RATIONAL CHOICES IN MASS POLITICS *

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Modelling Political Man as a rational actor is doubly problematical. First is the question of what the claim means. There is here nothing to suggest Rationalism in the ordinary philosophical sense. There is only a claim that men are rational in the sense of fitting means to ends. Second is the question of whether or not the claim is true: do men generally (and Political Men in particular) display this form of rationality? That, obviously, is an empirical question and a difficult one at that. True or false, however, the presupposition of rationality forms the cornerstone of much political and social philosophy, democratic theory in particular. Why respect the choices of citizens if they are incapable of rational choices? Hence it seems that, in absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the proposition that Political Man is a rational actor is one whose implications are well worth exploring.

The implications of the model for mass politics are, I hope to show, truly alarming. They are so much so that one might be tempted, on that basis alone, to abandon the rational choice model of politics. Then again, mass political behaviour is itself often quite alarming and in just the ways the model leads one to expect. While the implications of the model are not very nice, neither is the reality it is meant to mirror. And to the extent it offers a good account of those aspects of the problem we can observe, perhaps we ought take seriously its analysis of those aspects which it tells us are of necessity hidden from our view.

I. Fundamentals of Rational Choice in Politics

The substantive discussion must, alas, be prefaced by a few methodological notes. An individual can make rational choices only
with reference to his utility function; and it is nonsensical to discuss what it would be rational for him to choose without first discussing what he values. Always something of an embarrassment, this is a stage of the proceedings over which wise men glide with as much agility as they can muster. As I propose to depart sharply from the orthodoxy at this juncture, however, I am obliged to linger.

Traditionally, some variant of Wicksteed’s non-tuism is postulated. That is to say, it is assumed that a man does not take into account the interests of those with whom he deals in constructing his own utility function. Often that is enough to derive interesting results. When something more is required, as occasionally it is, recourse is ordinarily to egoism.¹

With postulates such as these we do ourselves a good bit of mischief. It is on the basis of such assumptions that rational choice theorists have come to be known as the ‘one dimensional men’ of modern social science. Barrington Moore comments derisively (but not unfairly) that ‘material and other rewards’ constitute ‘the “payoff” in the language of gangsters and game theory.’² Such a narrow focus, however, is not inherent in the model. Rather, it has been gratuitously imposed upon it.

Ultimately more important than the esteem of our professional pears, however, is the explanatory power of the model itself. That, too, has been compromised by outlandishly egoistic motivational postulates. It is obvious to the most casual of empiricists that men do feel powerful loyalties to their families, churches and ethnic groups. And to social scientists hoping to forge some national allegiance out of all these primordial sentiments, they are painfully obvious.³

There is a certain amount of play in the non-tuism postulate. Since it will only be used to predict political behaviour, it is enough that non-tuism should be exhibited in political interactions. Not to worry if a man is a loving father, so long as that does not get in the way of his being a conniving politician.⁴ Here proponents of non-tuism have simply chosen the example most favourable to their case. While fellow-feeling within the natural family probably does not spill over into politics, fellow-feeling within the ‘spiritual family’ almost certainly does.

A second way in which the egoism postulate misrepresents political reality is by making it irrational for men ever to act on the basis of their ethical principles. The seriousness of the misrepresentation depends on the frequency of ethically-motivated political behaviour, which in turn depends on one’s definition of ‘ethical’. So instead of offering a list of examples — most of which would bear alternative interpretations anyway — I shall simply hope
for intuitive concurrence that this is a serious oversight.

These errors can best be remedied by redefining the utility function. Instead of maximising wealth, status and power as in the traditional model, the present account has rational men trying to live up to their self-images. Although it would be obviously foolhardy to predict self-images from the armchair, certain general patterns are sure to emerge. A man's self-image will combine material propositions (you are what you eat), ethical propositions (a man is known by his principles) and associative propositions (a man is known by the friends he keeps). The mix and precise content will vary from group to group and, in some measure, from individual to individual. But utility functions in the real world are likely to include something of all three components.\(^5\)

The real reason for this revision is that it seems to make for a better fit with empirical evidence. Methodological purists may be offended by the cynical attempt to boost the predictive power of rational choice models by subsuming three quarters of sociology. They should notice, however, that there are both precedents and rational choice justifications for such a revision.

