Nadine Gordimer's novel *Berger's Daughter* was on my desk as I began to outline this essay. With rare discipline, she reflects our age's liberal arrogance in the shameless, brilliant mirror of her homeland, the South African Police State. Her protagonist suffers from an "illness"—"not to be able to ignore that condition of a healthy, ordinary life: other people's suffering." In the *Feminization of America*, Ann Douglas makes a similar point. For her, the "illness" is the loss of sentimentality, a sentimentality that asserts that precisely those values which industrial society destroys, are those which it cherishes. There is no known substitute for this dishonesty in an industrial society. Those affected by the loss of sentimentality become aware of apartheid: that which we have now, or that which we shall get after the revolution.

In this essay, I want to explore why, in an industrial society, this apartheid must be; why without apartheid based on sex or pigmentation, on certification or race, or party membership, a society built on the assumption of scarcity cannot exist. And to approach the unexamined forms of apartheid in concrete terms, I want to speak about the fundamental bifurcation of work that is implicit in the industrial mode of production.

I have chosen as my theme the shady side of industrial economy, more specifically, the shady side of work. I do not mean badly paid work, nor unemployment; I mean unpaid work. The unpaid work which is unique to the industrial economy is my theme. In most societies men and women together have maintained and regenerated the subsistence of their households by unpaid activities. The household created most of what the household needed to exist. These so-called subsistence activities are not the subject of my
lecture. My interest is in that entirely different form of unpaid work which an industrial society demands as a necessary complement to the production of goods and services. This kind of unpaid servitude does not contribute to subsistence. Quite the contrary, equally with wage-labor, it ravages subsistence. I call this complement to wage-labor "shadow-work". It comprises most housework women do in their homes and apartments, the activities connected with shopping, most of the homework of students cramming for exams, the toil expended commuting to and from the job. It includes the stress of forced consumption, the tedious and regimented surrender to therapists, compliance with bureaucrats, the preparation for work to which one is compelled, and many of the activities usually labelled "family life".

In traditional cultures the shadow-work is as marginal as wage-labor, often difficult to identify. In industrial societies, it is assumed as routine. Euphemism, however, scatters it. Strong taboos act against its analysis as a unified entity. Industrial production determines its necessity, extent and forms. But it is hidden by the industrial-age ideology, according to which all those activities into which people are coerced for the sake of the economy, by means that are primarily social, count as satisfaction of needs rather than as work.

To grasp the nature of shadow-work we must avoid two confusions. It is not a subsistence activity, it feeds the formal economy, not social subsistence. Nor is it underpaid wage-labor, its unpaid performance is the condition for wages to be paid. I shall insist on the distinction between shadow and subsistence work, as much as on its distinction from wage-labor, no matter how vigorous the protests from unionists, marxists and some feminists. I shall examine shadow-work as a unique form of bondage, not much closer to servitude than to either slavery or wage-labor.

While for wage-labor you apply and qualify, for shadow-work you are born or diagnosed. For wage-labor you are selected; into shadow-work you are put. The time, toil and loss of dignity entailed are exacted without pay. Yet increasingly the unpaid self-discipline of shadow-work becomes more important than wage-labor for further economic growth.

In advanced industrial economics these unpaid contributions toward economic growth have become the social locus of the most
widespread, the most unchallenged, the most depressing form of discrimination. Shadow-work, unnamed and unexamined, has become the principal area of discrimination against the majority in every industrial society. It cannot be ignored much longer. The amount of shadow-work laid on a person today is a much better measure of discrimination than bias on the job. Rising unemployment and rising productivity combine now to create an increasing need to diagnose ever more people for shadow-work. The "age of leisure", the "age of self-help", the "service economy", are euphemism for this growing specter. To fully comprehend the nature of shadow-work, I shall trace its history, a history which runs parallel to that of wage-labor.

Both "work" and "job" are key words today. Neither had its present prominence three hundred years ago. Both are still untranslatable from European languages into many others. Most languages never had one single word to designate all activities that are considered useful. Some languages happen to have a word for activities demanding pay. This word usually connotes graft, bribery, tax or extortion of interest payments. None of these words would comprehend what we call "work".

For the last three decades, the Ministry for Language Development in Djakarta tried to impose the one term bekerja in lieu of half a dozen others used to designate productive work. Sukarno had considered this monopoly of one term a necessary step for creating a Malay working class. The language planners got some compliance from journalists and union leaders. But the people continue to refer to what they do with different terms for pleasurable, or degrading, or tiresome, or bureaucratic actions — whether they are paid or not. All over Latin America, people find it easier to perform the paid task assigned to them than to grasp what the boss means by trabajo. For most toiling unemployed in Mexico, desempleado still means the unoccupied loafer on a well-paid job, not the unemployed whom the economist means by the term.

For classical Greeks or later Romans, work done with the hands, done under orders or involving income from trade was servile, better left to the lowly or slaves. In theory, Christians should have considered labor as part of each man's vocation. Paul, the tentmaker, had tried to introduce the Jewish work ethics into early Christianity: "who does not work shall not eat". In fact though, this early Christian ideal was very thoroughly repressed. In
Western monasteries, except for short periods of reform, Saint Benedict’s motto “ora et labora” was interpreted as a call to supervise lay brothers at work, and to do God’s work by prayer. Neither the Greeks not the Middle Ages had a term resembling our work or job.

What today stands for work, namely wage-labor, was a badge of misery all through the Middle Ages. It stood in clear opposition to at least three other types of toil: the activities of the household by which most people subsisted, quite marginal to any money economy: the trades of people who made shoes, barbared or cut stones; the various forms of beggary by which people lived on what others shared with them. In principle, medieval society provided a berth for everyone whom it recognized as a member: its structural design excluded unemployment and destitution. When one engaged in wage-labor, not occasionally as the member of a household but as a regular means of total support, he clearly signaled to the community that he, like a widow or an orphan, had no berth, no household, and so, stood in need of public assistance.

In September of 1330 a rich cloth merchant died in Florence and left his property to be distributed among the destitute. The Guild of Or San Michele was to administer the estate. The 17,000 beneficiaries were selected and locked into the available churches at midnight. As they were let out, each received his inheritance. Now, how were these “destitute” selected? We know, because we have access to the welfare notes of Or San Michele Guild in proto-industrial Florence. From it, we know the categories of the destitute: orphan, widow, victim of a recent act of God, heads of family totally dependent on wage-work, or those compelled to pay rent for the roof over their bed. The need to provide for all the necessities for life off wage-work was a sign of utter impotence in an age when poverty designated primarily a valued attitude rather than an economic condition. The pauper was opposed to the potens, the powerful, not yet to the dives, the rich. Until the late XII century, the term poverty designated primarily a realistic detachment from transitory things. The need to live by wage-labor was the sign for the down and out, for those too wretched to be simply added to that huge medieval crowd of cripples, exiles, pilgrims, madmen, friars, ambulants, homeless that made up the world of the poor. The dependence on wage-labor was the recognition that the worker had neither a home where he could contribute within the household, nor the ability to rely on the alms of society. The
right to beggary was a normative issue, but never the right to work\textsuperscript{20}.

To clarify the right to beggary, let me quote from a sermon by Ratger of Verona, preached nearly half a millenium earlier than the Florentine example. The sermon was delivered in 834 and is a moral exhortation on the rights and duties of beggars.

"You complain about your weakness. Rather thank God, do not complain, and pray for those who keep you alive. And you, over there, healthy though you are, complain about the burden of your large broad. Then, abstain from your wife, but not without first getting her agreement, and work with your hands so that you can feed yourself and others. You say you cannot do this. Then cry about your own weakness, which is burdensome for you. Beg with restraint for what is necessary, abstain from all that is superfluous... Keep company with the sick, succor the dying and wash the dead."

Ratger here speaks about a right to beggary that for a thousand years was never challenged\textsuperscript{21}.

