INTRODUCTION

In this first issue on *Aesthetic Values*, edited jointly by the Seminaries of Aesthetics of the Universities of Cracow and Ghent, a series of articles is presented that pertain to general problems of aesthetic value. In “The Twofold Significance of “Aesthetic Value”” Harold Osborne first argues for his well-known theory of aesthetic value as “enhancement of percipience” and secondly shows that this value, thus conceived, is of immense socio-cultural importance in a society that is no longer concerned exclusively or mainly with survival values. Accordingly aesthetic values acquire central importance both cognitively and sociologically, at least in principle. Next, our co-editor Maria Golaszewska, in “Artistic and Aesthetic Values in the Axiological Situation”, argues for the characterisation of artistic and aesthetic values as a special kind of problem-solving in a general axiological context. John Hoagland’s article is overtly polemical: he tries to show, by the example of Picasso, that psychoanalytical reductionism in aesthetics is beside the point, at least as far as great works of art are concerned. Psychoanalysis as such cannot explain true creativity. In “Beauty, Necessity and The A Priori”, Anthony Savile tries to show — in the best analytical tradition — that Kant’s doctrine of beauty cannot be salvaged, upon close reading, if exemplariness must remain closely linked, as Kant thought, with universality. Universality might, more profitably, be interpreted sociologically. Hubert Dethier in “The Critique of Aesthetic Reason, from the point of view of J. Mukarovsky” presents some general considerations concerning such notions as “aesthetic function”, “aesthetic norms” and “aesthetic value” on the basis of Mukarovsky’s approach to these matters. In our own article, “Why subjectivism is always more wrong than objectivism ever can be, even in aesthetics”, we examine the problem of the validity of aesthetic judgements in their subjectivistic and objectivistic versions as a special case of the general problem of scepticism and dogmatism. We conclude that the problem of validity can only be solved — however partially — if it is possible to establish so-called
conditions of detrivialisation that are ontological and epistemological at the same time. In “An Objectivist looks at the Concept of Aesthetic Value” J. L. Broeckx first analyses the concept of value and aesthetic value, then contends that aesthetic value is objective, i.e. pertains to qualities as attributes of public objects and lastly tries to prove that aesthetic values are final and foundational for all other kinds of value as such. Thus — as in the article by Osborne but more explicitly and forcibly — the centrality of aesthetic values is once again affirmed.

Karel Boullart, co-editor, 
State University of Ghent