As for the antecedents in economic theory, the most direct link is through Lancaster's 'New Approach to Consumer Theory'.\(^6\) The keystone of his analysis is the notion of an underlying preference ordering which in turn dictates the more superficial preferences revealed in everyday activities. The preferences Lancaster probes are, of course, not very far below the surface. Whereas he is concerned to explain why margarine is a better substitute for butter than a new car, we are here concerned to explain why membership in the Athenaeum is a close substitute for a Rolls Royce. With preferences for self-images the bedrock really has been reached; there is surely nothing more fundamental than these.

The rational choice justification for talking about self-images would run something like this: Man is not and should not rationally be forever at the mercy of transient desires. Human life is not episodical but rather temporally-extended. In a narrow sense, the fact imposes certain prudential obligations on a rational man to plan for the future. In a wider sense, it obliges him to try to build the pieces into an integrated whole, to try to make something of his life. What he will be able to do toward that end is determined, of course, by ever-shifting circumstances. Nevertheless, he must have some overall plan, however hazy, to guide him, and this is where self-image enters into rational choice logic.\(^7\)
II. Characteristics of Mass Politics and Their Causes

All this elaborate apparatus is not built for its own sake but rather as a way of getting some leverage on the problems of mass politics. This is a topic today somewhat out of vogue. Its popularity dropped off sharply from the days of Lippman and Ortega y Gasset to Kornhauser, and now it is largely left to students of public opinion to bemoan the flaws of ‘mass publics’. Everywhere the problems of ‘mass’ politics are described in roughly the same terms. The core of the matter seems to be that mass opinion tends to be uninformed, suggestible, unstable, irrational and, all too often, extremist and immoral.

I have no intention of quarrelling with this description, although doubtless there are those who would. My purpose instead is to offer an alternative theory to account for such phenomena. A long tradition, handed down from Marx, Tönnies and Durkheim, suggests that explanations be couched in terms of social structure. Something in the nature of industrial society produces alienation, anomie and generally pathological responses to the socio-political environment. In contrast to this conventional wisdom, this essay maintains that the observed patterns in mass political behaviour can be better interpreted as consequences of rational choices made under certain kinds of constraint.

The best one-word summary of complaints with the masses is ‘irresponsibility.’ Masses do indeed behave irresponsibly — as rationally they should. To behave responsibly implies, among other things, paying careful attention to the consequences of one’s actions. Hart and Honoré analyse the paradigm case of causal human action as ‘an interference in the natural course of events which makes a difference in the way these develop.’ Where the causitive agent consists in very many people acting simultaneously, however, no single man could, acting alone, alter the outcome. Hence it is entirely rational for those involved in mass politics to be oblivious to the effects of their political actions. Masses behave irresponsibly because no one is individually responsible; and those things for which everyone is jointly responsible are, for practical and legal if not moral purpose, the responsibility of no one.

This is how Downs explains, in uncompromisingly rational choice terms, the whimsical and uninformed nature of mass opinion. Since no one man can alter the outcome, no one need bother with the vast amounts of information required for a carefully reasoned decision. Everyone might as well be flippant and extremist because, in a mass public, what will be will be regardless of any one voter’s
ballot.

Downs's analysis does not, however, go far enough. Were he being scrupulously honest, the logic of his model would lead Downs to predict that no one would ever take the trouble to vote. Since the probability of any one man casting the decisive ballot is less than the chance he will be killed on the way to the polls, the politically rational thing to do must be to conserve on shoe leather. But once Downs has imported the *deus ex machina* of civic duty to get citizens into the poll booth, they might as well behave themselves. They have no reason not to be extremists, to be sure; but neither do they have any reason to be. They have not reason to expend resources on acquiring information themselves, but neither do they have a reason not to be guided by 'informed' opinion.