The abhorrence of wage-labor still fits the outlook which might be shared by today's world majority. But with the current dominance of economics in everyday language, people lack the words to express their feelings directly. In a letter I received from a 23-year old Mexican, a kind of wonderment for those totally dependent on wage-labor comes through clearly. Miguel is the son of a widow who brought up four children by growing radishes and selling them from a petate on the floor of the local market. Besides the children, there were always some outsiders eating or sleeping at her home. Miguel went to Germany as the guest of Mr. Mueller, a grade school teacher in his native village, who in five years had renovated part of an old house, adding a guest room. Miguel accepted the invitation, in order to obtain training in art photography from Leitz. He wants to document traditional weaving techniques.

Unhampered by previous schooling, Miguel quickly learned to speak German. But he had difficulties understanding the people. In his letter, written after six months in Germany, he reported: "Señor Mueller behaves as todo un señor (a true gentleman might be the English equivalent). But most Germans act like destitute people with too much money. No one can help another. No one can take people in — into his household." I believe that Miguel's
comments reflect well the situation and attitudes of a past millenium: people who live on wages have no subsistent household, are deprived of the means to provide for their subsistence and feel impotent to offer any subsistence to others. For Miguel, wage-labor has not yet gotten stuck beyond the looking glass.

But for most people in Europe and the West, wage-labor went through the looking glass between the XVII and XIX century. Instead of being a proof of destitution, wages came to be perceived as a proof of usefulness. Rather than being a supplement to subsistent existence, wages came to be viewed — by those who paid them — as the natural source of livelihood for a population. These populations had been excluded from the means of subsistence by progressive forms of enclosures\(^2\). An incident illustrates the beginning of this process. In 1777, barely twelve years before the Revolution, the Academy of Chalon-sur-Marne in Northwest France, endowed a competition for the best treatment of the following problem: how to abolish rampant beggary in ways that would profit the Crown and be in the interest of the poor. The initiative reflects the increase of beggary in an age of enclosure, proto-industry and bourgeois values. It also reflects a new economic meaning of poverty, a condition now opposed, not to the powerful, but to the moneyed. The prize for the competition was awarded an essay whose opening sentences sum up its thesis: "For centuries, people have searched for the stone of wisdom. We have found it. It is work. Wage-labor is the natural source of enrichment for the poor."

The author is certainly a man of letters, a clerk. He probably lives on some sinecure, a benefice or some other form of handout. To his own mental labors, he would never attribute such wondrous transforming powers\(^2\). He would insist on his right to high-class beggary. He is not a modern professor, who believes himself a white collar worker, justly earning his living, being socially productive. But for both, it would be true to say: those who since the XVIII century write about work, its value, dignity, pleasures, always write about the work that others do\(^2\).

The text also reflects the influence of hermetic or alchemic thought on social theory. Work is presented as the stone of wisdom, the panacea, the magic elixir which transforms what it touches into gold. Nature turns into priced goods and services by its contact with the labor which transmutes it. Making various concessions for the contribution of capital and resources to value, this is the
fundamental position of classical economists from Adam Smith and Ricardo to Mill and Marx. The alchemic language of the late XVIII\textsuperscript{0} century was replaced by Marx with the then fashionable "coquetry" with the language of chemistry. The hermetic perception of value has continued to determine the character of social ethics until today, even though the labour theory of value was replaced, in economics, first by utility theory, then by post-Keynesian thought, and finally by the utter confusion which attends the contemporary insight that "economists conceive of the world in terms that fail to grasp its essential characteristics or that seriously misrepresent them." Economists understand about work no more than alchemists about gold.

The prize-winning essay of 1777 is also remarkable for the late date at which, in France, the policy to compel the poor to useful work was considered a novelty. Until the mid-XVIII\textsuperscript{0} century, French poor houses were run on the medieval Christian assumption that forced labor was a punishment for sin or crime. In protestant Europe and in some Italian cities which were industrialized early, that view had been abandoned a century earlier. The pioneering policies and equipment in Dutch Calvinist or North German workhouses clearly show this. They were organized and equipped for the cure of laziness and for the development of the will to do work as assigned. These workhouses were designed and built to transform useless beggars into useful workers. As such, they were the reverse of medieval alms-giving agencies. Set up to receive beggars caught by the police, these institutions softened them up for treatment by a few days of no food and a carefully planned ration of daily lashes. Then, treatment with work at the treadmill or at the rasp followed until the transformation of the inmate into a useful worker was diagnosed. One even finds provisions for intensive care. People resistant to work were thrown into a constantly flooding pit, where they could survive only by frantically pumping all day long. Not only in their pedagogical approach, but also in their method of training for self-approbation, these institutions are true precursors of compulsory schools. I have found a collection of thirty-two letters written by former inmates addressed to the workhouse in Bremen and published by that institution. Each one purports to be grateful acknowledgement of a cure from sloth by a successfully treated (schooled) patient.

Even if the Bremen letters are authentic, they certainly do not reflect popular sentiment. The destitute of the XVIII\textsuperscript{0} century, by
this date generally labelled as the “poor”, violently resisted such efforts to qualify them for work. They sheltered and defended those whom the police tried to classify as “beggars” and whom the government tried to cure of social uselessness in order to protect the unobtrusive poor from such vagrants.

Even the harshest governments seemed unsuccessful in their forays. The crowd remained ungovernable. The Prussian Secretary of the Interior, in 1747, threatens severe punishment to anyone who interferes with the poverty-police:

“... from morning till night, we try to have this police cruise through our streets to stop beggary ... but as soon as soldiers, commoners or the crowd notice the arrest of a beggar to bring him to the poorhouse, they riot, beat-up our officers sometimes hurting them grievously and liberate the beggar. It has become almost impossible to get the poverty-police to take to the street...”

Seven more analogous decrees were issued during the following thirty years.

All through the XVIII° and well into the XIX° century, the project of Economic Alchemy produced no echo from below. The plebeians rioted. They rioted for just grain prices, they rioted against the export of grain from their regions, they rioted to protect prisoners of debt and felt protected whenever the law seemed not to coincide with their tradition of natural justice. The proto-industrial plebeian crowd defended its “moral economy” as Thompson has called it. And they rioted against the attacks on this economy’s social foundation: against the enclosure of sheeps and now against the enclosure of beggars. And in these riots, the crowd was led, more often than not, by its women. Now, how did this rioting proto-industrial crowd, defending its right to subsistence, turn into a striking labor force, defending “rights” to wages? What was the social device that did the job, where the new poor-laws and workhouses had failed? It was the economic division of labor into a productive and a non-productive kind, pioneered and first enforced through the domestic enclosure of women.

An unprecedented economic division of the sexes, an unprecedented economic conception of the family, an unprecedented antagonism between the domestic and public spheres made wage-
work into a necessary adjunct of life. All this was accomplished by making working men into the wardens of their domestic women, one on one, and making this guardianship into a burdensome duty\textsuperscript{34}. The enclosure of women succeeded where the enclosure of sheep and beggars had failed.

Why the struggle for subsistence was so suddenly abandoned and why this demise went unnoticed, can be understood only by bringing to light the concurrent creation of shadow-work and the theory that women, by her scientifically discovered nature, was destined to do it\textsuperscript{35}. While men were encouraged to revel in their new vocation to the working class, women were subreptitiously redefined as the ambulant, full-time matrix of society. Philosophers and physicians combined to enlighten society about the true nature of woman’s body and soul. This new conception of her “nature” destined her for activities in a kind of home which excluded her from wage-labor as effectively as it precluded any real contribution to the household’s subsistence. In practice, the labor theory of value made man’s work into the catalyst of gold, and degraded the homebody into a housewife economically dependent and, as never before, unproductive. She was now man’s beautiful property and faithful support needing the shelter of home for her labor of love\textsuperscript{36}.

