference; convictions that the world is inscrutable, or else that it is "transparent" and holds no secrets; that it is fundamentally good or bad. Between these extremes there are several intermediate possibilities which, just like the former, cannot be fully rationalized. Depending on which aspect of the world we perceive, we have different feelings about ourselves, about our insignificance, our power, our being lost in the world, etc. Hence there occurs a strict interdependence between the attitude towards the world, towards the aspect that it reveals to us, and the response it calls forth from us.

Let us now proceed to analyze one of the possibilities in this matter: the world appearing as powerful and perfect, infinitely superior to man, indifferent, notinterfering in his fate, arousing in us the feeling of smallness, loss, with some positive emotional hue (the world is not hostile here) — a peculiar joy derived from the very fact that there exists something perfect and grand, in which we may participate with admiration. The world's indifference to our fate gives us the feeling of being different and independent, enhances our sense of freedom. The powerful world does not destroy, it lets man live his insignificant existence; yet it also permits man to make his existence great once he has built his own perfection or power, not by world standards, but by human ones. We may refer to Pascal's wonder over the magnitude of the world, combined with the belief that man is superior owing to his thought and consciousness. Yet as soon as this is perceived, that aspect of the world in which power and perfection decided about man's specific, non-rational experience and conviction, disappears. Superiority, dominance by power, i.e. "quantitative" qualifications, become transformed into "qualitative" ones: the world and man are two different entities.

As a result of viewing the world as superior, perfect, powerful we experience the feelings of acceptance and admiration, feelings that are "detached", cool, for we cannot exert any influence on this
great world and the world does not influence our fate either. To all this may be added the conviction that the world is inexhaustible, that its perfection and might are only partly revealed to us, so that we are confronted with a wide field of research, study and exploration. Experienced perfection is the promise of a perfection which is unknown, concealed from us, but existing. Hence we may speak of the "depth" of this aspect of the world; yet it is not a depth which threatens us with engulfment or causes vertigos, such as an abyss or the deep of the sea, but one that incites thought, prompts us to move forward, to inquire into the sense of the world and the sense of our own life. Here, greatness and might are related to dignity and majesty, as well as to richness and variety. Is it not this aspect of the world which is revealed to us when we are dealing with the aesthetic value called beauty, both in art and in nature?

The simplest example of beauty in nature may be the starry sky observed on a clear night: it creates the feeling that the world is infinitely greater than we are, yet its might does not threaten us, is only partly revealed before our eyes, and what we see is but a tiny particle of what lies beyond, of the mysterious magnitude of space; yet we also have here the depth, characteristic of beauty, which stimulates reflection on our own insignificance, on our qualitative otherness from all that is not us. Upon that which is given to us we superimpose certain artistic (or para-artistic) structures: we do not see the starry sky as a chaos of glimmering dots, but as a "dispersed structure" which fascinates us due not to symmetry and regularity, but due to the spontaneous "extravagance" of lights forming constellations, to the richness and variety of that which appears to be simple and unvaried. Acceptance, admiration and enchantment are all feelings that fit this sight, that arise against the background of assumed distance and the sense of certain cool separateness.

Art which realizes beauty arouses our admiration; it is full of solemnity and dignity, balanced and varied, profound, encouraging quest and inciting thinking, it is, of course, perfect in respect to mastery, originality, expressed ideas — in other words, it is equipped with artistic values of a high order. Indeed, these values have been selected in such a way that this depth and magnitude are revealed to us, so that the ideas expressed in the work do not give us the impression of needless explication, didacticism or importunate obviousness, but strike us as very important truths. The classic description applied to works of fine art is that work is beautiful to which nothing can be added and from which nothing can be removed.
without destroying its perfect harmony. Such works are perfect both as regards their formal arrangements, the applied artistic structures, and their contents and the profundity of their ideas. To perceive beauty is to discover the aspect of the world expressed in a work which realizes this value.

Let us return, however, to the problem of relationship between artistic and aesthetic values. Such a relationship exists, yet not in the sense of the strict assignment of one to other (as Ingarden believed). The less so since aesthetic values manifest themselves in a situation and depend, at least to some degree, on the recipient’s way of looking at things, on the contents of his “aesthetic a priori”, on his knowledge and experience. It is true that artistic values “stand the test” when they provide the basis for the constitution of a fully valuable aesthetic object revealing aesthetic values, but the creation of artistic values is sometimes a long process, in which not one, but several artists take part, undertaking fragmentary performances. We have here vaguely defined conceptions, hazy intuitions, the expression of which is not yet grounds for the origin of a fully valuable aesthetic concretization or for the perception of a new value. This question refers us to the problem of the artist’s creative process, to the solution, and to the stage at which artistic values is realized — is it at the stage of a new idea, or is it at the stage of execution? And then, the first execution is, as often as not, imperfect (for instance Picasso’s innovatory Les Demoiselles d’Avignon).

In the case of those products of nature to which we ascribe aesthetic values, we are dealing with para-artistic structures, and therefore there is no radical difference here as regards the analogous requirements imposed upon works of art. It is not so much that we see the beauty of nature through art, but that we see beauty because, in the realm of natural objects, structures employed by art have been perceived. Besides art, they obviously can also be found in reality. Varied and symmetrical arrangements, all sorts of asymmetries, sequences of events with a defined type of consequence, dynamism, tensions, contrasts — all these exist in vestigial form in nature, while man’s way of looking at things makes these structures explicit and turns them into principles in order to bring out aesthetic values.

Artistic values refer to the artist’s efficiency, to his inventiveness, to the problems he has set before him and the way in which he has solved them, and indirectly to the era in which he lived or lives, to the cultural background from which his problems and ways of
solving them have sprung. Aesthetic values refer to the world of man, who is also culturally conditioned, for in every epoch other irrational factors come to the fore, other convictions and visions of the world dominate. Yet those values cannot be adequately linked with the epoch, because, on the one hand, there is a wide margin here for individual interpretation of the world, and, on the other hand, the values in question have a several human character and transcend the border lines between the epochs. During all epochs such aesthetic values as beauty, tragicality, poeticality, naivety, loftiness, comicality, etc. are produced, having something in common with one another and yet remaining different; they share an attitude towards the world determined by non-rational convictions, but they vary in their reference to different aspects of the world and in the means of artistic expression they employ.

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NOTES


2 Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, Bern, Monachium, 1966 (2nd ed.).

3 Roman Ingarden, *Spór o istnienie świata*, Warszawa, 1947, t. II.


It seems that each kind of aesthetic values is based on another set of convictions connected with the nature of our world: For instance, the tragicality implies the conviction that the world is superior to man, and inimical, that it wants to destroy the human being — thus, we feel fear towards fate and a pity towards the heroes involved in this kind of situation.