The realities of mass politics seem far more sinister than Downs would lead us to expect. Here is where fiddling with the utility function really begins to pay off. The familiar old voting paradox holds only if a man's reward from voting depends exclusively on the outcome of some political contest. Anyone whose utility function includes associative or nonconsequentialistic ethical components still does have a reason for going to the polls. Such a man might rationally vote for the Communist Party to symbolise his affinity with the proletariat or against Vorster and a matter of moral principle without for a moment supposing that he has any chance of altering the outcome. Or caring. His payoff comes from the act, not the political result. As the astute *Walden II* character Dr. Frazier observes, 'Do you think a man goes to the polls because of any effect which casting his vote has ever had? By no means He goes to avoid being talked about by his neighbors or to "knife" a candidate he dislikes, marking his X as he might defile a campaign poster...'.

An analysis such as this can, it seems, account for an impressive range of observations about mass politics. All that Downs explains is incorporated: voters are ill-informed because there is no point in buying expensive information they cannot use effectively; extremism comes to the fore because citizens are voting on the basis of associative and idealistic ethical principles, the consequences be damned. In addition, the present model goes beyond Downs in several important respects. All the surveys show that party allegiance is amasingly invariant despite radical alterations in circumstances and, occasionally, radical alterations in the parties themselves. The fact is puzzling for those who suppose that voters respond in whatever minimal way to the great issues of the day; it comes as no surprise if voting is seen to be a symbolic act indicative of group affinities. A similar line of argument explains the tendency for
children to vote as their parents and for members of special interest
groups (economic, racial or religious) to vote the same way. Similarities in objective material circumstances might account for
some of the variation. The logic of self-images will surely explain
more. Children follow in the political footsteps of their parents
largely because they borrow large chunks of their self-images from
their parents. In a less impressionistic vein, Campbell, Converse,
Miller and Stokes report, in their classic study of *The American
Voter*, that there is dramatically distinctive voting behaviour among
trade unionists, Catholics, negroes and Jews. They find that this
relationship between group identification and voting behaviour
diminishes only very slightly when they control for 'life situation'
(i.e., socio-economic variables) and, furthermore, that it is
gratifyingly sensitive to the strength of one's *identification* with the
group.\(^1^4\)

This is hardly a peculiarly American phenomenon. It is even more
obvious and pronounced where political parties are explicitly
organised along religious, linguistic or other ethnic cleavages. Data
from a 1957 Norwegian survey convinces Stein Rokkan that, 'to
large masses of citizens ..., elections clearly were not occasions for
choosing between alternative governments but simply opportunities
for registering loyalties to particular parties...’ Even more
dramatically, the Butler-Stokes data on *Political Change in Britain*
shows a strong link between voting intention and *subjective* class
self-image — the relationship is statistically significant at a confidence
level of 0.025 — but no statistically significant relationship between
*objective* class and voting intention.\(^1^5\)

More orthodox structuralist analyses of mass societies can also be
fitted into this larger theory. The familiar explanation of the
phenomenon is that old ties — familial, communal or what have you
— which hold together traditional societies have been severed. Mass
society is a society of the uprooted, desperate for some
community-surrogate to which loyalty can be shifted. Such an
explanation is entirely compatible with the rational choice model I
have been urging. Utility functions, on my analysis, include
associative components, and it is only to be expected that when old
ways of satisfying these needs disappear some new ways will be
sought.

**III. Cures in Theory and in Practice**

To recapitulate, mass politics have the characteristics they do
because of the kinds of demands citizens make, and they make the
demands they do because of the sheer size of the polity. Only those preferences which do not depend for their satisfaction on electoral outcomes would rationally be reflected in democratic decisions. The political theory of possessive individualism should be disdained as a descriptively misleading model as well as a morally repugnant one. Mass political behaviour will often reflect associative desires, occasionally reflect ethical principles, but never reflect possessive material desires.

This model suggests that the sheer size of the electorate imposes constraints on individual choice such that politically a man can only half express himself. There might be some material issues (say, steering the economy) which each and every voter suppose to be by far the top political priority; and everyone might suppose that some one party is by far the best suited to the task. But, sadly, doing something about this urgent need implies affecting the electoral outcome in a way most people cannot manage. The really burning issues of the day may never be considered in the voting booth, which, assuming the government is democratically elected, inevitably means that those issues receive inadequate attention at the elite level as well.