The bourgeois war on subsistence could enlist mass support only when the plebeian rabble turned into a clean living working class made up of economically distinct men and women\textsuperscript{37}. As a member of this class, the man found himself in a conspiracy with his employer — both were equally concerned with economic expansion and the suppression of subsistence. Yet this fundamental collusion between capital and labor in the war on subsistence was mystified by the ritual of class struggle. Simultaneously man, as head of a family increasingly dependent on his wages, was urged to perceive himself burdened with all society’s legitimate work, and under constant extortion from an unproductive woman. In and through the family the two complementary forms of industrial work were now fused: wage-work and shadow-work. Man and woman, both affectively estranged from subsistence activities, became the motive for the other’s exploitation for the profit of the employer and investments in capital goods\textsuperscript{38}. Increasingly, surplus was not invested only in the so-called means of production. Shadow-work itself became more and more capital-intensive. Investments in the home, the garage and the kitchen reflect the disappearance of subsistence from the household, and the evidence of a growing monopoly of
shadow-work. Yet this shadow-work has been consistently mystified. Four such mystifications are still current today.

1. The first comes masked as an appeal to biology. It describes the relegation of women to the role of mothering housewives as a universal and necessary condition to allow men to hunt for the prey of the job. Four modern disciplines seem to legitimate this assumption. Ethologists describe female apes like housewives guarding the nest, while the males hunt through the trees. From this projection of family-roles onto the ape, they infer that nesting is the gender specific role of the female and real work, that is the conquest of scarce resources, is the task of the male. The myth of the mighty hunter is then by them defined as a cross-cultural constant, a behavioural bedrock of humanoids, derived from some biological substratum of higher mammals. Anthropologists irresistibly rediscover among savages the traits of their own moms and dads, and find features of the apartments in which they were bread, in tents, huts and caves. From hundreds of cultures, they gather evidence that women were always handicaped by their sex, good for digging rather than hunting, guardians of the home. Sociologists, like Parsons, start from the function of the family that they can study and let the gender-roles within the family illuminate the other structures of society. Finally, sociobiologists of the right and the left give a contemporary veneer to the enlightenment myth that female behaviour is male adaptive.

Common to all these is a basic confusion between the gender-specific assignment of tasks that is characteristic for each culture, and the uniquely modern economic bifurcation in XIX° century work ideology that establishes a previously unknown apartheid between the sexes: he, primarily the producer; she, primarily private-domestic. This economic distinction of sex-roles was impossible under conditions of subsistence. It uses mystified tradition to legitimate the growing distinction of consumption and production by defining what women do as non-work.

2. The second mask for shadow-work confuses it with "social reproduction". This latter term is an unfortunate category that Marxists use to label sundry activities which do not fit their ideology of work, but which must be done by someone — for example, keeping house for the wage-worker. It is carelessly applied to what most people did most of the time in most societies, that is, subsistence activities. Also, it named activities that in the late XIX°
century were still considered to be non-productive wage-labor, the work of teachers or social workers. Social reproduction includes most of what all people do around the home today. The label thus thwarts every attempt to grasp the difference between woman’s basic and vital contribution to a subsistence economy, and her unpaid conscription into the reproduction of industrial labor — unproductive women are consoled with “re-production”.

3. The third device that masks shadow-work is the use of economic measurements to explain behaviour outside the monetary market\textsuperscript{41}. All unpaid activities are amalgamated into a so-called informal sector. While the old economists built their theory on the foregone conclusion that every commodity consumption implied the satisfaction of a need, the new economists go further: for them, every human decision is the evidence of a satisfying preference. They build economic models for crime, leisure, learning, fertility, discrimination and voting behaviour. Marriage is no exception. G. Becker\textsuperscript{42} for instance, starts from the assumption of a sex-market in equilibrium, and hence derives formulas that describe the “devision of outputs between mates”. Others\textsuperscript{43} calculate the value added by the housewife to a TV dinner made by her unpaid activities in selecting, heating and serving it. Potentially, this line of thought would permit to argue that wage workers would be better off if they were to live as homebodies, that capital accumulation is what women have been doing unpaid at home. For Milton Friedman’s pupils, \textit{it is sex which offers a paradigm for the economics of what women do}.

4. A fourth mask is placed on shadow-work by the majority of feminists writing on housework. They know that it is hard work. They fume because it is unpaid. Unlike most economists, they consider the wages lost huge, rather than trifling. Further, some of them believe that women’s work is “non-productive” and yet the main source of the “mystery of primitive accumulation”, a contradiction that had baffled omniscient Marx. They add feminist sunshades to Marxists spectacles. They tend to wed the housewife to a wage earning patriarch, whom they see exploiting his woman, as his employer exploits him. The XIX\textsuperscript{0} century conspiracy of class enemies at the service of growth is thus re-enforced by a war of the sexes in each home. They seem not to have noticed that the re-definition of woman’s nature after the French Revolution went hand in hand with one of man’s. Abstract sex rather than real pants were now at issue in the battle. Although their woman-oriented outlook
provides new insights into heretofore hidden reality, their movement-specific commitment tends to cloud the key issue: it obscures the fact that modern women are crippled by being compelled to labor that, in addition to being unsalaried in economic terms, is fruitless in terms of subsistence.

Recently, however, some new historians of women's work have penetrated beyond conventional categories and approaches. They refuse to view their subject through hand-me-down professional glasses choosing rather to look from "below the belt". They study childbirth, breastfeeding, housecleaning, prostitution, rape, dirty laundry and speech, mother's love, childhood, abortion, menopause. They have revealed how gynecologists, architects, druggists and colleagues in chairs of history reached into this disorderly grab bag to create symptoms and market novel therapies. Some of them unravel the home life of third world women in the new urban slums, and contrast it with the life in the campo or kampung. Others explore the "labor of love" which was invented for women in neighborhoods, clinics and political parties.

The pathfinding innovators who dare to view industrial society from its shady and messy underside light up and dissect kinds of oppression heretofore hidden. What they then report does not fit the available -isms and -ologies. Not looking at the effects of industrialization from above, their findings turn out to be quite other than the pinnacles which managers describe, than the crevices which workers feel, than the principles which ideologues impose. And their eyes see differently than in the ethno-anthropological explorers who are more accustomed through their training to view the Zande or to reconstruct a village priest's life in medieval Provence. Such unconventional research now violates a long-standing scholarly and political double taboo — the shadow which hides the Siamese twin nature of industrial work, and the prohibition to seek new terms to describe it.

Unlike the suffragettes of the social sciences, who seem obsessed by what enclosure has "unjustly" denied them, the historians of female intimacy recognize that house-work is *sui generis*. They detect the spread of a new shadow existence between 1780 and 1860, in different countries at a different rythm. They report on a new life whose frustrations are not less painful when they are, occasionally, artfully gilded. They describe how this work *sui generis* was exported, together with wage-labor beyond the confines of Europe. And they observe that, whenever women be-
came second best on the labor-market, their work, when unpaid, was profoundly changed. Parallel with second-class wage-work organized for women, first at the sewing machine, then at the typewriter and finally on the telephone, something new, the disestablished housewife came into being.

This transmogrification of housework is particularly obvious in the United States because it happened so abruptly. In 1810 the common productive unit in New England was still the rural household. Processing and preserving of food, candlemaking, soap-making, spinning, weaving, shoemaking, quilting, rugmaking, the keeping of small animals and gardens, all took place on domestic premises. Although money income might be obtained by the household through the sale of produce, and additional money be earned through occasional wages to its members, the United States household was overwhelmingly self-sufficient. Buying and selling, even when money did change hands, was often conducted on a barter basis. Women were as active in the creation of domestic self-sufficiency as were men. They brought home about the same salaries. They still were, economically, men’s equals. In addition, they usually held the pursestrings. And further, they were as actively engaged in feeding, clothing and equipping the nation during the turn of the century. In 1810, in North America, twenty-four out of twenty-five yards of wool were of domestic origin. This picture had changed by 1830. Commercial farming had begun to replace subsistence farms. The living wage had become common, and dependence on occasional wage-work began to be seen as a sign of poverty. The woman, formerly the mistress of a household that provided sustenance for the family, now became the guardian of a place where children stayed before they began to work, where the husband rested, and where his income was spent. Ann Douglass has called this transmogrification of women their “disestablishment”. In fact, it strongly suggests the epoch’s clerical aspirations and anxieties. Just as the clergyman of the time had been newly segregated in a strictly ecclesiastic realm, women were now both flattered and threatened to stick to their proper sphere where lip-service could be paid to the superiority of their functions. With their economic equality, women lost many of their legal privileges, among them the right to vote. They vanished from traditional trades, were replaced by male obstetricians in midwifery, and found the way into the new professions barred. Their economic disestablishment reflected societies’ commitment to the satisfaction of basic needs in the home by means of products created in wage-labor that had moved away from the household. Deprived
of subsistence, marginal on the labor-market, the frustrating task of the housewife became the organization of compulsory consumption. The existence which is becoming typical for men and children in the 1980’s was already well known to a growing number of women in the 1850’s.

