INTRODUCTORY NOTE

As the title of this volume indicates, we no longer talk about dialogue logic, but about dialogue logics. How is one to qualify such a change? Should one deplore the almost generally accepted defeat to construct and justify the dialogue logic or, on the contrary, interpret it as the coming of age of a new field in philosophical logic? This volume does not attempt to answer this question directly. The various contributions do show that the different approaches developed today are interesting in themselves. Even if a unification is not likely to occur (if such is to be desired at all), there is no reason to consider the present-day situation as unsatisfactory.

Although this volume cannot pretend to present a complete picture of the field, the sample collected here is a representative one. The contributions of the Erlangen Schule — Paul Lorenzen, Kuno Lorenz and Carl Friedrich Gethmann — clearly show that there are internal disagreements. Whereas Gethmann’s approach is rather “liberal” — he proposes various rules for dealing with negation, depending on the conversational context — Lorenzen and Lorenz are still closer to the search for the dialogue logic. The discussion between Gethmann and Lorenz is a fine example of this disagreement. The other contributions all share the same idea that the search for a unique dialogue logic is an impossible if not undesirable attempt. The proponent par excellence of this position is Richard Sylvan. His article is practically a list of arguments for rejecting any form of uniqueness. Given any context, a set of plausible dialogue rules for that context can be articulated he argues, but there is no problem in finding another context in which these same rules are violated. Else Barth and Jaakko Hintikka, starting from similar premisses, set out to construct a classification of some set of dialogue logics. Hintikka arrives at his spectrum of question-answering logics and Barth constructs a two-phase model for distinguishing genuine dialogues from monologues, artificially formulated as dialogues. In my own contribution, I look at a particular context, viz. that of
problem-solving, and try to find a genuine dialogue logic for that context.

One of the most fascinating aspects of the work presented here, is that some well-known philosophical problems such as: what is the nature of truth, what is the meaning of a sentence, what is the nature of logic, are dealt with in the dialogue framework. This does not settle the general problem, but it does give us insight into the requirements for an acceptable answer. On the other hand, it seems clear that the problem of dialogue logic(s) cannot be treated in isolation. E.g., in my own contribution, I rely on the logic of problem-solving, Hintikka's dialogue logic is intimately connected to the larger domain of question-answering logics and Gethmann needs (parts of) speech act theory. Of course, the implicit danger is to reach a conclusion of the form: in order to solve the problem of dialogue logics, we have to solve this or that related problem. There is nothing wrong with this kind of reduction. However, it may too easily turn into an excuse for not addressing the original problem, but I do believe this volume does not suffer from this defect.

The importance of the subject need hardly be motivated. After all, we spend a great deal of our lives discussing, talking, explaining, asking, disagreeing, disputing (is a fight not a form of dialogue), convincing, in short conducting dialogues. It is very tempting (and I will not resist to it) to jump to the meta-level: it may be of interest to analyse this volume itself from a dialogical point of view. Would such an analysis reveal that the more opinions, the livelier the debate?

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