The unsavory features of mass politics arise from the conjunction of size and democracy. In principle, reformist schemes could count on either to give. In practice, there seems little to be done with the size factor. Breaking up political units will inevitably give citizens more power over the decisions taken within their own community. But when political units have become too small, likely as not all the really important decisions are being taken elsewhere. Then reducing the size of the polity merely gives voters more and more power over less and less.16

The crucial questions here are, of course, empirical in nature. At what point and with what force does the tendency for smallness to beget powerlessness begin to set in? What do voters take to be the ‘really important decisions’? It is not inconceivable that these questions might be answered in ways compatible with substantial decentralisation. The best example is perhaps industrial democracy. Those most intimately concerned regard as the ‘important questions’ those arising in the workplace, and those problems can by and large be settled in the workplace alone. Devolving managerial responsibilities to the work-gang level surely entails some loss of technical efficiencies (economies of scale, etc.), but considering the increased zeal of the participating workers the outcome is likely to be a net increase in productivity. In the industrial context, then, units of decision can be substantially reduced in size without
sacrificing much of consequence to anyone concerned.\textsuperscript{17}

Industrial democracy, however, looks very much like a special and highly unrepresentative case on which to construct a general theory of politics. It can serve as an adequate model only insofar as people are concerned only with narrow and isolated problems of the sort that might arise in connexion with, e.g., 'neighbourhood politics'.\textsuperscript{18} There is every indication that people are in fact (and every reason they should rationally be) concerned with larger and more interrelated issues. To the extent they are, simply reducing the size of the unit of decision in order to solve the problems associated with mass politics is sure to backfire in just the ways discussed.

This seems especially true considering how extremely small a decision unit must be for any one man rationally to begin taking notice of the electoral consequences of his political behaviour. The relationship between responsible voting behaviour and the probability of one's vote altering the outcome is far from a linear one: below some threshold, improvements in the odds (say, from one in a million to one in ten thousand) will simply have no effect on electoral behaviour. Thus, the evidence that some services (police, especially) are provided more efficiently in small towns than large cities if of only marginal import in this connexion.\textsuperscript{19} The optimal jurisdiction is still entirely too large to escape the consequences of mass politics.

Disagreeable as it may seem, it is democracy that must give. Supposing the rationale for democracy to be that such institutions guarantee governmental policy will reflect the desires of the citizenry, democracy in the context of mass politics defeats its own purpose. The reason is that size skews electoral choice. Politically, citizens speak only half their minds. Consequently, governments designed to be perfectly responsive to demands articulated through the ballot box in fact respond very imperfectly indeed to the true preferences of the people.

When saying that democracy will have to give, I do not have in mind any half-way house such as 'democratic elitism'. Letting the electorate set the goals and instructing politicians to work toward them invites the sort of abuse in which British civil servants have become expert. Impracticality aside, the same forces causing electors to half-state their true preferences are still at work. A full-blooded elitism can circumvent the effects of mass politics; a democratically-constrained elitism cannot.

The logic of the model suggests certain ways of mitigating the effects of mass politics by mitigating the effects of mass society. Basically, the strategy is to provide a variety of extrapublical outlets
for ethical and associative drives. In this way, such desires will hopefully become satiated and their impact on politics will thus be mitigated. Practical measures for doing this include all the pat sociological panaceas for restoring the lost sense of community, ranging from encouraging evangelical religious to taking Oscar Newman’s advice about *Defensible Space* in the design of housing projects.²⁰ Schemes like these, however, offer only a very partial remedy to the present problem. They can drive nonconsequentialistic motivations out of the political arena, but, given a wide franchise, there is no way to drag consequentialistic considerations back in.

Many societies — even very large ones — politics exhibit few if any of the characteristics here associated with mass politics. The reason does seem to be that, as predicted, democracy has been short-circuited, although often rather obliquely.