The new historians of female sensitivity and mentality ostensibly concentrate on women’s work. But, in fact, they have given us the first coherent report written by trained historians who speak as loosers in the war against subsistence. They provide us a history of “work” performed in the shadow of economic searchlights, written by those who are compelled to do it. This shadow, of course, blights much more than motherly or wifely duties. It infallibly extends with progress and spreads with the development of the economic sphere, reaching further into both men’s and women’s lives to leave no one’s day completely unclouded. The house-wife will probably remain forever as the icon of this shadow-existence, just as the man in overalls will survive the microprocessor as the icon of the “industrial worker”. But to make this other half of industrial existence into women’s work, tout court, would be the fifth and ultimate mystification. It would forever besmirch the personal reality of women with a sex invented for economic control. For this reason, I propose “shadow-work” to designate a social reality whose prototype only is modern housework. Add the rising number of unemployed to the increasing number of people kept on the job only to keep them busy, and it becomes obvious that shadow-work is by far more common in our late industrial age than paid jobs. By the end of the century, the productive worker will be the exception.

Shadow-work and wage-labor came into existence together. Both alienate equally, though they do so in profoundly different ways. Bondage to shadow-work was first achieved primarily through economic sex-coupling. The XIX° century bourgeois family made up of the wage earner and his dependents replaced the subsistence-centered household. It tied the femina domestica and a vir laborans in the thralldom of complementary impotence typical for homo economicus. This crude model of bondage to shadow-work could not suffice for economic expansion: profits for capitalists are derived from compulsory consumers just as power of professionals and bureaucrats is derived from disciplined clients. Both capitalist and commissar, profit more from shadow-work than from wage-labor. The sex-coupling family provided them with a blueprint for more
complex and more subtly disabling forms of bondage to shadow-work. This bondage today is effected essentially through social agents empowered for diagnosis. Diagnosis literally means discrimination, knowing-apart. It is used today to designate the act by which a profession defines you as its client. Whatever allows a profession to impute a need for dependence on its services, will do quite well to impose the corresponding shadow-work on the client. Medical scientists and pedagogues are typical examples of such disabling professions. They impose the shadow-work of service-consumption on their clients and get paid for it out of the clients’ income, either directly or through taxed monies. In this fashion, the modern professionals who induce care push the pattern of the work-bonding modern family one step further: through wage-labor, people in “caring relationship” jobs now produce precisely those frustrating things which women in the XIX° century family were originally compelled to do or make for no pay whatever. The creation of professionally supervised shadow-work has become society’s major business. Those paid to create shadow-work are today’s elite. As housework is only the most visible tip of shadow-labor, so the gynecological engineering of the housewife is only the most impudent cover for society-wide diagnostics. For example, the sixteen levels of relative degradation which define the classes of drop-outs from the educational system assign disproportionate burdens of shadow-work to society’s lower and larger cohorts, and do so much more effectively than sex or race ever could have done.

The discovery of shadow-work could well be, for the historian, as important as the discovery — a generation ago — of popular cultures and peasants as subjects of history. Then Karl Polanyi and the great Frenchmen around the Annales, pioneered the study of the poor, of their ways of life, their sensibilities and world-views. They brought the subsistence of the weak and illiterate into the realm of historical research. The study of women under the impact of industrialization can be understood as a beachhead into another no-mans-land of history: the forms of life that are typical only to industrial society yet remain invisible, as long as this society is studied under the assumptions about scarcity, desire, sex or work that it has secreted. The discovery of this shadow-realm, which is distinct both from that of subsistent popular cultures and from that of political and social economy, will make those whom André Gorz calls “post-proletarians” into subjects of history. And the historian will be able to see that the diagnostic procedure that first dis-established women by opposing them to men, in the meantime
Illich has dis-established everyone in multiple ways. In this perspective, the history of the industrial age is that of a radically new kind of discrimination. The war against popular cultures and vernacular values could never have succeeded unless those to be divested of subsistence had first accepted their enclosure into distinct spheres and thereby had been divided. The creation of the housewife bespeaks an unprecedented, a sexual apartheid. But it also illustrates the kind of consciousness in which desire could not but become mimetic. The many attempts to make this dividing line appear as a prolongation of traditional fronteers that have forever separated people from people, is as futile as the attempt to make industrial work appear as a prolongation of what people always did — both serve the same mystification. Both protect the taboo that covers the unexamined life of our age. People who insist on interpreting the current status of women as updated purdah, must miss the point. Equally, those who view relegation to South African Homelands as a modern resettlement based on traditional attitudes towards distinct pigmentation, totally miss the meaning of the color line. And anyone who sees the zek in the gulag primarily as a slave is blind to the motto that only a Hitler presumed to write large on the entrance to Auschwitz: “Arbeit macht Frei”. He will never understand a society in which the unpaid work of the Jew in the camp is exacted from him as his due contribution to his own extinction. Modern enclosure, apartheid, is never just cruel or just degrading, it has always a demonic dimension. It can be expressed in prose only up to a point. To grasp it we have to listen to a poet like Paul Celan: “... und Sie schaufeln ein Grab in den Lueften, Sie schaufeln und schaufeln, da liegt Man nicht eng ...” The subtler forms of apartheid can blur our vision for the mysterium iniquitatis always inherent in them. Yesterday’s fascism in Germany, or today’s in South Africa manifest it.

Industrial society cannot forgo its victims. XIX° century women were enclosed, disestablished, they were damaged. Inevitably they had a corrupting influence on society at large. They provided that society with an object for sentimental compassion. Oppression always forces its victims to do societies’ dirty work. Our society forces its victims to become cooperative objects of oppression through care. Its condition for ordinary happiness is sentimental concern for others that ought to be helped, saved or liberated. This is the story that Nadine Gordimer told me, not about women but about blacks. She told it to me with “the deceptive commonplace that people, accustomed to police harassment, use before the un-
initiated”, an attitude that she attributes to her main character, Berger’s daughter. For her there is no ordinary happiness, because she is ill. The illness that she describes is the loss of that sentimentalism on which ordinary happiness today depends.

Ann Douglas, the American, has well described this sentimentalism. It is a complex phenomenon that in industrial societies is the substratum of ideologies and religions. It asserts that the values that an industrial society’s activities deny, are precisely those that it cherishes. It asserts that the values now attributed to subsistence — subsistence which economic growth inevitably destroys — are precisely those for the sake of which growth must continue. It transmogrifies subsistence into the economy’s shadow. Sentimentalism succeeds in dealing with the apartheid, implicit in the opposition between production and consumption, by manipulating nostalgia for subsistence. The sentimental glorification of the victims of apartheid: women, patients, blacks, illiterates, underdeveloped, addicts, the underdog, the proletariat, provides a way to solemnly protest a power to which one has already capitulated. This sentimentalism is a dishonesty for which there is no known substitute in a society that has ravished its own environment for subsistence. Such a society depends on ever new diagnosis of those for whom it must care. And this paternalistic dishonesty enables the representatives of the oppressed to seek power for ever new oppression.

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NOTES

3 The History of Scarcity. Economics always imply the assumption of scarcity. What is not scarce cannot be subjected to economic control. This is as true of goods and services, as it is of work. The assumption of scarcity has penetrated all modern institutions. Education is built on the assumption that desirable knowledge is scarce. The same, medicine assumes about health, transportation about time, and Unions about work. The modern family itself is built on the assumption that productive activities are scarce. This assumption of scarcity rather than the nuclear conjugal organization
of the household, distinguishes the modern family from that of other times. The identification of that which is desirable with that which is scarce has deeply shaped our thinking, our feeling, our perception of reality itself. Scarcity that in other societies coloured a few well defined values — such as foodstuffs in Spring and wartime, arable land, pepper or slaves — now seems to affect all values of public concern. Being thus immersed in it, we have become blind to the paradox that scarcity increases in a society with the rise of the G.N.P. This kind of scarcity which we take for granted was — and largely still is — unknown outside of commodity-intensive societies. The history of this sense of scarcity, however, still remains to be written.

A major step towards such a history has been made in 1979 by Paul Dumouchel and Jean-Pierre Dupuy in the two separate essays they published under the joint title L’enfer des choses. Both authors start with an insight to which they were helped by René Girard. Girard, a Frenchman, in 1961 demonstrated that the great novelists of the XIX\textsuperscript{0} century had made a discovery that consistently has illuded the social scientists. These novelists describe a radical mutation of human desire and of envy. This transformation can be observed already in Don Quijote of Cervantes, but it becomes pervasive in the time of Dostojewsky. In Girard’s words, these bourgeois novelists were aware of the fact that desire, that in other previous literature had a direct object, in the XIX\textsuperscript{0} century becomes triangular, mimetic. The protagonists of the great novelists live in a society that has made it almost impossible to desire, except what others whom one envies, either have or want. And when these protagonists pursue their desires in this fashion, they transmogrify their envy into virtue. When they imitate their model, they believe that they do so to distinguish themselves from it. Guided by Girard, the two authors, Dumouchel and Dupuy, locate the uniqueness of modern institutions in the institutional arrangements that foster mimetic desire and, with it, scarcity of an unprecedented kind. Instead of using Marx, Freud or Lévi-Strauss to de-mystify Dostojewsky, they demystify the great political economists, psychoanalists and structuralists whom, each in different ways, spin their yarn out of a-historical scarcity. They expose scarcity that is defined by mimetic desire as the foregone conclusion on which the entire edifice of commodity-intensive economics is built.

Bibliography on “mimetic desire”: the modernization of envy.

SHADOW–WORK


McCAWLEY, J.D. "Verbs of Bitching", in: HOCKNEY, D. ed., Contemporary Research in Philosophical Logic and Linguistic Semantics, pp. 313–332, has wetted my appetite for semantic studies on the history of envy in contemporary languages.

4 Bibliography on commodity-intensive versus subsistence "economies".


One of my major problems became the restrictions and qualifications that had to be attached to most terms of formal economics whenever these are used to describe non-monetized social reality. The reality that deals with applicability of formal economic concepts in anthropology can be found in DALTON, G. "Theoretical Issues in Economic Anthropology", in *Current Anthropology*, vol. 10, no 7, pp. 63–102, 1969. With the critical evaluation of the New Economists who expand economic analysis to the informal sector of contemporary societies, Dupuy will be dealing in a forthcoming book. My main concern is the difference in the qualification that must be attached to economic terms, ex. gr. "scarcity", when this term is applied to describe first the lack of food during a famine among the Barotse, and then to the lack of time of a nervous housewife.

5 *Unemployment.*

In a society that aims at full employment, most people who do unpaid work are not counted as "unemployed". If "the concept of unemployment was beyond the scope of any idea which early Victorian reformers had at their command, largely because they had no word for it ... (G.M. YOUNG, *Victorian England*) or if ... (Victorians by their avoidance of the term) ... proved their lack of understanding (of crowd feelings) as EPTHOMSON (*Making of the English Working Class*) would claim." consult WILLIAMS, Raymond. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976, pp. 273–275.

See also GARRATY, John A. *Unemployment in History: Economic Thought and Public Policy*. New York: Harper & Row, 1978. In his introduction the author says: "... no one has ever before written a general history of unemployment ... I call this book Unemployment in History instead of a History of Unemployment... It does not attempt to describe why there was unemployment, but how the condition of being without work has been perceived and dealt with in different societies from the beginning of recorded history..." The book examplifies the futility of using modern concepts for historical research.
The Household.

I argue that the activity, which is ordinary modern language is called "housework" must be understood as substantially distinct from that which outside industrial society takes place within the framework of a "house". For the common Indo-Germanic attitudes towards the house, see BENVENISTE, Emile. Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes. Vol. 1. Paris: Ed. de Minuit, 1969, p. 295 ff. A synthetic and clear introduction to the place of the house in old European subsistence in BRUNNER, Otto. "Das ganze Haus und die altereuropäische Oekonomik", in: BRUNNER, Otto, Neue Wege zur Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte. Göttingen, 1968. FLANDRIN, Jean-Louis, Familles: parenté, maison, sexualité dans l'ancienne société. Paris: Hachette, 1976. RYKWERT, Joseph. On Adam's House in Paradise. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1972, and RYKWERT, Joseph, The Idea of a Town: The Anthropology of Urban Form in Rome, Italy and the Ancient World. Princeton Univ. Press, 1976, are introductions to the theoretical background of modern architecture. See also: ELIAS, Norbert, Die höfische Gesellschaft. Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1977. My reading of these leads me to believe that just as health has been "medicalized" in contemporary societies, so the perception of space has been professionalized. Modern space is arranged for a human being as it is perceived by the architect at the service of his colleagues from the medical, paedagogical and economical professions.

On the genesis of this essay.

After finishing Medical Nemesis I decided to elaborate on the key chapter of that book: chap. 3 in the draft version, Boyars London 1974 and in Némésis médicale, Seuil 1975; chap. 6 in Medical Nemesis as definitively published by Pantheon, New York, 1976, and simultaneously as Limits to Medicine by Boyars. Under the guidance of J.P. Dupuy I began to read into the history of economic analysis. I became increasingly fascinated with those aspects of commodity-intensive society that economists tend to relegate to the "informal sector"; I became interested in them precisely from that point of view under which the economic searchlight envelops them in a deep shadow. The common characteristics of these shadow-transactions I began to call the "shadow-economy". Phenomenologically this shadow-economy revealed characteristics which distinguished it as well from "embedded" subsistence activities as from formally economic transactions. Having studied for almost a decade the student, the computer, the patient, I found their behaviour as actors in the shadow-economy, as collaborators in disciplined frustration,
thoroughly comparable. To clarify this issue I wrote a paper on *Taught Mother Tongue*, see: *CoEvolution* op cit. Then I came across two papers that oriented my further readings, both, according to their authors, are only "drafts": WERLHOF, Claudia von. *Frauenarbeit: Der blinde Fleck in der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*. Bielefeld 1978 (Engl. *Women's Work: The Blindspot in the Critique of Political Economy.*) Both versions are available from: Universität Bielefeld, Soziologische Fakultät. Postfach 8640, 4800 Bielefeld 1; and BOCK, O. und DUDEN, B. "Zur Entstehung der Hausarbeit im Kapitalismus" in: *Frauen und Wissenschaft*. Berlin: Courage Verlag, July 1977. pp. 118–199, contains up to 1975 the most stimulating bibliography on the activities typical for enclosed women. The study of these two papers led me to the conviction that the activity for which the modern housewife is the prototype, has no parallel outside of industrial society; that this activity is fundamental for the existence of such a society; that contemporary wage-labor could come into existence only thanks to the simultaneous structuring of this new kind of activity. I discovered therefore, in the work that women do in the domestic sphere of a modern economy, the prototype for transactions by students, patients, computers, and other captive consumers whom I had been studying.