In most societies a thinly-veiled form of elitism is operative. The argument on this point presupposes that associative concerns really do motivate men. Where the group is reasonably tightly structured, an individual cannot get his associative charge without being accepted by the group, which is typically conditional on his agreeing to be bound by the pronouncements of its authoritative spokesmen. Members must toe the line or else they cease to be members in good standing and are deprived of the thrills of belonging. The facade of democracy can be (and ordinarily is) preserved, but the underlying demand management makes a mockery of true democratic principles.²¹

Something like this seems to be what is entailed in pure cases of consociational democracy. Many of the cases claimed for it, of course, were never seriously divided societies in the first place. But where the hatred is really there, the only way intercommunal fixers can function is to circumvent democracy, to refuse to give their ostensible constituents the taste of blood they demand. Looking at the core cases of consociational democracies, Holland and Belgium, it seems that elites get by with such behaviour only by the grace of God — quite literally. Church spokesmen are perhaps the paradigm cases of the sort of authority figures who can save massive societies from the madness of mass politics. Their authority is, for the faithful, above questioning in a way that that of secular leaders never can be.²²

Lest that be taken as praise for authority figures, one hastens to add that this kind of power concentration lends itself to especially pernicious forms of abuse. At best, authorities will use their positions to feather their own nests. At worst, they will avail themselves of the opportunity to stir the masses into a frenzy, launching another
Inquisition or whatever. The same power that can be used to prevent a mass movement can also be used to initiate one. Which it will be depends precariously on the tastes and mental stability of the elite. So the power of authoritative spokesmen for groups is very much a mixed blessing.

Other mechanisms also work at the pre-choice stage to supplement elite management. Essentially what is involved is brainwashing. To a limited extent this is accomplished by building up an absurd sense of political efficacy. Almond and Verba, for instance, report that 75% of Americans think they could do something to prevent an unjust law from passing through Congress. It is an outrageous fantasy, but a socially useful one nonetheless. Illusions of efficacy can substitute for elite management, and insofar as they exist electoral results will fully and accurately reflect the true policy preferences of the voters suffering under them.

Some would warmly embrace the new ‘noble lie’ embodied in exaggerations of efficacy on the grounds that it provides a democratic alternative to elitism. I hesitate on the grounds that it may not be an alternative at all but only a more invidious form of elite management. Once institutions for socially-useful brainwashing have been created, it is a short step to turning them to less noble uses. Democratic institutions are presumably desired as guarantees that governmental policy will reflect the demands of the people. If elites can mold popular demands (by factual misrepresentations or whatever), there is really very little point in the charade.

The irresponsibility seemingly inherent in mass politics can be avoided either through elite management or by encouraging citizens to overestimate the efficacy of their own vote. Generalisations as to how to choice is likely to go might postulate two crucial variables. One is the extent of ‘rugged individualism’ afoot in the country. Societies where men happily defer to the guidance of spokesmen for their group — racial, religious or what have you — will naturally tend towards the elite management solution. If, however, men insist on determining for themselves ‘the knee-angle of a deference to competing authorities’, elite management is simply not on and the exaggerated efficacy solution is required instead. The second variable is the degree of fragmentation within the community. Even if everyone is submissive to authority figures and perfectly contented to allow them to do deals on their behalf, the system breaks down when there are too many representatives trying to get in on the act. Where there is a mere handful of groups to be accommodated (as in the Netherlands), elites can manage; where there are thousands of groups to be accommodated, they cannot and the exaggerated
efficacy ruse is required once again.25

IV. The Ethical Alternative

Finally, it must be noticed how certain kinds of moral principles might, if sufficiently widespread, preclude development of mass political phenomena regardless of the size of the decision unit. People might, as a matter of high principle, display responsible behaviour even when rational choice logic does not demand it.

An example at the most mundane level would be the ideal of 'good citizenship'. Among other things, this requires a citizen to discharge his civic duty conscientiously. No matter whether his vote has no real electoral impact, the ideal of good citizenship still requires a man to behave as if it did.

From the point of view of society at large, it is terribly convenient for individuals to take this attitude toward their civic duties. It is, in jargon now out of fashion, functional. But there is nothing much in it for the individuals involved, since each one's contribution toward the sustenance of the system as a whole is, as a proportion of the necessary total of such actions, frightfully small. The individual may, of course, take great pride in thinking of himself as a good citizen whether or not he gets anything else out of it; and for that reason alone he might choose to vote responsibly. The important point, however, is that there is no reason he should: it is, as economists would say, simply a matter of (in this case, ethical) taste.