In female housework I began to see the expression of two distinct degradations: an unprecedented degradation of women, and an unprecedented degradation of work, be this kind of work done by women, men, or in betweens such as children and patients. It seemed to me that the full importance of the unique, industrial age degradation of women will never be adequately understood, unless the bifurcation between "work" and "shadow-work" has first been clearly established. Housework is the key example for shadow-work. If we want to reduce shadow-work, we must first clarify what it is. The shady housework of modern women, for instance, is not what women always did. This, two French books just published prove by refined indirection: SEGALLEN, Martine, *Mari et femme dans la société paysanne*. Paris: Flammarion, 1980, and VERDIER, Yvonne. *Façons de dire, façons de faire: la laveuse, la couturière, la cuisinière*. Paris: Gallimard, 1979. Both express on every page the happy surprise of the authors, modern women, as they reconstruct from the living traces it has left in rural France, the vernacular life of the last century. Housewives are, however, only one category who is currently resisting shadow-work. All around the world ten thousands of movements try to unplug their communities from both wage and shadow-work through the choice of alternative use-value oriented

8 Payment for shadow-work?
Some forms of work in contemporary society that, at first, seem to be unpaid, are ultimately highly rewarded in monetary terms. University studies are often a good example. The *numerus clausus* obligates a student to embark on a career that he does not like and to acquire competences and notions that are in no provable way related to the performance of his future functions. It is socially inevitable, frustrating and often exacting work. Typically, however, the life-time income of a college graduate will be very much higher than of his non-graduate brothers and sisters. His non-monetary perquisites will also be such higher. Pro-rating this extra income per hour of cramming for exams in a school of accounting, makes these hours into some of the best paid in society. Unlike the first twelve years of schooling, that are made obligatory by life-long social sanctions against the dropout, “work” done in college could be considered part of a well paid life-time job. The fact that everywhere in the world university students organize for higher scholarships can be perhaps interpreted as evidence for the fact that they do feel themselves already as “workers”.

This is obviously not so for authentic shadow-workers: full-time housewives, middle-school pupils, part-time commuters. Their claim to recompensation is of a different kind. When they succeed to transform an activity that, in 1970, was exacted as unpaid shadow-work into paid labour by 1980, they have redefined their type of activity. In Sweden for instance, some housewifes are now paid wages, and some factory workers have negotiated through their Unions a bonus for each hour spent commuting to the job. Their employers recognize that their workday begins when they leave their homes.

I am therefore not arguing that some unpaid work, that is now performed in view of a future recompense, could not be paid in advance; nor am I arguing that some shadow-work cannot be transformed into wage-labour. What I argue is something else: the creation
of new wage-labour inevitably also generates new shadow-work. New social services inevitably increase the disciplined acquiescence of clients. What is worse: shadow-workers can be used to create shadow-work of others. In fact, Sweden might be now leading the world in the attempt to employ disciplined shadow-workers (volunteers) in its social services. See: “Working Life in the Future — Programme for a future Study”, and “Care in Society — A Project Presentation”, published by the Secretariat for Futures Studies, Box 7502, S-103 92 Stockholm. This is a plan to make shadow-work in the social sector increase much faster than wage-labour. Philanthropy was used in this way since the evangelical campaigns in England in the 1810’s.

Subsistence.
Should I use the term? Until a few years ago in English it was monopolized by the “subsistence agriculture”, this meant billions living on “bare survival”, the lot from which development agencies were to save them. Or it meant the lowest level to which a bum could sink on skid-row. Or, finally, it was identified with “subsistence” which, in turn, was identified with wages. To avoid these confusions, in my article in CoEvolution, part I, pp. 29–30, I have proposed the use of the term “vernacular”. This is a technical term used by Roman lawyers for the inverse of a commodity.


I want to speak about vernacular activity and vernacular domain. Nevertheless, here, I am avoiding these expressions because I cannot expect from my readers of this essay to be acquainted with “Vernacular Values”. Use-value oriented activities, non-monetary transactions, embedded economic activities, substantive economics, these all are terms which have been tried. I stick to “subsistence” in this paper. I will oppose subsistence oriented activities to those who are at the service of a formal economy, no matter if these economic activities are paid or not. And, within the realm of economic activities, I will distinguish a formal and an informal sector, to which wage and shadow-work correspond.

SACHS, Ignacy et SCHIRAY, M. Styles de vie et de développement dans le monde occidental: expériences et expérimentations. Regional Seminar on Alternative Patterns of Development and Life Styles for the African Region, December 1978. CIRED, 54 boul. Raspail, Paris 6., attempts a similar distinction between true and phoney use-
values: "... le hors-marché recouvre deux réalités fort différentes, les prestation de services gratuits par l'Etat et la production auto­nome de valeurs d'usage... Les pseudo-valeurs d'usage n'apportent aucune satisfaction positive de besoin autre que la satisfaction de posséder plus." For background on this: SACHS, Ignacy. "La notion de surplus et son application aux economies primitives". In L'Hom­me, tome VI, n° 3, juillet-sept. 1966. pp. 5–18; and EGNER, Erich. Hauswirtschaft und Lebenshaltung. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1974. An interesting international seminar on subsistence has been held in Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, Soziologische Fakultät, Postfach 8640, D-4800 Bielefeld.

10 The semantic of work.

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11 The linguistic colonisation.


12 Servile work and Hannah Arendt.

ARENDT, Hannah. The Human Condition. New York: Anchor Book, 1959, has beautiful chapters on labour and work that are frequently referred to. They are valuable insofar as they sum up a Western, civilized consensus on a distinction between the reign of necessity and that of freedom, a distinction that was repeated frequently from Plato to Marx. But the unexamined acceptance of Arendt’s philosophical interpretation as history of work, tends to veil the discontinuity in the status of work during the transition to industrial society. I argue, that in the classical sense of Hannah Arendt, the social conditions for both labour and work have been destroyed. On servile work, see also: VERNANT, J.P. “Travail et

13 *Work and the Church*

The place of work as a keyword in catholic thinking can be gauged from the following observations: the single most encyclopedic reference on catholicism is the 25 volume *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*. When, after fourty years of publication, the last but one fascicule of the index was published, in 1971 the editors added in the midst of the subject index a 6000-word essay to “travail” which begins with the sentence: “the absence of such an article in this encyclopedia is the symptom of a lacuna in theology...” I intend to prepare a study guide to the contribution of the major churches in the XIXth century to the evolution of shadow-work — mainly under the form of social and housework — and to the parallel evolution of a “christian” ideology that ascribes dignity to wage-labour. The best guide to bibliography seems to be the series of articles on “Arbeit” in *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*. On the violence done in the name of gender by American disestablished religion during the mid-XIXth century, I was impressed by the analysis made by DOUGLAS, Ann. *The Feminization of American Culture*. New York: Avon Books, 1978.

See also HALL, Catherine. “The Early Formation of Victorian Domestic Ideology” in BURMAN, S. *Fit Work for Women*. London: Croom-Halm, 1979. pp. 15–32. As productive work moved from the home to the factory, evangelical campaigns (1780–1820), parallel to Wesley’s methodism in the U.S. led to the consolidation of a domestic sphere in which women did their duties while men went out to work. Women not working, became the only proper way for them to live. As Elie HALEVY, op. cit., first noticed, in the late XVIIIth century the religious became linked with the domestic and thus the private world of morality could be opposed to the a-moral, a-theological world of economics.

primary social group ... a man's wife and children were not ipso facto paupers, but widows and orphans, who stood in danger of loosing their berth were perhaps the earliest clearly defined category of persons with a call upon public assistance.

15 *Medieval attitudes towards poverty and towards work.*

The attitude that people had towards the weak, hungry, sick, homeless, landless, mad, imprisoned, enslaved, fugitive, orphaned, exiled, crippled, beggars, ascetics, street vendors, soldiers, foundlings and others who were relatively deprived has changed throughout history. For every epoch, specific attitudes to each of these categories are in a unique constellation. Economic history, when it studies poverty, tends to neglect these attitudes. Economic history tends to focus on measurements of average and median calory intake, group-specific mortality rates, the polarisation in the use of resources etc...

During the last decade, the historical study of attitudes towards poverty has made considerable progress. For late antiquity and the Middle Ages, MOLLAT, Michel. *Etudes sur l'histoire de la pauvreté.* Série "Études", tome 8, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, collects a selection of three dozen studies submitted to his seminar.