At the plane of high theory, perhaps the most familiar example of a fortuitous ethical principle is Kant's categorical imperative. Underlying the present rational choice model of mass political behaviour is a sort of tailoring of prescriptions to circumstances which is antithetical to the analysis of morality in terms of universalisable prescriptions. The good Kantian, unwilling to universalise the rule that 'people need not take into account the consequences of their action', would be disinclined to behave irresponsibly at the polls.

There is, of course, no instrumentally rational reason to be swayed by the 'what if others did likewise' argument. Others will, in fact, almost never mimic one's own actions, especially when they are performed in the privacy of the poll booth. Insofar as this is one's motive in adopting Kantian rules of behaviour, then, the choice is simply irrational, in the sense of being ill-suited to the ends it was designed to serve.26

At a level above instrumental rationality, the logic of self-images might sometimes require some such principle for imposing
consistency on one's choices. It would seem difficult indeed to have any coherent image of oneself if one is guided sometimes by considerations derived from one set of principles and other times by another set entirely. This seems especially difficult when both sets of principles are, in their own terms, clearly applicable as is typically the case with 'role rationality'. Stanley Benn's example of the Labourite Education Minister, committed in his public role to comprehensive schools but in his role as father to sending his children to public school, is classically schizoid: what kind of integrated self-image could the man possibly possess and justify in terms of that pair of flatly contradictory actions?

However, in many cases — and in the case at hand in particular — one of the competing sets of ethical principles is, on its own terms, inapplicable. Individual voters need not take into account consequentialistic concerns because their vote is, in isolation, of virtually no consequence. The logical dynamics of self-image, then, do nothing to compel people to consider (as a matter of principle) the consequences of their votes.

Thus, there is nothing in the narrow logic of instrumental rationality or the logic of self-image to compel people to be good Kantians in general or compulsively truthful voters in particular. The crucial point is, however, the converse: neither is there anything there to preclude it. Just as a consumer's choice of ultimate goods in his own (i.e., means-ends rationality affords no rationale for choosing one end over another), so too is the consumer free to choose any ethical principle he fancies as an ultimate goal. The choice of ethical principles is in this sense an extra-rational one, with Kantian precepts being as eligible as any others. Perhaps this is the most — perhaps the only — hopeful way around the problems of mass politics herein exposed. Alas, it seems that we can do no better than to make the solution turn uncomfortably on the vagaries of ethical taste.

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NOTES

*Earlier versions have been read at Nuffield College, Oxford in Trinity Term 1975 and at the 1976 Annual Meetings of the Public Choice Society in Roanoke, Virginia. Particularly helpful commentators included Brian Barry, Stanley Benn, Steve Beachon, Marty Heisler, Robin Marris, Mancur Olson, Kev Roberts and Ric Uslaner. This is part of a larger study, tentatively entitled The Politics of Playing on Sentiment, generously tentatively supported by a Faculty Research Grant from the University of Maryland.
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13 B. F. Skinner, *Walden II* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 265. The key elements of this argument are familiar enough. Political philosophers will recognise traces of arguments (owing to, e.g., Kant, Rousseau, J. S. Mill, T. H. Green and A. D. Lindsay) that political participation is an expressive as well as an instrumental act. Moralists will recognise the existentialist insistence that it is one’s moral and existential duty to exercise free will, making choices even though they may have little if any impact on the course of events. Incorporating all these elements into rational choice models was first attempted in Robert E. Goodin and K. W. S. Roberts, ‘The Ethical Voter’, *American Political Science Review*, 69 (1975), 926-8.

14 Tables 12-1, 12-2, 12-3.


25 The first variable is discussed at some length by Merriam in *The Making of Citizens* and by Goodin and Beckon in ‘The Powers that Be and the Powers that Do’. The logic of the second variable is such that it must refer to the number of ‘pillars’ rather than the number of particular organisational claimants: to count the Catholic political party and the Catholic trade union organisation as two separate groups to be accommodated is obvious double-counting.