16 GEREMEK, B. *Le salariat dans l'artisanat parisien au XIe siècle.* Paris, Mouton, 1968, indicates clearly that legitimate wage-earners where only those who derived most of their subsistence from participation in the household of their employers. See also STAHLEDER, Helmuth. op. cit.
17 The non-economic perception of poverty.
The comparative study of attitude towards poverty in the Eastern and the Western Middle Ages sheds light on this point. PATLAGEAN, Evelyne. "La pauvreté à Byzance au temps de Justinien: les origines d’un modèle politique." in MOLLAT, M. op. cit. vol. 1, pp. 59–81, argues that in urbanized Byzantium the law recognized poverty as a primarily economic condition long before such recognition became possible in continental Europe.


22 Enclosure, is one way of describing the process by which a popular culture is deprived of its means for subsistence. See POLANYI, Karl. The Great Transformation. Boston, Beacon Paperback, 1957, especially chap. 7 "Speenhamland 1795" and chap. 8 "Antecedences and Consequences", pp. 77–102. A particularly sensitive monography on the process by which the poor were transformed, I found in GUITTON, Jean Pierre, La société et les pauvres: l’exemple de la généralité de Lyon, 1534–1789. Bibliothèque de la Faculté des Lettres, Lyon, n° 26, 1971, "... la société au XVIII° siècle, pour reconnaître sa responsabilité dans le paupérisme, condamne à l'ex-
tinction les mendiants et les vagabonds comme "ordre" social.
... la société marginalise le fond médiéval qui faisait de la pauvreté
un signe d'élite, et de l'aumône, ... le signe de la solidarité organisée."

HALEVY, Elie, op. cit. described the attitude towards the poor as
this is reflected in those who write about them in England. In England,
ever since the time when the advent of protestantism had
brought about the disappearance of the monasteries, the law had
recognized the right of the indigent, the infir, the beggars, but
also the labourers whose wages did not keep them from want to
assistance offered by the nation. The right to sustenance was written
into the law in 1562, 1572 and 1601. In every parish, Justices of the
peace were empowered to levy a poor rate on the inhabitants. Only
in the early XVIII\textsuperscript{0} century, the taxpayers began to protest effectively
against this imposition, and by 1722, the workhouse received the
seal of the law. The newer formula of the right to work superseded
the traditional guaranteed right to existence.

23What Bertrand RUSSELL said in \textit{Praise of Idleness}. London:
G. Allen, 1960, about landowners (p. 17) can just as well be said
about the learned. "... the gospel of work which has led the rich ...
to preach the dignity of labor, while taking care themselves to
remain undignified in this respect."

24FERBER, Christian von. \textit{Arbeitsfreude: Wirklichkeit und die
Ideologie. Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie der Arbeit in der industriellen
Gesellschaft}. Stuttgart: Enke\textdagger, 1959.

25The metaphors Marx uses all the time are far from being simple
metaphors: the Substance Labor is crystallized in products; it is de-
posited, congealed in them; it exists as an amorphous gelatine, it is
decanted from one product into another. Engels exposes explicitly
the dialectic of chemistry but, page after page, the alchemy comes
through that "reduces" the social historical into physiology, and
vice versa. For Marx, the epiphany of value lies in the materialisation
of the faculties that are originally sleeping in man, and awaken
only through his transformation into an industrial producer.
CASTORIADIS, Cornelius. "From Marx to Aristotle, from Aristotle
to us." in \textit{Social Research}, vol. 45, n\textsuperscript{0} 4, 1978. pp. 667--738. (trans-
lated from the French by Andrew Arato). p. 672 ff.

26HEILBRONER, R.L. \textit{Business Civilisation in Decline}. New York:
Norton.

27HUFTON, O. \textit{The Poor in XVIII\textsuperscript{0}} Century France. Oxford:


*Moral Economy.*


*Four issues on the division of labour that must not be confused.* These four issues are intimately related, but cannot be clarified unless they are separately discussed.

1. It becomes increasingly obvious that here is no proven correlation between education for a specialized function and the technical competence for the performance of this function. Further, the basic assumptions on which a socialist critique of a capitalist division of labour were built, have ceased to hold. See the introduction to GORZ, André. *Critique de la division du travail*. Paris: Seuil, 1973.
In German: “Kritik der Arbeitsteilung” in Technologie und Politik, no 8, pp. 137–147; and GORZ, André. Adieux aux prolétariat: au delà du socialisme. Paris: Galilée, 1980. Les forces productives développées par le capitalisme en portent à tel point l’empreinte, qu’elles ne peuvent être gérées ni mises en œuvre selon une rationalité socialiste ... Le capitalisme a fait naître une classe ouvrière dont les intérêts, les capacités, les qualifications, sont fonction de forces productives, elles-mêmes fonctionnelles par rapport à la seule rationalité capitaliste. Le dépassement du capitalisme ... ne peut dès lors provenir que de couches qui représentent ou préfigurent la dissolution de toutes les classes, y compris de la classe ouvrière elle-même ... La division capitaliste du travail a détruit le double fondement du “socialisme scientifique” — le travail ouvrier ne comporte plus de pouvoir et il n’est plus une activité propre de travailleur. L’ouvrier traditionnel n’est plus qu’une minorité privilégiée. La majorité de la population appartient à ce néo-prolétariat post-industriel des sans-statut et des sans-classe ... surqualifiés. ... Ils ne peuvent se reconnaître dans l’appellation de “travailleur”, ni dans celle, symétrique, de “chômeur” ... la société produit pour faire de travail ... le travail devient astreinte inutile pour laquelle la société cherche à masquer aux individus leur chômage ... le travailleur assiste à son devenir comme à un processus étranger et à un spectacle.

2. A new trend in the history of technology is represented by KUBY, Thomas. “Über den Gesellschaftlichen Ursprung der Maschine.” in Technologie und Politik, no 16, 1980, pp. 71–103, (English version in forthcoming The Convivial Archipelago, edited by Valentina BORREMANS (1981). Summary of a forthcoming important study on Sir Richard Arkwright, the barber and wigmaker who in 1767 constructed the first spinning machine that could make cotton yarn suitable for warps. His invention is usually seen as a linear progress beyond Hargrave’s spinning Jenny — at that time already power-driven — that could make yarn only for weft. Division of labour was not a necessary implication of technical improvement needed to increase production. Rather, increased productivity could not be exacted from workers without organizing technical processes in such manner that they also reduced workers to disciplined cogs attached to a machine. For a splendid introduction to the history of thought on the relationship between freedom and techniques see ULRICH, Otto. Technik und Herrschaft. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977. Also MARGLIN, Stephen, “What do bosses do?” in Review of Radical Political Economics, VI, Summer 1974, pp. 60–112; VII, Spring 1975. pp. 20–37, argues that the XIXth century factory system developed not due to a technological superiority over handi-
craft production, but due to its more effective control of the labour force that it gave to the employer.

3. A third aspect under which the division of labour is currently discussed is the culture-specific assignment of tasks between the sexes. See next note 32.

4. The economic division of labour into a productive and a non-productive kind, is a fourth issue which must not be confused with any of the first three. BAULANT, M. "La famille en miettes." in Annales, n° 4, 1972. p. 960 ff. For the process see MEDICK, Hans. op. cit. previous note. It is the economic redefinition of sexes in the XIX° century. I will show that this "sexual" character has been veiled in the XIX° century.

32 Division of labour by sex.


33 The modern couple and the nuclear family.

The nuclear family is not new. What is without precedent, is a society which elevates the subsistenceless family into the norm and thereby discriminates against all types of bonds between two people that do not take their model from this new family.

The new entity came into being as the wage-earners family in the XIX° century. Its purpose was that of coupling one principal wage-earner and his shadow. The household became the place where the
consumption of wages takes place. HAUSEN, Karin. "Die Polarisierung des Geschlechtscharakters: eine Spiegelung der Dissoziation von Erwerb und Familienleben." in Sozialgeschichte der Familie in der Neuzeit Europas, Neue Forschung. Hrsg. von W. CONZE, Stuttgart, 1976. pp. 367–393. This remains true even today when in many cases all members of a household are both wage-earners and active homebodies. It remains true even for the “single’s” home equipped with “one-person-household-ice-box”.

This new economic function of the family is often veiled by discussion about “nuclear family”. Nuclear family, conjugally organized households, can exist and have existed throughout history as the norm in societies in which the coupling of subsistence-less people would not have been conceivable. VEYNE, Paul. “La famille et l’amour sous le Haut-Empire romain.” in Annales, 33o année, n° 1, janv.-févr. 1978, pp. 35–63, claims that between Augustus and the Antonines in Rome, independently from any christian influence, the ideal of a nuclear, conjugal family had come into being. It was in the interest of the owners to make this kind of family obligatory for their slaves. In its aristocratic form, it was taken over by christians. DUBY, Georges. La société au XIe et XIIe siècles dans la région maconnaise. Paris 1953, and HERLIHY, David. “Family Solidarity in Medieval Italian History.” in Economy, Society and Government in Medieval Italy. Kent State Univ. Press, 1969. pp. 173–179, see the early European family typically reduced to a conjugal cell into well into the XIIe century. Then, a process of consolidation begins that is concerned mainly with land-holdings. Canon law has little influence on it. See also PELLEGRINI, Giovan Battista. “Terminologia matrimoniale” in Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano per l’Alto Medioevo di Spoleto, 1977. pp. 43–102, which introduces into the complex terminology, or set of terminologies, which are necessary to understand medieval marriage. See also METRAL, M.O. Le mariage: les hésitations de l’Occident. Préface de Philippe Ariès. Paris: Aubier, 1977. For the XVIIe and XVIIIe centuries I found useful ARIES, Philippe. L’enfant et la vie familiale sous l’ancien régime. Plon, 1960, and LEBRUN, François. La vie conjugale sous l’ancien régime. Paris: Colin, 1975. LASLETT, Peter. Un monde que nous avons perdu: les structures sociales pré-industrielles. Flammarion, 1969. Engl.: The World we have lost, find conjugal families typical for England much before the industrial revolution. BERKNER and SHORTER, Edward, “La vie intime”: Beiträge zur Geschichte am Beispiel des kulturellen Wandels in der Bayrischen Unterschichte im 19 Jh.” in Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Sonderheft 16, 1972,
find nuclear families typical for South-Germanic peasants at a certain stage in the life-cycle when the old have died off. It seems probable that the extended family is primarily “the nostalgia of modern sociologists”.

What makes the modern family unique, is the “social” sphere in which it exists. The O.E.D. gives among nine meaning the third as: “group of persons consisting of the parents and their children, whether actually living together or not”, as a meaning that appears in the XIX century. Family-qua­rrels, 1801; family-life, 1845; unfit for family-reading, 1853; family tickets for admission for half the price, 1859; family-magazine, 1874.


34 The family as an institution of “police”.

In the subsistent family, the members were tied together by the need of creating their livelihood. In the modern couple-centered family, the members are kept together for the sake of an economy to which they, themselves, are marginal. DONZELOT, Jacques. La police des familles. Paris: Ed. de Minuit, 1977. Engl.: The Policing of Families, transl. by Robert Hurley. New York: Pantheon, 1979, follows and elaborates FOUCAU, Michel. La volonté de savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1976, by describing this as “policing” by which the so-called social domain is created ... the domain to which we refer when we speak of “social” work, “social scourge, “social” programmes, “social” advancement. According to J. Donzelot, the history of this domain, and the process by which it comes into being, namely “policing” can neither be identified with traditional political history, nor with the history of popular culture. It represents a bio-political dimension that uses political techniques to invest the body, health, modes of living and housing, through activities which all were, originally, called policing. Doncelot’s attempt to describe the formation of the “social sphere” will be better understood after reading DUMONT, Louis. “The Modern Conception of the Individual: Notes on its Genesis and that of Concomitant Institutions.” in Contributions to Indian Sociology. VIII, October 1965.; also Micro­fiches, Presses de la Fondation des Sciences Politiques. The French translation: “La conception moderne de l’individu: notes sur sa genèse en relation avec les conceptions de la politique et de l’Etat à partir du XIIIe siècle.” in: Esprit, février, 1978. L. Dumont describes the simultaneous appearance of the political and the economic sphere. See also Paul Dumouchel’s, op. cit. comments on Louis Dumont.
The diagnosis of "woman".


DUDEN, Barbara. "Das schöne Eigentum." in _Kursbuch_, 49, 1977, a commentary on Kant's writings on women.
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37 From Mistress to Housewife.
nischer Fortschritt und Frauenarbeit in 19 Jh.: zur Sozialgeschichte der Naehmaschiniene.” in Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Jg. 4, Heft 4. 1978. pp. 148–169, describes how the sowing machine that could have made the household more independent from the market, was, in fact, used to increase exploitative wage-labour defined as female work. DAVIES, M. “Woman’s place is at the Typewriter: The Feminisation of the Clerical Labor Force.” in Radical America, vol. 8, nO 4, July-Aug. 1974. pp. 1–28, makes a similar analysis of the use of the typewriter around which an unprecedented army of secretaries was organized. On the reorganization of prostitution around the services of medicine and police, see: CORBIN, Alain. Les filles de noce: misère sexuelle et prostitution aux XIXO et XXO siècles. Paris: Aubier Coll. Historique, 1978. On the prehistory of the ideal of the housewife see HOOD, Sarah Jane R. The Impact of Protestantism on the Renaissance Ideal of Women in Tudor England. Thesis PhD Lincoln, 1977. From abstract: “The feminine ideal of wife and mother appears for the first time among Northern humanists in the Renaissance. Studia Humanitatis were the key to the successful fulfillment of the domestic role as learned wife to a companion husband, and intelligent guide to education of children. This upper class ideal replaced medieval ideal of virgin or courtly Lady. The protestant ideal of calling made the domestic ideal the vocation of all women in Tudor England. All women were now called to the married state, and could make no finer contribution than to bear children. The home-maker replaced the Renaissance companion. The lowliest household asks a worthy contribution to godly society. But when all were called to matrimony and motherhood, then women were called to nothing else. To choose other, was to deny their holy vocation. Thus the domestic ideal became dogmatized.” One of the principle means by which society imposed recently defined work on women through its agents, the caring professions, is the ideal of “motherly care”. How mothering became an unpaid, professionally supervised kind of shadow-work can be followed through: LOUX, Françoise. Le jeune enfant et son corps dans la médecine traditionnelle. Paris: Flammarion, 1978; BARDET, J.P. “Enfants abandonnés et enfants assistés à Rouen dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIo siècle.” in Hommage à Rael Reinhard, Paris 1973. pp. 19–48. Flandrin comments: “La seule étude permettant actuellement de mesurer les dangers de l’allaitement mercenaire pour les enfants de famille.”; CELIS, J., LAGET, M., et MOREL, M.F. Entrer dans la vie: naissances et enfants dans la France traditionnelle. Paris, 1978; OTTMUELLER, Uta. “Mutterpflichten” Die Wandlungen ihrer inhaltlichen Ausformung durch die akademische

POULOT, Denis. Le sublime ou le travailleur comme il est en 1870, et ce qu’il peut être. Introduction d’Alain Cottereau. Paris, François Maspero, 1980. A small factory owner of Paris, himself a former worker, in 1869 tries to develop a typology of “workers” and how each type behaves towards his boss and his wife.


SKOLKA, Jiti V. “The Substitution of Self-Service activities for marketed Services.” in Review of Income and Wealth, Ser. 22, 4, 1976, p. 297 ff, argues as follows: self-service activities are defined as activities carried out outside the market, having as inputs consumer time, industrial products (mainly durables) and often energy. Increasingly these self-service activities are substituted for marketed services. Thus an increasing part of activities in industrialized countries are productive, yet cannot be recorded by conventional economic measures, since they neither appear on the market nor have market value. Unless the value of self-service, substituted for marketed values, is included in the measurement of the nation’s welfare, this measurement becomes meaningless. Yet, any recording of self-service activities implies large-scale imputations, a procedure disliked by statisticians.